

INSOLUBLES

WALTER SEGRAVE

CRITICAL EDITION WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY BARBARA BARTOCCI AND STEPHEN READ





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Barbara Bartocci and Stephen Read (eds), *Insolubles*. Walter Segrave.
Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0359>

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<https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0359#resources>

The Medieval Text Consortium Series: Volume 1
ISSN Print: 2754-0634 | ISSN Digital: 2754-0642

ISBN Paperback: 978-1-80511-090-3 | ISBN Hardback: 978-1-80511-091-0 |
ISBN Digital (PDF): 978-1-80511-092-7

DOI: 10.11647/OBP.0359

Cover image: Photo by Sean Babbs, 2020, University of Colorado Boulder Libraries Instruction and Outreach | Collections of Distinction Special Collections, Archives, Government Information, and Maps, CC-BY.

Cover design: Jeevanjot Kaur Nagpal

Published by Open Book Publishers in collaboration with Benson Center Press.



Benson Center Press
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differre videntur. Habent enim secundum vocem dispositionem tam modi quam figure, ut hic:

Nullum falsum dicitur a Sorte, hoc est falsum, ergo hoc non dicitur a Sorte.

- 5 Tales igitur, quia causas apparentie habent maximas quoniam easdem quas et boni sillogismi, ideo ad solvendum sunt difficillimi. Merito ergo anthonomastice per earum maximam evidenciam insolubilia nuncupantur.

- 10 1.2 Visa igitur talium paralogismorum apparentia iam restat eorumdem non existentiam explicare. Pro quo sciendum quod quidam ponunt illos deficere in materia, quidam in forma.

Capitulum Secundum

⟨Solventes secundum peccatum in materia: cassantes⟩

- 15 2.1 Ponentes defectum in materia sunt bipartiti: quidam dicunt quodlibet insolubile oriri ex actu nostro aliquo, cuiusmodi sunt intelligere, cognoscere, scribere et huiusmodi; et illos actus in solvendo negant, et hii dicuntur cassantes.

2.1.1 Verbi gratia, ponatur Sortem dicere:

Ego dico falsum,

- 20 et arguitur sic: Sortes dicit aliquid, aut ergo falsum vel verum. Si verum, ergo verum est Sortem dicere falsum, ergo | dicit falsum. Si falsum, ergo falsum est Sortem dicere falsum, ergo non dicit falsum. Respondent hii quod Sortes nihil dicit nec loquitur, et ita interimunt actus dicendi.

E₈ 22rb

2.1.2 Istorum ratio potissima est hec: casu posito, dicunt ipsi:

- 25 Hec est falsa: Sortes dicit falsum,

1 differre] differit E₄ || vocem] voces E₈ 6 ideo] *add. in marg.* E₄ 7 per] pro E₄ || evidenciam *corr.*] evidencia *mss* 10 illos] eos E₄ 12 Capitulum Secundum] *in marg.* E₈ 14 quidam] enim *add.* E₄ 16 solvendo] solvere *a.c.* E₈ solvere res E₄ 20 falsum ... verum] *inv.* E₄ 23 nihil] nec E₈

derive their evidential force, they seem not to differ in any way from good syllogisms. For they have the same syntactic arrangement both in mood and figure, e.g.,

No falsehood is said by Socrates, this is a falsehood, so
this is not said by Socrates.

Therefore, since ⟨insolubles⟩ have the greatest causes of appearing ⟨to be good syllogisms⟩, which are just the same as those of a good syllogism, for this reason they are the most difficult to solve. Hence they are deservedly called insolubles *par excellence* because of their outstanding argumentative strength.

