9. Conclusions
© John Andrew Black, CC BY-NC 4.0 https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0281.09
A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation
Burke, 1987: 106
Context to the Analysis of Transport Change
The book has considered the modes of transport in Japan as dynamic governance systems that have responded to ever-changing political, economic, social and security imperatives, and described how these issues have been resolved. These transitions have been interpreted as six major time periods as proposed by Ishii (1980: viii): archaic; ancient; medieval; early modern; modern; and contemporary. The introductory chapter has justified this choice, explained the distinction between institutions and organisations and has defined a study area where the historical evolution of transport institutions and organisations has been described in detail.
History helps us to understand the past and informs us as to what might be relevant for the future. In Japan, a vision of the future—Society 5.0—has been mapped out (Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, n.d.) and is premised on the broad transitions that have historically occurred in Japanese society, where Society 4.0 corresponds to contemporary Japan in the second decade of the 21st century. The issues, and the institutional challenges of Japan Society 5.0, comprise the final parts to this chapter.
To set the socio-political context for this transport history, Chapter 2 commences with a description of migration from continental Asia to the Japanese archipelago, the importation of paddy rice cultivation, embryonic state formation, state expansion across the islands of Honshū, Kyūshū and Shikōkū with governance by a succession of powerful clan chiefs, Emperors and Court nobles, and warlords at the regional level. The institution of Emperor has lasted from ancient times but was reduced to ceremonial status under three military governments. The unification of Japan was eventually achieved in 1603 under the Tokugawa Shōgunate that was followed by two-and-a-half centuries of peace. This military government was replaced by the institution of Emperor in 1868, heralding in modern systems of national, prefecture and local government that prevail up to the present day.
Along with political transformations have come substantial socio-technical system transitions. Throughout the history of transport in Japan, innovations and policies that relate to the movement of people and freight—from archaic times to the present—both civic and civil society (mainly from the 16th century)—have been intimately entwined in one way or another to deliver progress, change and technological and managerial innovation. These major transitions that have taken place since archaic times have been covered in detail in Chapters 3–7, where the institutions and organisations responsible for governing and administrating each transport mode—ports and shipping, canals and waterways, roads, railways and airports and civil aviation—have been documented. Integrated land-use planning with transport is only a modern concept and these developments leading to more sustainable urban transport future have been described in Chapter 8.
All of these chapters have concluding summaries that address the key questions raised in the Introduction. In particular, these chapters have addressed the following questions for each transport mode:
- Who were the relevant institutions and organisations in society? What were their respective roles in relation to the movement of traffic on all transport modes especially issues of authority and power relations?
- Who were the key players behind the changes in these institutions and organisations and what tangible things did they achieve in the transport sector?
- To what extent is Japan influenced by overseas ideas in the transformation of its institutions, organisations and transport?
Institutional and Organisation Change in Transport by Mode
Ports and Shipping
Places to dock ships with variable tidal heights are possibly the oldest of man-made elements of transport infrastructure, and it is unsurprising that in two millennia port functions and ownership patterns have changed substantially. Initially, the ports at Suminoe and Naniwa served Imperial purposes for tribute missions and trade. As centralised political power declined other players emerged to fill the vacuum. For example, Watanabe was originally a port on a shōen estate, managed by Court nobles, but the port underwent a major transformation in late Heian and Kamakura periods, evolving from a warehousing and transhipment centre to collection of lumberyards and storehouses belonging to religious organisations and rich families. Other examples of organisations owning ports included the merchants of Sakai and the Buddhist religious order’s trading network at Ishiyama Honganji.
In the medieval period, warlords usurped the powers formerly associated with the court in Kyōto to establish military governments where daimyō ruled their domains and those with coastal waters could use ports to enter into legal and illicit trade and to wage war with other domains. Piracy was rife although it was as much an institution of ‘local government’ as an illegal organisation. Under the Tokugawa military government that lasted for over 250 years, economic growth was largely driven by merchant organisations who dominated the workings of ports and coastal shipping. When the institution of Emperor was reinstated with the Meiji Restoration of 1868, ports were deemed “government-owned structures”, which brought them under national government jurisdiction.
After the Second World War, the Port and Harbor Act (1950) dramatically shifted port administration from the central government to local governments with a “port management body”. However, with the increasing container shipping in the 1960s, the Ministry of Transport devised a public corporation model that would develop and manage international container terminals in Kōbe, Yokohama and Nagoya. The national government and private companies also invested in these port development authorities (abolished 1977 and replaced by port management corporations (PMC). Later, the Kōbe-Ōsaka International Port Corporation was launched by a consortium of the national government, the City of Kōbe, the City of Ōsaka and city banks.
These changes to port governance and shipping occurred through the actions of individuals. It is less easy in the distant past to consistently identify their names, but some examples can be found. The improved port at Watanabe, protected by stone levees and piers, was developed by Tōdaiji Temple’s Abbot, Shunjō Chōgen, to accommodate oceangoing vessels in the transport of building materials for the temples. Piracy organisations flourished until they were largely eradicated by an edict from one of the powerful warlords Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who then incorporated the ships into his own navy for the invasion of Korea. The Tokugawa bakufu asked Kawamura Zuiken to plan the secure transport of commodities to Edō and developed coastal shipping routes from the late 17th century.
