

INSOLUBLES

WALTER SEGRAVE

CRITICAL EDITION WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY BARBARA BARTOCCI AND STEPHEN READ





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⟨Gualteri Segrave Insolubilia⟩

E₈21vb,
E₄ 159ra

0.1 | Sicut vult philosophus 2° Metaphysice, non solum debemus grates reddere hiis qui nobiscum in opinionibus conveniunt, sed et hiis qui a nobis dissonant nostrasque opiniones inpugnant. Tales namque, etsi a via veritatis frequenter exorbitent, alios tamen ad hoc excitant ut vel illam adhuc inveniendam inquirent vel ut firmius robovent iam inventam. Quia igitur circa solutionem sophysmatum insolubilium diversi diversas scripserunt sententias sibi invicem repugnantes, quorumdam coactus rogatione illas duxi summarie recitandas ut sic pensatis hinc inde rationibus antiqua veritas plenius elucescat, a qua multum recedere non intendo, cum non sit verisimile illam sententiam fore penitus reprobendam quam tot et tanti inquisitione super hac habita diligenti diutius comprobaverunt.

Capitulum Primum

⟨De diffinitione insolubilium⟩

E₈ 22ra

1.0 | Insolubile ergo de quo presens versatur intentio non dicitur quia ipsum solvi est impossibile sed quia illud solvere est difficile; nec omne tale est insolubile, sed illi soli paralogismi dicuntur insolubiles ubi ex singulari infertur sua particularis secundum vocem vel ex universali sua singularis secundum vocem.

Et voco singularem secundum vocem alicuius propositionis que cum illa convenit in subiecto et predicato ut:

Hoc falsum dicitur a Sorte,
est singulare secundum vocem huius particularis:
Falsum dicitur a Sorte.

1.1 Nec mirum si tales paralogismi merito dicuntur insolubiles. Expletis enim mediis a quibus capiunt evidentiam, a bonis sillogismis nullatenus

2 conveniunt] sunt (*dub.*) E₄ 4 ad hoc] adhuc E₈ 5 adhuc] ad hoc E₄ 6 diversas] diversa E₈ 8 summarie] super mane E₄ || inde] *om.* E₄ 9 plenius] *add. in marg. eadem manus* E₄ 10 illam] idem E₄ 11 hac] hanc E₄ ante (*dub.*) *add.* E₄ 12 Capitulum Primum] *in marg.* E₈ 16 soli] sillogismi (*dub.*) E₄ 17 sua²] *iter.* E₈ 20 convenit] conveniat E₈ || ut] et E₄

⟨Walter Segrave, *Insolubles*⟩

0.1 As Aristotle recommends in *Metaphysics* 2,¹ we should give thanks not only to those who agree with our opinions, but also to those who disagree with us and criticize our opinions.² For even if ⟨the latter⟩ often stray from the path of truth, they nonetheless inspire others either to seek the truth yet to be found or to confirm more resolutely that truth which they have found. Hence, because different people have written different mutually inconsistent things about the solution to insoluble sophisms, I was induced by requests from some people to rehearse the chief points, so that, once the reasons having been weighed on each side, the old truth will shine forth more fully.³ I do not intend to depart much from that truth, since it is unlikely that an opinion which so many people have advocated for so long with such diligent enquiry should be completely rejected.

Chapter 1

⟨Definition of insolubles⟩

1.0 An insoluble, which is our present concern, is not so called because it is impossible to solve, but because solving it is difficult. Nor is everything like that an insoluble, but only those paralogisms are called insolubles where from a singular proposition a syntactic particular of it is inferred or from a universal proposition a syntactic singular of it.

I say that a syntactic singular of some proposition is ⟨any singular proposition⟩ which has the same subject and predicate, e.g.,

This falsehood is said by Socrates

is a syntactic singular of this particular proposition:

A falsehood is said by Socrates.

1.1 Nor is it surprising that such paralogisms are correctly called insolubles. For having filled in the additional premises from which they

¹ *Metaphysics* α, 993b12.

² See Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 118 #36 (Non solum his dicere gratias justum est quorum opinionibus aliquis communicavit, sed etiam qui superficialiter enuntiarunt, quia hi etiam conferunt aliquid) and Averroes, *In II Metaphysicen* (in Averroes, *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Commentariis*), comm. 2, f. 29F (https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_u_T0u0luuy1C/page/n65/mode/2up).

³ By “the old truth” (*antiqua veritas*), Segrave is alluding to what before Bradwardine’s attacks on it had been the standard solution to the insolubles, namely, restrictivism. See ‘Introduction’, §2.

differre videntur. Habent enim secundum vocem dispositionem tam modi quam figure, ut hic:

Nullum falsum dicitur a Sorte, hoc est falsum, ergo hoc non dicitur a Sorte.

- 5 Tales igitur, quia causas apparentie habent maximas quoniam easdem quas et boni sillogismi, ideo ad solvendum sunt difficillimi. Merito ergo anthonomastice per earum maximam evidenciam insolubilia nuncupantur.

- 10 1.2 Visa igitur talium paralogismorum apparentia iam restat eorumdem non existentiam explicare. Pro quo sciendum quod quidam ponunt illos deficere in materia, quidam in forma.

Capitulum Secundum

⟨Solventes secundum peccatum in materia: cassantes⟩

- 15 2.1 Ponentes defectum in materia sunt bipartiti: quidam dicunt quodlibet insolubile oriri ex actu nostro aliquo, cuiusmodi sunt intelligere, cognoscere, scribere et huiusmodi; et illos actus in solvendo negant, et hii dicuntur cassantes.

2.1.1 Verbi gratia, ponatur Sortem dicere:

Ego dico falsum,

- 20 et arguitur sic: Sortes dicit aliquid, aut ergo falsum vel verum. Si verum, ergo verum est Sortem dicere falsum, ergo | dicit falsum. Si falsum, ergo falsum est Sortem dicere falsum, ergo non dicit falsum. Respondent hii quod Sortes nihil dicit nec loquitur, et ita interimunt actus dicendi.

E₈ 22rb

2.1.2 Istorum ratio potissima est hec: casu posito, dicunt ipsi:

- 25 Hec est falsa: Sortes dicit falsum,

1 differre] differit E₄ || vocem] voces E₈ 6 ideo] *add. in marg.* E₄ 7 per] pro E₄ || evidenciam *corr.*] evidencia *mss* 10 illos] eos E₄ 12 Capitulum Secundum] *in marg.* E₈ 14 quidam] enim *add.* E₄ 16 solvendo] solvere *a.c.* E₈ solvere res E₄ 20 falsum ... verum] *inv.* E₄ 23 nihil] nec E₈