1.2 Having seen ⟨why⟩ these paralogisms appear ⟨to be good syllogisms⟩, it now remains to explain their not being ⟨good syllogisms⟩. To this end, it should be noted that some people propose a defect in matter, others a defect in form.⁴

Chapter 2

⟨Solutions according to errors in matter: cassationists⟩

2.1 Those proposing a defect in matter are of two kinds: for some say that every insoluble arises from some act of ours such as understanding, knowing, writing and suchlike; and they deny ⟨the existence of⟩ these acts in their solution and they are called Cassationists.⁵

2.1.1 For example, suppose Socrates says:

I say a falsehood

and one argues like this: Socrates says something, so ⟨he says⟩ either a falsehood or a truth. If a truth, then it is true that Socrates says a falsehood, so he says a falsehood. If a falsehood, then it is false that Socrates says a falsehood, so he does not say a falsehood. Cassationists respond that Socrates says nothing nor does he speak, and so they nullify the act of saying.

2.1.2 Their most powerful argument is this: in the scenario proposed, they say:

This is false: Socrates says a falsehood,

⁴ According to Dutilh Novaes, ‘Form and Matter in Later Latin Medieval Logic’, p. 343: “formally defective arguments would be those that do not display a valid [...] mood, while materially defective arguments are those with false premises.” She traces the distinction to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* Δ (1013b19–20) and comments by Alexander of Aphrodisias, and finds it in medieval authors such as al-Ghazali and Kilwardby.

⁵ Cassationists take their name from the Latin verb ‘cassare’, to nullify, to render useless or void (preserved in English as the verb ‘to cass’ in Scots law). See ‘Introduction’, §1.

sicut planum est, sed non potest esse falsa nisi ex altera istarum causarum: aut quia nihil dicit aut quia aliquid dicit sed illud est verum sed non ex secunda causa, ergo ex prima.

ad 2.1.1 Sed ista positio negat sensum. Talis enim sic dicens:

5 Ego dico falsum,
fatigatur ex loquela, si diu sic dicat, similiter aliquos audientes gravat in casu, quod non esset si ipse nihil diceret cum alii non audiant nisi quod ipse loquitur.

Similiter videns istam propositionem:

10 Ego nihil video,
aliquid videt.

ad 2.1 Constat similiter quantum ad hoc quod ponunt omne insolubile ortum habere ex actu nostro expresso in insolubili <quod> hoc est falsum. In hoc enim:

15 Falsum est,
nullus actus noster exprimitur, posito tamen quod ista sola sit. Quod accidit in aliis insolubilibus.

ad 2.1.2 Ad rationem istius positionis patet quod non concludit; hec enim falsa est:

20 Falsum dicitur a Sorte,
sed non ex aliqua illarum duarum causarum, sed quia denotat falsum dici a Sorte, quod non dicitur ab eo, sicut plenius determinabitur in processu.

<Solventes secundum peccatum in materia: Solutio Thomae Bradwardyn>

25 **2.2** Alii respondentes ad huiusmodi paralogramos nullum assignant defectum in paralogramo, sed in uno alio paralogramo ponunt defectum in materia, negantes alteram premissarum, unde dicente Sorte istam:

Sortes dicit falsum,

que sit A, dicunt quod A est | falsum. Et cum arguitur:

E₈ 22va

30 A est falsum et A dicitur a Sorte, ergo falsum dicitur
a Sorte,

2 sed¹] et E₄ 3 secunda causa] quarta E₄ 7 ipse] *om.* E₄ 16 nullus] est falsus unus E₄ || sit] aliter scit *add.* E₈ 16–17 Quod accidit *corr.*] *inv. mss* 18 quod] hoc *add.* E₄ || hec] est *add.* E₄ 22 non] omnino E₈ 25–26 assignant defectum] *inv.* E₄ 27 istam] ista E₄ 29 est] sit E₄

as is evident. But it can only be false because of one of two reasons: either because he says nothing or because he says something that is true, but not for the second reason, hence because of the first.

ad 2.1.1 But this solution denies the evidence of our senses. For if someone saying this:

I say a falsehood

says it for a long time he ⟨will be⟩ worn out from speaking, ⟨and⟩ similarly ⟨will⟩ wear down some of his listeners in the scenario, but that could hardly be the case if he said nothing, given that others hear only what he says.