In the early Edō period, the bakufu allowed townspeople to construct canals in the marshes, including Dōtombori that was completed in 1615 by the merchant Doton Nariyasu. Suminokura Ryōi (1554–1614) excavated several canals in Ōsaka including the Hozugawa and the Takasegawa to facilitate economy activities. Sand and soil excavated from these constructions were used in creating the foundations for the expansion of the port town.
Overseas ideas and influences have long been influential in the maritime transport sector. The importation of Chinese culture and administrative systems (for example, the T’ang Dynasty Oceangoing and Marketing Department) were mechanisms for expanding state power in the ancient period. The actions of foreign powers, especially the U.S.A. in the mid-19th century, not only opened up selected Japanese ports for trading, but also had bearing on the events leading up to the Meiji Emperor’s Restoration. In the late 19th century, Western models of administering public works were introduced by the Japanese Government and a Dutch engineer, De Rijke, planned the construction of Tempozan in the port of Ōsaka. General McArthur, during the Allied occupation of Japan, implemented port administration based on U.S. practice. Finally, following international trends in port governance (for example, Brooks, 2004; Brooks et al., 2017), Ōsaka port privatised its management.
Canals
The story of canals is much simpler because, unlike in continental Europe, England and the U.S.A., Honshū never developed a network of commercial canals due to its mountainous terrain and fast flowing rivers engorged after snow melt and typhoon rain. The main purposes of canal construction in Japan have been primarily to irrigate agricultural land, to control river flooding, to provide town water and to provide defensive moats around castles, of which the 17th century moats of Edō Castle are an excellent example of Japanese engineering techniques that received no external influences.
From Yayoi times, irrigation channels would have facilitated the local movement of rice and other produce. There have been only three substantial canal achievements for transport in the study area. Dating the 3-km long Horie Canal is difficult but there is no doubt of its importance by the 6th and 7th centuries. The Horie canal was completed by Imperial command. The canals constructed in Kyōto demonstrate the dynamics of the three-way interactions amongst merchant organisations and the daimyō and bakufu. Although there have been attempts and proposals to link Lake Biwa to the ocean, only the Lake Biwa Canal construction by the Kyōto City Government in the late 19th century has been successful.
In the late 16th century, Toyotomi Hideyoshi revived an ancient plan to connect Lake Biwa with the Sea of Japan and ordered the owner of Tsuruga lands, Ōtani Yoshitsugu, to build a canal from Oura on Lake Biwa to Tsuruga located on the Sea of Japan. These works were aborted because of the difficult mountainous terrain. Between 1605 and 1611, Suminokura Ryōi formed an enterprise with the other two leading merchant families, Chaya Shirōjirō and Gotō Shōzaburō to construct canals and to make the four rivers of Kyōto (Tenryu, Takase, Fuji and Hozu Rivers) more navigable for shipping goods. In 1868, when the national capital was transferred from Kyōto to Tōkyō, there was an inevitable economic decline experienced in the city. The Prefecture Mayor, Kunimichi Kitagaki, commissioned the construction of Lake Biwa Canal. The historical significance of this integrated development project is that it was the first project in the Meiji era that did not involve foreign engineers.
Roads
Road administration also has a long and complex history that has the role of government as the prime agent, although the role of individuals is more difficult to determine with any certainty. Roads served Imperial purposes, such as ceremonial links to ancient Kōfun burial mounds, links to ports for diplomatic missions with overseas nations and, importantly, the means of strategic control over the territorial expansion of the Yamato State, that included setting up road barriers (sekisho) guarding the entrances to the Kinai region.
The sekisho is one of Japanese oldest institutions, lasting until 1868. They were duplicated on national roads, shōen estates and, during the medieval period, on warlord domains—all providing security and a means to raise revenue with a passage toll. The purpose of the sekisho reached full fruition under the Tokugawa Shōgunate as a government control mechanism when five national main highways (and secondary roads) were designated radiating from Nihonbashi, Edō. The issue of travel permits (passports) was designed to control the movement of people by the government, especially any female members of the daimyō’s family trying to escape from Edō.
The Tokugawa government edict of an alternative resident system was not only a control mechanism of the regional warlords but a way of draining their incomes because the entourages travelling to and from Edō would have to have stopped both regularly and overnight at post stations, spending money that provided taxes to the bakufu. As restrictions were eased in the middle to late Edō era, commers, often on pilgrimages, would too have spent money in post stations.
As with ports, the Meiji Restoration ushered in new forms of government administration and roads. The Home Ministry (Naimushō) was established in November 1873 (abolished in December 1947 by the Allied Occupation Forces) and roads were included within this portfolio. The first general regulation for roads is found in the 1876 Law on Road Classification. The Highway Law of 1919 established regulations for the road and classification scheme on respective widths, gradients, curvatures and bridge construction. As part of Japan’s post-Pacific War reconstruction, a memorandum from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in 1948 introduced a five-year road plan to replace the German Autobahn-style highway planning in vogue in Japan during the early 1940s.
Road administration during the modern democratic era can be summarised as follows under government direction. In 1952, the law concerning Special Measures for Highway Construction (SMHC Law) provided loans from a Trust Fund in the Ministry of Finance to construct roads and approval for tolls to repay the loan. The Watkins Report triggered a flurry of additional highway legislation providing for national expressways, national toll roads, revised funding arrangements (government bonds, grants to prefectures) and metropolitan expressways. For example, the Japan Highway Public Corporation was established in April 1956—a non-profit government corporate entity established for the purpose of construction and management of expressways and ordinary toll roads.