Similarly, someone seeing this proposition:

I see nothing

sees something.

ad 2.1 Concerning their claim that every insoluble has its origin from an act of ours expressed in the insoluble, it is similarly certain that it is false. For in this:

A falsehood exists

no act of ours is expressed, supposing, however, that this is the only proposition. The same happens in other insolubles.

ad 2.1.2 Regarding the grounds for this solution: it is clear that they are not persuasive; for this is false:

A falsehood is said by Socrates,

but it is not because of either of those two reasons,⁶ but because it means that a falsehood is said by Socrates which is not said by him, as will be explained more fully in what follows.⁷

⟨Solutions according to errors in matter: Bradwardine's solution⟩

2.2 Others responding to these sorts of paralogsms find no defect in the ⟨initial⟩ paralogism, but in a further paralogism they claim there is a defect in matter,⁸ denying one of the premises. Thus supposing Socrates says this:

Socrates says a falsehood,

call it A, they say that A is false. And when one argues:

A is a falsehood, and A is said by Socrates, so a falsehood
is said by Socrates,

⁶ See §2.1.2: "because he says nothing or because he says something true".

⁷ See §3.4.

⁸ That is, in its premises.

concedunt consequentiam et antecedens et consequens similiter, et ita nullum defectum assignant, cum tamen ille sit parallogismus, ut patebit in processu. Et cum arguitur ultra:

5 Hec est vera 'Sortes dicit falsum' et Sortes dicit hanc et
 solum hanc, ergo dicit verum,
negant minorem: illam enim quam ego propono non dicit Sortes, sed sibi similem.

2.2.1 Ratio autem istius positionis est hec: dicit hec [pro]positio quod pars potest supponere pro suo toto, et hoc indifferenter respectu cuiuscumque
10 predicati et respectu cuiuscumque copule, unde A, quam dicit Sortes, significat se falsam dici a Sorte, et ita significat se esse falsam et veram similiter, quia quelibet propositio significans se non esse veram significat se esse veram, ut dicit positio. Et ita illa quam dicit Sortes, est falsa pro se ipsa, sed illa quam ego dico <et> similis est ei secundum vocem, vera est.
15 Illa enim quam ego dico verificatur pro consimili dicta a Sorte, sed illam quam ego dico non dicit Sortes, ut si dicat Sortes:

 Sortes dicit falsum,
que sit A, dicunt quod A significat se esse falsam et veram similiter, sed <si> ego propono:
20 Sortes dicit falsum,
que sit B, dicunt quod B est simpliciter vera pro A dicta a Sorte.

2.2.2 Contra istam positionem arguitur multipliciter. Primo sic: A quam dicit Sortes est falsa, ergo eius contradictoria erit vera:

 Nullum falsum dicitur a Sorte,
25 et tu concedes quod falsum dicitur a Sorte, ergo erunt ista simul vera:
 Falsum dicitur a Sorte
et:
 Nullum falsum dicitur a Sorte,
que apparent contradictorie.

30 2.2.3 Contra hoc arguitur aliter sic: proponatur hec vel scribatur:

1 concedunt consequentiam] conceditur consequentia E₈ || ita] ista E₄ 2–3 cum ... processu] *om.* E₈ 6 enim] *om.* E₄ || ego propono] expono E₄ 8 dicit] quod *add.* E₈ 12 similiter] simpliciter E₄ 13 veram] *om.* E₄ || positio] *om.* E₄ 14 similis est] *inv.* E₄ 15 illam *corr.*] aliam *a.c.* idem *p.c.* E₄ illa E₈ 16 si] quia E₄ 21 est simpliciter] *inv.* E₄ 23 est] esse E₄ || erit vera] sed E₄ 25 ergo erunt] *inv.* E₄ 29 que apparent contradictorie] que apparet contradicere E₈ quia apparent contradictorie E₄ 30 arguitur aliter] arguo E₈ || proponatur] ponatur E₄

they grant the inference and the premises and the conclusion similarly, and thus assign no defect—although in fact it is a paralogism, as will be clear in what follows. And when one argues further:

‘Socrates says a falsehood’ is true and Socrates says this
and only this, so he says a truth,

they deny the minor premise, for Socrates does not say the proposition I assert, but a proposition similar to it.⁹

2.2.1 Now the ground for this solution is this: this solution says that the part can supposit for its whole and this indifferently for any predicate and any copula.¹⁰ Hence A, which Socrates says, signifies itself to be a false utterance of Socrates’, and thus signifies itself to be false—and also to be true because any proposition signifying itself not to be true signifies itself to be true, so the solution claims.¹¹ And thus the proposition uttered by Socrates is false about itself, but the one which I utter, which is similar to it syntactically, is true. For the proposition which I utter is true about the similar utterance of Socrates’, but Socrates does not utter the proposition which I utter; e.g., if Socrates says:

Socrates says a falsehood,

call it A, they say that A signifies itself to be false and also true, but (if) I claim

Socrates says a falsehood,

call it B, they say that B is unconditionally true about A, which is uttered by Socrates.¹²

2.2.2 I argue against this solution in many ways, first like this: A, which Socrates says, is false, so its contradictory will be true:

No falsehood is said by Socrates,

and you grant that a falsehood is said by Socrates, so these will be true together:

A falsehood is said by Socrates,

and

No falsehood is said by Socrates,

which appear to be contradictories.

2.2.3 I argue in another way against this argument like this: let this proposition be proposed or written:

⁹ See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §ad 7.1.1.

¹⁰ This is Bradwardine’s third postulate: *Insolubilia*, §6.3.

¹¹ This is Bradwardine’s second conclusion: *Insolubilia*, §6.4.

¹² An allusion to Bradwardine’s appeal to the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter* to characterize his solution to the insolubles: see Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §ad 7.11.

Hoc est falsum,

que sit A et demonstrato per aliam, li B, hoc toto A, quod est possibile secundum hanc positionem, tunc A est falsum. Concedatur; ergo eius contradictorium est | verum:

E₈ 22vb

5 Hoc non est falsum,
vel:

Nihil quod est ⟨hoc est⟩ falsum,
et tu concede⟨s⟩ quod A est falsum, ergo eodem precise demonstrato ista erunt simul vera:

10 Hoc est falsum,
et:

Nihil quod est hoc est falsum,
quod non capit mens.

2.2.3.1 Preterea: ex opposito ipsius A arguitur sic:

15 Nihil quod est hoc est falsum, A est hoc, | ergo A non est falsum.

E₄ 159rb

Maior est vera et minor, et tamen negatur conclusio secundum istam [pro]positionem et ideo dicitur negando consequentiam.

20 Sed contra: maior est universalis negativa denotans predicatum negari a quolibet demonstrato in subiecto, et in minori accipitur subiectum unum pro quo supponit subiectum ⟨maioris⟩, ergo iste sillogismus regitur per dici de nullo. Sic ergo dicendo negatur evidentissimum fundamentum sillogismorum.

25 Sed dicitur quod etsi subiectum supponat pro A in maiori non tamen denotatur predicatum removeri ab illo.

Contra: cum maior sit universalis negativa denotabit predicatum removeri ab aliquo demonstrato per subiectum, et nihil demonstratur ibi nisi A, per casum, ergo in maiori denotatur predicatum removeri ab A.