In recognition that road networks were largely mature, road administration was placed within a new “super” ministry—The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) in 2001. Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō established the Committee for Promoting Privatisation of Four Highway-related Public Corporations and in June 2004, The Privatization Bill was passed in the Diet in June 2004. Six joint-stock highway corporations (one-third government owned) were created and an independent administrative agency, the Japan Expressway Holding and Debt Repayment Agency (JEHDRA) was established to function as an asset-holding and debt-servicing public organisation (the agency will be dissolved once the loan repayment is completed by 2050).
There is plenty of evidence that overseas influences were important to the development of the Japanese road sector. Road design, such as widths, the planting of shade trees by the side of the road and the location of post stations, were influenced by Chinese practice. German Autobahn-inspired planning was popular with governments of the 1930s and 1940s. In the modern democratic era, highway design was derived from the U.S. Highway Capacity Manual. Road improvement programs had a strong American influence due to the involvement of economic specialists led by Dr Ralph Watkins whose report triggered a flurry of additional highway legislation.
Railways
The governance of railways has a much shorter history, only from the late 19th century when both public and private sectors were involved. In October 1872, the first line opened between Tōkyō and Yokohama under the management of the Ministry of Public Works. Other government routes were completed in the 1870s until a cash-strapped government allowed the private sector to build and operate railways. Soon, the Japanese Government realised the strategic importance of railways and enacted the Railway Nationalization Act (1906) purchasing leading private railway companies. Japan Government Railways became a virtual monopoly of railway business until the Allied Occupation Forces instructed the Japanese Government to reorganise government railways into a public corporation that lasted until 1987 when Japan National Railways was divided into regional operations and privatised. Private railways continued to operate low traffic and largely rural services. Private companies also managed urban subways and light rail.
The greatest government railway achievement, show-cased to the world at the 1964 Tōkyō Summer Olympics, was the successful completion of the “bullet train”. It opened the way for the Shinkansen program that was an exemplary international example of a national government development program as part of a national socio-economic system. Japan National Railways initiated research on a linear propulsion railway system in 1962. When Japan National Railways was privatised in 1987, the development of the maglev system was taken over by the Central Japan Railway Company. The Maglev Chuō Shinkansen between Tōkyō and Ōsaka is expected to open in 2045.
In terms of Japanese personalities who influenced railway technology, three names stand out—two from the private sector; the other from the public sector. Kobayashi Inchizō is recognised in Japan as a pioneer of private railway companies and their diversified business model, which includes land-use development along the route of a railway. Otsuka Koreaki, the manager of the Sanuki Railway and the Nankai Railway, followed U.S. management practices and installed a tearoom in the first-class carriage, employed young women as waitresses and transferred much of the authority to the train supervisor. The “Tōkaidō Shinkansen”, when it opened for passenger services in 1964 owed much to the vision of the President of the JNR, Sogō Shinji, at a time that railways, worldwide, were in decline. It is a fair assessment to say he helped initiate a global “railway renaissance”.
Overseas’ pressure, first from the Russians, to introduce railway technology culminated with the British Minister to Japan, Harry Parkes, successfully lobbying that railways using British technology and expertise be introduced to Japan. In April 1870, the Japanese Government hired the British engineer, Edmund Morel, as its first Engineer-in-Chief, who advised on the establishment of the Ministry of Public Works, on engineering education and administration and on the formation of an engineering college (later, the Tōkyō Imperial Technical University). The private railway companies in cities, including Ōsaka and Tōkyō, were especially innovative, including importing U.S. railway technology and developing land and associated land-use activities, such as department stores.
Aviation and Airports
Both the government and the private sectors were initially involved with aircraft design and manufacture and in providing civilian flights at a time when airfields were rudimentary when compared to those of the 21st century. Japanese aeronautical engineering advanced quickly and introduced distinctive innovations, such as the Nakajima aircraft. The Japanese Government stepped in as an airline operator when it established the Japan Air Transport Corporation (JAT) in 1928 as the national flag carrier. JAT absorbed private companies. Military aviation expanded during the 1930s at the expense of civil aviation until 1945 when airfields were taken over by Allied occupying forces. When civilian air transport resumed in 1953, Japan Air Lines (JAL) was established as a major private company servicing domestic and international markets.
In the case of airport development, the Japanese government was cash strapped in the post-war period. The paving of the taxiway and apron at Haneda came from the national budget. However, to restore the airport as an international gateway, the Japanese Cabinet decided to build a terminal with private capital, and, in 1953, The Japan Airport Terminal Co., Ltd. was established through the cooperation of major Japanese businesses. Airports are regulated by the Aeronautical Law (1952) with regard to safety, the Noise Prevention Law (1967) with regard to environmental noise, and the Airport Development Law (1956) with regard to airport developments. Recently, major airports (for example, Kansai) have been funded by private-sector consortia using the private financing initiative (PFI).
The individuals who have shaped the pioneering Japanese aviation sector both came from the military sector. In the first decade of the 20th century, two members of the Imperial Navy argued against the then prevailing doctrine of land-based warfare. They were Lieutenant Commander Akiyama Saneyuki, who lectured at the Naval Staff College in Tōkyō on the advances in aviation technology, and Lieutenant Commander Yamamoto Eisuke, who presented a written statement on aviation to his superiors. Both the military and the civilian government recognised the potential of aviation.
The successive reshaping of Japan’s aviation has happened under French, British, German and American influence with technological transfer a key element. In the modern democratic period, aviation is strongly regulated by international and bilateral agreements and technical innovation through the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). In addition, foreign trends in aviation policy are influential. New airline entrants have been allowed, there have been bankruptcies and mergers, the industry has been de-regulated (for example, the Civil Aeronautics Law was revised at the end of 1994 to relax the conditions for introducing and setting discount fares in domestic markets) with, today, eight major carriers in the international passenger, domestic passenger and freight markets.
Integrated Land Use and Transport
From an institutional perspective, spatial planning, and divisions covering all modes of transport, are found within the Ministry of Infrastructure, Land, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). Important characteristics of the Japan planning framework that has allowed integrated developments include a government-directed land readjustment program, government new town initiatives building on the private-sector model of suburban railway developments and transit-oriented developments that have created some stunning architectural spaces, such as Kyōto Station and the world’s largest railway (and maglev) station in Nagoya. Whilst the Western literature suggests transit-oriented development is an American planning concept, Chapter 8 has convincingly demonstrated that, for decades, it has been part and parcel of the Japanese private railway business model, as demonstrated by the career described in the autobiography written by Kobayashi Inchizō (Kobayashi, 1989).
Further Research
The methodology and approach described in this book have application to any jurisdiction and any time period, as defined by the researcher. In the case of Japan, there are obvious avenues for further original research to that underpinning this book, especially by researchers, versed in the Japanese written and spoken language, who can access primary historical data and conduct interviews with key informants about contemporary transport modes. Research designs could embrace any, or all, time horizons, any, or all, transport modes, could be locally based, sub-regional or regional, and could be urban or rural in their focus. Higher education thesis work across the country, collectively, could add up to a rich understanding of how transport institutions and organisations have changed over time. Equally, similar approaches to research framing could be applied to any jurisdiction in the world.
Japan Society 5.0—Visions
The fourth question posed in the introduction to this book was: what might the future in Japan look like in terms of institutions, society and transport? Who will be the visionary leaders in transport and organisational change in the Japanese society of the future? The current leaders of Japan envisage a fundamentally different society and have given it a name. “Society 5.0” (Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, n.d.) is premised on the broad transitions that have historically occurred in Japanese society—from the initial society of the hunter gatherers of the Jōmon period (c. 10,000 B.C. to c. 300 B.C.) to Society 2.0 with the paddy rice cultivation during the Yayoi period (c. 300 B.C. to c. 300 A.D.), then Society 3.0 from ancient to medieval times and the early industrialised state to Society 4.0 (the information society) that approximates to contemporary Japan in the third decade of the 21st century.
In November 1995, Japan enacted the Science and Technology Basic Law. The Science and Technology Basic Plan aims to comprehensively and systematically advance science and technology policy. The 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan was endorsed by a Cabinet Decision on 22 January 2016, covering the 5-year period between the fiscal years 2016–2021. The plan introduced Society 5.0 as the sort of society that Japan should aspire towards. The essential characteristics of Society 5.0 are identified as follows:
[…] information from sensors in physical space is accumulated in cyberspace. In cyberspace, this big data is analyzed by artificial intelligence (AI), and the analysis results are fed back to humans in physical space in various forms” (Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, n.d.: a).
Information technologies in every industrial sector, and in social activities, will address stagnant economic growth and solutions to emerging social and environmental problems including meeting the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
The Japanese Government mentions “smart cities” as a desirable policy goal. Funding for experimental demonstration projects have been completed in various cities, to the extent that the government believes Japan is on the verge of a major transition from the present “Society 4.0” to a future “Society 5.0” that has only been sketchily outlined and, so far, subject to limited academic scrutiny and relevant peer-reviewed publications. Holroyd (2020) explores the conceptual background, rationale, policies and programmes Japan has enacted in pursuit of the visions of Society 5.0. Gladden (2019) investigates the presumed human-centeredness of Society 5.0 by comparing its makeup with that of earlier societies. The frameworks and analyses developed in a research monograph by the University of Tokyo and Hitachi (Hitachi-UTokyo Laboratory, 2020) look at the strengths and weaknesses of the Society 5.0 paradigm and potential benefits and dangers of its implementation.
An initial step towards achieving Society 5.0 was made when, in August 2019, the Japanese Government established the Smart City Public-Private Partnership Platform to promote collaboration to achieve Society 5.0 with more than 100 cities and more than 300 companies and research institutions signed up. As part of the broader Society 5.0 vision, Japan has 229 smart city projects in 157 areas. The platform supports projects with knowledge exchange, business-matching and closer ties between public, private and academia.