30 **2.2.3.2** Preterea: secundum istam positionem sequitur quod aliqua universalis est vera cuius aliqua singularis est falsa, ymmo cuius multe singulares sunt false, et similiter indefinita falsa cuius autem aliqua singularis est vera, quia [subiectum] oppositum ipsius A est verum et tamen singularis

2 demonstrato] eodem preter se *scr. sed del.* E₈ || aliam] alium E₈ *om.* E₄ || toto *corr.*] totum *mss* 3 Concedatur] conceditur E₄ 8 precise] preciso E₄ 12 est hoc] *om.* E₄ 14 A] *om.* E₄ 24 etsi] si E₄ || non tamen] *om.* E₈ 27 A] *om.* E₄ 30 cuius²] cum E₄ 31 indefinita] infinita E₄ || cuius] cum E₈ 32 oppositum] *om.* E₄

This is a falsehood,
 call it A, where the whole of A is referred to by ⟨the subject of⟩ another
 ⟨instance of ‘This is a falsehood’⟩, call it B, which is possible according
 to this solution.¹³ Then A is false ⟨and B is true⟩. If this is granted, then
 ⟨A⟩’s contradictory is true:

This is not a falsehood

or

Nothing which is this is a falsehood;

and you grant that A is false, so these will be true together:

This is a falsehood

and

Nothing which is this is a falsehood,

referring precisely to the same thing ⟨viz A⟩, which is incomprehensible.

2.2.3.1 Moreover: I argue from the opposite of A like this:

Nothing which is this is a falsehood, A is this, so A is not
 a falsehood.

The major premise is true as well as the minor, and yet the conclusion
 is denied according to this solution, and so the validity of the inference
 must be denied.

On the contrary: the major is a universal negative meaning that the
 predicate is denied of anything referred to by the subject, and in the
 minor one object is taken for which the subject ⟨of the major⟩ supposits,
 so this syllogism is governed by the rule “dici de nullo”, so by saying ⟨that
 the validity of the inference must be denied⟩ the most evident ground of
 syllogisms is denied.¹⁴

But it is said ⟨in reply⟩ that even if the subject supposits for A in the major,
 the meaning, however, is that the predicate is not separated from it.

On the contrary: since the major is a universal negative it will mean that
 the predicate is separated from anything referred to by the subject, and
 nothing is referred to in the major except A, by hypothesis, so in the major
 the meaning is that the predicate is separated from A.

2.2.3.2 Moreover: according to this solution, it follows that some universal
 proposition is true one of whose singulars¹⁵ is false, indeed, many of its
 singulars are false—and similarly, that an indefinite is false some singular
 of which is true—because the opposite of A is a true ⟨universal⟩ but the

¹³ As set out in §2.2.1 above.

¹⁴ It’s a syllogism in Celarent, which is directly supported by the “dici de nullo” (“to be said of none”): see Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, I 1, 24b30–31.

¹⁵ This is the syntactic singular as defined in §1 above.

ubi demonstratur A est falsa. Et secundum positionem istam conceditur totum istud quia ista:

Nihil quod est A est falsum

habet istas duas singulares:

5 A non est falsum,

et:

A est verum,

et illas significat disiunctive, particularis autem opposita illas significat copulative. Sed istud videtur mirabile. Magis enim deberet esse modo
10 contrario secundum | processum Aristotelis. 'Omne' enim et talia signa universalis non significant universale sed quoniam universaliter secundum Aristotelem in libro Peryarmonias, et hoc est facere terminum communem sibi adiunctum copulative supponere pro quolibet sui (inferiori) secundum omnes exponentes.

Eg 23ra

15 **2.2.3.3** Preterea: hoc quod dicitur quod ista:

A est verum,

est singularis huius universalis, quod est:

⟨Nihil quod est⟩ A est falsum,

est manifeste falsum quia hec universalis est mere negativa, sicut patet,
20 ergo nihil ponit affirmando sicut nec ista:

Cesar non est,

que nihil ponit esse; tamen quia predicatum illius universalis est iste terminus 'falsum', respectu cuius accipiende sunt singulares propositiones, hec autem singularis:

25 A est verum

non convenit cum illa universali in predicato, ymmo et simile esset dicere quod

Sortes est niger

est singularis huius:

30 Nihil quod est Sortes est album,

quod est manifeste falsum.