The transformation to Society 5.0 is predicated on achieving “smart cities” of the future of which the transport sector is prominent. The Japanese Government’s policy goals are, for an “inclusive” society, to reduce road and public transport congestion; to lower CO2 emissions; to reduce road traffic accidents; and to stimulate mobility consumption (especially the purchase of autonomous vehicles and “smart”, self-driving wheelchairs for the elderly). New “added value” to mobility is generated through the artificial intelligence (AI) analyses of big data in a database spanning diverse types of information that might include sensor data from motor vehicles, real-time information on the weather, road traffic conditions, accommodation, food and drink and an individual’s personal history (Government of Japan, Cabinet Office, n.d.: b).
More specific transport challenges being faced in Society 5.0 are contained in the 2020 White Paper issued by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (Policy Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2020). The report outlines a range of challenges facing Japan including climate change, keeping safe from disasters, achieving a sustainable infrastructure maintenance cycle, securing regional transport and making use of new technologies. In order to provide a rationale for speculation on what this means for institutional and organisation change, the next section provides an historical perspective by contrasting Society 4.0 with its predecessor, followed by some ideas on role of the national government in Society 5.0, before analysing institutional and organisational change using four contemporary problems as examples.
Speculations on Society 5.0
First, it is worth reflecting on the key similarities and differences in Japan Society 3.0 and Japan 4.0. with respect to road transport and personal mobility (Table 29). Governments of both societies formulated clear policies for roads, and both societies had mechanisms for maintaining roads. Of course, the vehicle technologies and the power to move those vehicles are dramatically different. Travel is a derived demand from the socio-economic activities in which people are engaged, so it is in these aspects of society that the most profound changes have occurred.
In an agrarian society the majority of the population were farmers and were tied to the land. In addition, both bakufu and han (provincial) governments restricted the movement of ordinary people unless there were successful applications to obtain a travel permit. Spatial restrictions were in place with little change in inter-generational occupations. Society was very static. The qualitative transitions to Society 4.0 included: a reduction in transaction and travel costs; removal of the Confucian class system; an expansion in occupations; unbounded personal mobility; inter- and intra-regional migration; choice of residential and workplace locations; and expectations, and optimism, that, over time, prosperity and well-being would continue to increase.
The chapters of this book have demonstrated that transitions are processes that have required continuous adaptations, where the institutions of governments had significant agency. The governance challenges will be negotiations with the changing networks of actors, relationships involving power and resources, understanding new patterns of consumption and determining how shifts in future mobility are regulated, priced and taxed. The primary role of the national government is how this transition will be efficiently and equitably managed, although Docherty (et al., 2017:123) suggest that it is “difficult to be optimistic”, based on the failure of all national governments in managing the global problem of car dependency that started in the second half of the 20th century.
It can be speculated that the role of the central government will decline in relative terms. In Japan, the national government is driving Society 5.0 forward, although, in its promise to devolve decision making, the unspecified details of its implementation are left to local government, businesses and the community to work out. Indeed, a key overarching message from the national government is a commitment to work more effectively with all relevant stakeholders than has been the case. Morimoto (2021, Chapter 10) points out one of the most difficult issues in city planning and transport is consensus building with stakeholders and this in itself requires reform in how governments go about their business.
One probable reform that will distinguish Society 5.0 from earlier models used Japanese by governments will be the introduction of “agile governance”. Agile governance requires a diverse range of stakeholders, including governments, businesses, individuals, and communities who will carry out ongoing analysis of the social situations they find themselves in, define the goals they seek to achieve, design the various systems for achieving these goals and carry out ongoing dialogue-based assessments of outcomes to make improvements to these systems (Japan, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2021: v). Governance-related issues for realising Society 5.0 are wide ranging, from privacy, system security and transparency to the allocation of responsibilities and cyber security. The underlying proposition is that Society 5.0 will be socially fluid in terms of its (yet to be determined goals) requiring governments to be more flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances than is currently the case: solutions are constantly revised to ensure their optimality based on conditions and goals that constantly change.
The implications of this agile governance for future transport policy making is clear. For example, the past goals set for urban transport planning have been primarily solving congestion from growing demand based on economic and environmental considerations (a classic systems approach). In the area of transport and mobility such challenges in Japan include debt-burdened governments’ abilities to finance new infrastructure and maintenance, automation and consumer behaviour in the opportunities opening up in an accelerating digital economy. In the future, goals will be designed to continuously and rapidly run cycles of “goal-setting”, “conditions and risk analysis”, “system design”, “operations”, “evaluation” (with a full range of economic, environmental and social inputs), and “solutions” (Figure 9) in a closer partnership of the civic and civil spheres of society. Communications will be best described as “two-way symmetrical communication” as opposed to one-way asymmetrical communication (see Black, 1997).
The rapidity of actions needed to constantly monitor the need to implement the cycles in Figure 9 imply that a greater spatial devolution of decision making is required. Society 5.0 should facilitate “innovation by citizens and for citizens” (Deguchi and Karasawa, 2020: 165) and this suggests that more leadership at the local government level is required. However, more work needs to be done also to engage citizens and users and to prepare a climate that continuously facilitates bottom-up, grassroots initiatives. Local governments must work out how they will gather local data on the physical space such as roads, buildings, people movements and vehicular traffic, and how they will develop platforms that integrate effective Big Data into cyberspace infrastructure.
The aspiration of agile governance is that cyberspace will facilitate citizen-led, community-based planning by allowing citizens to be involved in the gathering and collating of Big Data (e.g., mobile spatial data or real-time people-flow data replacing the periodic person trip surveys conducted by consultants to government) and of the sharing and evaluating future visions (Deguchi et al., 2020b: 94) for local places. This would involve regulatory easing where government data are made available as open data. According to Deguchi and Karasawa (2020: 161), planners must achieve a perspective of harmony between individual and group interests when designing the environment and institutions, as the “principle of honouring human dignity requires no less.” All of this seems to be predicated on a substantial shift in values from the current position of a predominantly paternalist government, foe example, in road planning—described by Healy (1977: 205) as “a positivist procedure which has been criticized as technical and elitist”—to genuine co-production in transport planning and implementation and solving mobility problems.
To provide more detail about agile governance in Japan, four specific challenges are selected for analysis from the documentation on Society 5.0: the international competitiveness of the Japanese automotive industry, value added smart applications to mobility and government-industry responses to maintaining the mobility of older citizens with autonomous driving vehicles; an ageing population and the problem of the decline in rural towns and villages; the ever-present threat of natural disasters and building for resilience; and aviation safety and security. Whilst Japan has many more problems where institutional and organisational reforms are required, all four of these challenges are closely related to the movement of people and freight.
Personal Mobility and Autonomous Driverless Vehicles
Organisations will become more dominant in Society 5.0 than has been the case. For example, there is a strong belief in the Japanese vehicle manufacturing sector that technology can help solve personal mobility problems, without over-burdening the energy sector, adding to environmental pollution and solving road safety problems, as has been outlined with the example of Toyota’s Woven City Project (Chapter 8). The transition to “green energy” will be complete by mid-century, under government-formulated targets, but implemented by private-sector energy providers.
Digital players, supported by mega-fund investors, are revamping Japan’s long-stagnant taxi industry (Agarwal et al., 2018). Japanese car manufacturers are producing hydrogen fuel technology cars (Pollet et al., 2019, Table 1, p. 91), where the role of government might be to give incentives to potential buyers (as in California) to expand the market penetration of this technology. Already local governments are promoting a hydrogen economy with, for example, the City of Tōkyō deploying hydrogen fuel cell buses during the 2021 Summer Olympic Games and setting a longer-term goal of putting 200,000 such buses into service by 2025 (Phillips, 2019).
The third and fourth decades of the 21st century will reveal closer collaboration and cooperation amongst all sections of civil and civic society in Japan. Twenty years ago, Cabinet established the Strategic Headquarters for the Promotion of Advanced Information and Telecommunications, with its roadmap of autonomous vehicle development. The roadmap has been updated annually since 2014, and the Promotion of Advanced Information and Telecommunications (2019: 103–111) illustrates the 2019 version. Distinctive features of the roadmap are the respective scenarios for three types applications: passenger vehicles; logistics services; and public transport services. Developments in information technology and software engineering by the private sector will deliver enhance tools to make supply chains more efficient and reliable.
Examples of leveraging “big data” for supply chain resilience are Toyota’s “RESCUE,” developed with Fujitsu, and a visualisation system called the Local Economic Driver Index (LEDIX)—a private sector collaboration between the Teikoku Data Bank and Takram (World Bank, 2020, Fig. 2.4, p. 22). These systems will be applied to map out logistical supply chains in order to understand rapidly the impacts of supply chain disruptions and opportunities for economic development, including post-disaster recovery (World Bank, 2020: 84).
This technological revolution in the transport sector has demanded increased inter-ministerial cooperation. In 2015, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō announced the 2015 revision of the Japan Revitalization Strategy that included, as a strategic item, autonomous driving vehicles, and in doing so established the Panel on Business Strategies in Automated Driving in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), and in MLIT. The panel was tasked to resolve current problems, and to formulate actions that would secure Japan’s competitiveness in the field of autonomous driving systems and would solve various societal problems, such as road congestion, road safety and personal mobility for the elderly (Ki, 2020: 31). The major governmental players in the Japanese autonomous vehicle policy making are the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC), METI, MLIT and National Police Agency. To support this panel, SIP was established as the Japanese government’s cross-ministerial research and development program (Ki, 2020: Fig.3.1., p. 33).
Within this institution, the Promoting Committee for SIP Automated Driving Research Project was formed with input from government, industry and experts drawn from universities (Ki, 2020, Fig. 3.4, p. 34). The Project Director is from the Toyota Motor Corporation, with sub-project directors drawn from universities, consultancy and the automotive industry. Other members include the Cabinet Office, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC), the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Land Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) together with industry and academic experts. Research and development is outsourced to industry and academic research groups.
Whilst research and development are imperative to transform the transport sector, the major obstacles to the introduction of fully driverless vehicles (Level 5) are legal and regulatory, not technology. Less than six months after the National Police Agency’s proposal, the Japanese Diet enacted amendments to the Road Traffic Act allowing Level 3 automated vehicles to be used on public roads from May 2020. Level 3 automated vehicles are capable of driving without the need for the driver to monitor the dynamic driving task, or the road and the roadside driving environment, but the law does require the driver be in a position to resume control, if needed. The issue of transfer of control between vehicle and driver has proved controversial, and the Japanese automotive industry is split as to whether this can be done safely. In March 2021, Honda launched the world’s most advanced self-driving car using “level 3” autonomous driving technology, with an initial batch of 100 Legend models in Japan (Sugiura, 2021).