1 positionem istam] *inv.* E₄ 2 istud] quod *add.* E₈ 8 illas significat²] *inv.* E₄ 17 est singularis] *inv.* E₄ 22 que] et E₈ 30 album] albus E₄

singular proposition where A is referred to is false; and according to this solution the whole is granted, because this:

Nothing which is A is a falsehood,
has these two singulars:

A is not a falsehood
and

A is a truth,¹⁶
and it signifies them disjunctively, while the particular proposition which is the opposite (of the universal) signifies them conjunctively. But that seems miraculous, for it should rather be in the other way round according to Aristotle's thought. For 'every' and such universal quantifiers do not signify a universal but instead signify universally according to Aristotle in the *Perihermeneias*,¹⁷ and (to signify universally) is to make a general term adjoined to it supposit conjunctively for any of its (inferiors) by means of all the exponents.

2.2.3.3 Moreover: to say that this:

A is a truth
is a singular of the universal proposition, namely
(Nothing which is) A is a falsehood,

is manifestly false because this universal proposition is purely negative, as is clear; hence it claims nothing affirmatively, just as neither does this:

Caesar does not exist,
which does not claim anything to exist. However, because the predicate of that universal proposition¹⁸ is the term 'falsehood', in respect of which the singular propositions should be taken—whereas this singular:

A is a truth,
does not agree with the universal in the predicate—it would be like saying that

Socrates is black
is a singular of

Nothing which is Socrates is white,
which is manifestly false.

¹⁶ According to Bradwardine, A (that is, 'This is a falsehood') signifies conjunctively that A is a falsehood and A is true. So its opposite (that is, 'Nothing which is this is a falsehood') is a universal negative proposition which signifies disjunctively that A is not a falsehood or that A is not true. These conjuncts and disjuncts, which are parts of what A and its opposite signify, are also described by Bradwardine as singulars of A and its opposite: see Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §ad 7.6.

¹⁷ See Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, ch. 7, 17b11–12 (tr. Boethius, ed. Minio-Paluello, p. 10, 14–15); Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 305 #11.

¹⁸ That is, 'Nothing which is A is a falsehood'.

Et ideo dicitur quod hec est singularis subiecti etsi non propositionis.
Sed contra: subiectum istius universalis est terminus singularis non habens nisi unum suppositum, puta A, ergo etc.

2.2.4 Preterea: ista [pro]positio ponit[ur] quod una talis:

5 Falsum dicitur a Sorte
est vera pro una simili falsa. Pono ergo quod iste due simul sint:
Falsum est
et:

Falsum est,
10 et nulla alia, et sit una A et alia B. Quero tunc an A sit verum vel falsum.
Si verum, ergo eadem ratione B est verum, cum non sit maior ratio de una
quam de alia, ergo nihil est falsum, ergo propositio ⟨A⟩ dicens falsum
esse est falsa. Si A est falsum, ergo B est verum quia hec positio ponit
15 falsum cum non sit maior ratio quare una debeat esse vera quam alia.

Ideo dicitur negando consequentiam:

A est falsum, ergo B est verum,
quia utraque illarum significat se esse veram et falsam.
Sed contra: ergo ita foret in aliis quia de similibus simile est iudicium, | E₈ 23rb
20 ergo si una talis foret falsa:

Sortes dicit falsum,
quelibet consimilis foret falsa. Similiter ista:
Falsum est

secundum istam positionem non significat se esse falsam nisi nullo alio
25 existente falso, ergo posito quod A falsum sit, B non significat se esse
falsum.

Si dicatur quod A significat se esse falsum etiam alio falso existente, contra:
cum non sit maior ratio quare significet se esse falsum uno falso existente
quam alio, sequitur quod semper significaret se esse falsum. Consequens
30 falsum quia aliquando est vera.