Recommendations from a report by a National Police Agency (NPA) on 1 April 2021 on “level 4” self-driving vehicles is that they should be held responsible for following the traffic rules and be operable without the need for a human with a driving license. However, the report did not clarify the primary responsible party for accidents or law violations. Trials with a view to the practical use of “level 4” technology are already underway. The Japanese government aims to start these public transport services (especially targeting the elderly) in some areas in 2022 and hopes to make them commonplace nationwide by 2025. The NPA will conduct studies at the same time with the objective of revisioning the Road Traffic Act (Machida, 2021).
The future challenge is to take experience from the numerous demonstrations and trials undertaken across Japan and convert them into operational systems of automated vehicles, freight vehicles and public transport—with all systems regulated by the national government. All trials have involved multiple actors and the future land transport in Japan will involve more service delivery actors than at present.
To illustrate this complexity, in March 2021, a demonstration experiment of a self-driving bus (with two attendants and space for six passengers) was conducted by the Council for Area Development and Management of Otemachi, Marunouchi and Yurakucho, in Tōkyō. The trial comprised of companies, and others in the neighborhood, and the Japanese telecom giant SoftBank’s subsidiary Boldly Inc. (formerly SB Drive), which develops autonomous driving technology (Michinaga, 2021). The bus made five to eight round trips a day on an about 350-metre straight section between the Marunouchi Building and the Marunouchi Park Building at a speed of about 6 km/h. The bus runs on the right side of the street (Japanese drive on the left), and automatically stops when people walk or cross the street in front of it.
Finally, a new industry that adds value to personal mobility in the form of digital applications will emerge and one that will require government regulation over communication security and personal privacy. Given the increasing computational power and miniaturisation of personal devises, such as smart watches, it is easy to imagine a world where access to a “device” through face and voice recognition allows instantaneous access and retrieval of information about any dimension of proposed travel. Required information might be, but is not limited to, about: the journey/destination (mode, time, make bookings for a driverless vehicle, or map out the route for a personal, autonomous vehicle level 5); and, more importantly, through artificial intelligence (AI) get a personalised itinerary for things to do with detailed descriptions at the destination, such as tourist sites, hot springs, shopping, cafes, restaurants, etc, given the Japanese love of taking photographs and videos that are automatically stored on the “cloud”, the whole experience of that trip retrieved afterwards and communicated to family and friends if desired.
Ageing Population and Rural Shrinkage
Japan, along with many other countries, is facing a population decline (National Institute of Population and Social Security, 2018; cited in Central Japan Railway Company, 2020: 16) together with an ageing demographic structure that have several implications for transport. These include: a decline in the total amount of daily travel (unless offset by a change in immigration policy or substantial boosts to tourism); marginally less peak-period commuter traffic with working from home; a reduced income taxation base to fund transport infrastructure and maintenance; and a higher proportion of elderly people who have grown up with access to personal transport and a desire to maintain that independence. The value-added mobility system outlined above will assist greatly the future mobility of the elderly. Responses to these challenges are being initiated by local government and the private sector.
A shrinking population, coupled with the outmigration of the young to larger cities, has resulted in a deteriorating economic situation for small towns in Japan. Public projects implemented top-down under the Comprehensive National Development Plans have undermined the rural municipalities’ capacity to independently promote context-tailored development (Chang, 2018). The absence of innovation in counter-shrinkage policies stems from several structural factors that need to be addressed: the highly centralised policy-making process; sectionalism in the central bureaucracy; financial independency of rural municipalities; and the nostalgic pro-regrowth mind-set by many conservative politicians.
Champions need to emerge from organisations that can address the problems of rural Japan. Drawing on a case study methodology from four shrinking communities in Minami and Uchikō, Shikōkū Island, Chang (2018) investigated examples of community re-vitalisation. Apathy in the local institutions for change and low resident engagement were identified to be the two main barriers to starting initiatives. Both of them stem from the sense of resignation and powerlessness nurtured in the local people by decades-long decline and policy neglect. Successful local programs were instigated by intermediate organisers who acted as catalysts creating a future vision of the place, building trust-based networks of motivated residents, organising collaborative activities and bringing in external funding and knowledge that created connections with various key actors outside of the communities.
The challenge for governments is to devise policies on the processes of building local capacity that prepare the foundation to implement locally-based approaches to arresting rural decline in Japan. Inspiration for such policy development could come from the Cittaslow (Slow City) approach that is a sustainable development model addressing rural shrinkage and promoting the quality of life in rural communities (Cittaslow, n.d.). Legally established in March 2001 in Greve, Italy, by the General Secretary, Marzio Marini, “Cittaslow—Rete Internazionale delle città del buon vivere”, has now grown into a global network of over 272 participating towns (as of February 2021).
Natural Disasters and Resilience
The central government will continue its role in legislation and emergency funding around natural disasters. The resilience of industrial sectors, firms and supply chains is prioritised under national policies (Ebisudani and Tokai, 2017: 81–82), including: the Basic Act for National Resilience Contributing to Preventing and Mitigating Disasters for Developing Resilience in the Lives of the Citizenry (2013); the Fundamental Plan for National Resilience (2014, updated in 2018); and the annual Action Plan for National Resilience (since 2014). At the subnational level, key industrial areas, such as Aichi Prefecture and Kawasaki City, have integrated resilient industry as one of the key pillars of their Fundamental Plans for Regional Resilience.
It can be said with certainty that Japan will face major natural catastrophes. Japan is highly vulnerable to natural hazards, such as tsunamis and storm surges (The World Bank, 2020, Table 2.3, p. 35). These predicted seismic events are expected to cause significant economic, asset and financial damages, requiring up to 20 years for recovery and reconstruction. Additionally, future massive storm surges and large-scale river floods are expected to cause major impacts to the large metropolises of Ōsaka, Tōkyō and Nagoya—all key manufacturing hubs (World Bank, 2020: 34).
In the past, the public sector has played the leading role in ensuring infrastructure’s resilience. These institutional arrangements have now evolved to public-private agreements that have enabled substantial reductions in the length of time that services have been disrupted. For example, highways were reopened six days after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Northeast Japan, because of the prearranged contracts between the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism and local construction companies (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014). There is going to be a greater role in the future for private-sector enterprises in disaster resilience—all predicted on the development of smart applications and documentation.
Manufacturing industries are often clustered together in industrial estates, making them key sites for collaborative interventions. Industry stakeholders could work together to strengthen zone-wide capacities for disaster risk preparedness and response. Key resilience strategies include promoting mutually beneficial business continuity plans amongst member firms. Industry stakeholders can also help build strategic partnerships between member firms and governments, critical infrastructure providers and operators and financial institutions for disaster contingency planning. Industrial parks may be able to gain collective access to financing for any resilient infrastructure improvements and post-disaster support (World Bank, 2020: 5).
The future institutional arrangements in the aftermath of disasters is for national and local governments to establish greater cooperation with private firms to develop prearranged agreements for recovery work. Private firms and industry associations have an incentive to cooperate in the quick recovery of the critical infrastructure essential to business continuity, economic loss minimisation and industry competitiveness. By minimising the disruption time to infrastructure services, such as transport, industries remain connected to their supply chains.
Aviation Safety and Security
Governments have a responsibility to ensure aviation safety and security against terrorism. The Civil Aviation Bureau of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is the competent authority in aviation security, sets the standards for security measures to be implemented by air carriers, airport operators and other organisations concerned and therefore will continue to be a major transport agent in the future. Safety measures are being actively introduced in Japan on the basis of new technology and in accordance with international standards, through the activities such as: aircraft inspections; competence certification for airmen; and supervision of the operation and maintenance systems of the air carriers.
On the basis of the new CNS/ATM plans of the ICAO, the installation of next-generation aviation safety systems is being promoted in Japan (Civil Aviation Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, 2021). Multifunctional transport satellites (MTSAT) both for aeronautical missions, including air traffic control, and for meteorological missions, including weather observation, have been launched, and an important challenge for aviation will be the continuous update of this technology.
The Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation (CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2010) considered whether the leadership of Prime Minister, Kan Naoto (in office, 2010–2011) would bring with it any change in aviation policy and, importantly, the report looked at the forces of inertia in the bureaucracy that needed overcoming. The Government of Japan has continued to maintain tight control over its aviation market, creating barriers for both domestic firms and foreign competitors through tolerating political coordination, protectionist policies and limiting landing slots and airport access. “Current regulations are incongruous with facilitating increased exposure and competitiveness for the Japanese aviation market in the international arena” (Cronin, 2013: 1).
In fact, there are some within the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism who “desire fair and transparent allocations” of landing slots (Cronin, 2013: 13). Whether these opaque and uncompetitive regulatory frameworks surrounding the Japanese aviation industry have been redressed remains uncertain, but what is certain is that post-Covid 19, as with all counties, Japan will have to resurrect its domestic and international airline industry. Challenges also arise in formulating airspace regulations of drones delivering parcels, and in managing the emerging industry of commuting by small autonomous driving aircraft.
Final Note
In Blue Ocean Strategy, Kim and Mauborgne (2005) describe how to create uncontested market space that will render the existing competition irrelevant, imaginatively telling the reader to picture a market universe composed of two sorts of oceans: red oceans and blue oceans. Red oceans represent all the industries in existence today (and, inter alia, all of the institutions and organisations dealing with transport). In contrast, blue oceans represent all of the industries “not in existence today” (Kim and Mauborgne, 2005: 4). This requires, for any jurisdiction in the world, imagining, and strategically mapping out, an entirely new infrastructure planning and transport sector for both institutions and organisations. This is clearly beyond the scope of this book, but the historical survey contained in it might give inspiration to those willing to take up the challenge. The framework of the new institutional economics, and the general questions posed about institutional and organisational change in the first chapter of this book, will provide the starting points for such an ambitious investigation.
For example, an in-depth institutional analysis of contemporary transport institutions and organisations (the agents) needs undertaking, and interviews with key players must be conducted to gain a deeper understanding of challenges and issues. This type of brief would normally be undertaken by domestic or international consultancy organisations. Creative solutions for institutional and organisational reform need to be designed. Stakeholder and community input to this process will be essential with transparency in the way options are framed. A business case must be presented to decision makers where options are given together with estimates of costs and the identification of benefits on quantitative and qualitative scales. When there truly is a need to change, and it is widely supported in Japan, in the words of Andressen (2002: 149–150), “the system can alter course relatively quickly and effectively”.
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