2 istius] huius E₄ 3 puta] *om.* E₄ 8–9 et ... est] *om.* E₈ 13 est³] *om.* E₄ 15 maior]
falsa *add.* E₄ 17 B] una E₄ 22 foret] esset (*dub.*) E₄ 27 A] minor *a.c.* B *p.c.* E₄ ||
etiam] et E₈ 28 significet] significaret E₄ 30 est vera] *inv.* E₄

And so it (might be) said that it is a singular of the subject even if not of the proposition.

But on the contrary: the subject of this universal is a singular term having only one supposit, namely A, hence (that A is the singular of the universal proposition is manifestly false).

2.2.4 Moreover: this solution claims that one proposition like this:

A falsehood is said by Socrates

is true about a falsehood similar to it. Hence suppose that there are these two together:

A falsehood exists

and

A falsehood exists

and no others, let one be A and the other B. Then I ask whether A is true or false. If (A is) true, then for the same reason B is true, since there is no more reason why one rather than the other. So nothing is false, so the proposition, (that is, A,) saying that a falsehood exists is false. If A is false, then B is true because this solution claims that one of them can be true about a falsehood similar (to it). But the conclusion is false since there is no more reason why one should be true than the other.

So one reply is to deny the inference:

A is false, therefore B is true,

because each of them signifies itself to be true and false.

But on the contrary: then it would be like that in other cases because there should be a similar judgment about similar things, therefore if one proposition like this was false:

Socrates says a falsehood,

any proposition similar to it would be false. Similarly, this:

A falsehood exists,

only signifies itself to be false according to this solution if there is no other falsehood, so supposing that A is false, B does not signify itself to be false.

If it is said that A signifies itself to be false even when there is another falsehood, on the contrary: since there is no more reason why it should signify itself to be false when one falsehood exists rather than another, it follows that (A) would always signify itself to be false. The conclusion is false because sometimes (A) is true.

2.2.5 Preterea: supponatur quod Sortes et Petrus sint simul in eadem domo et dicat Sortes:

Falsum est in domo,

que sit A, et dicat Petrus simul:

5 Falsum est in domo,

que sit B. Queritur tunc utrum A sit verum vel falsum. Si verum, ergo B est verum eadem ratione, et ultra: ergo nullum falsum est in domo, posito quod tantum iste due propositiones sint. Ideo dicitur quod utraque est falsa.

10 Sed contra: si Sortes diceret istam propositionem extra domum:

Falsum est in domo,

tunc illa foret vera pro B dicta a Petro in domo secundum istam positionem. Sed manifestum est quod idem significat omnino et eodem modo ista propositio prolata extra domum et intra. Sed extra domum prolata verificatur pro B, ergo in domo similiter.

15 Et istud confirmatur per hoc quod propositio non mutatur de veritate in falsitatem nisi per mutationem factam ex parte rei, sed tota res pro qua verificatur extra domum manet non mutata ipsa existente in domo, ergo si pro hac re verificatur extra domum, pro eadem verificabitur in domo.

20 In eo enim quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. |

Eg 23va

2.2.5.1 Preterea: significatum complexi consurgit ex significatis incomple-xorum copulatis ad invicem, sicut patet ex processu in tertio De anima et libro Peryarmenias. Sed manifestum est quod termini incomplexi istius propositionis:

25 Falsum est in domo

idem significant in domo et extra domum, et eodem modo quantum in eis est, et eodem modo copulantur ad invicem in domo et extra domum, ergo significatum quod consurgit ex istis sic copulatis erit idem in domo et extra domum, cuius tamen oppositum ponit hec positio.

3 est in domo] esse in domo est in domo E₄ 7 B] minor a.c. E₄ || ergo] om. E₈ 8 due] om. E₄ 9 est] sit E₄ 10 si] om. E₄ 12 pro] quod E₈ || Petro] dicta add. E₄ 14 ista] om. E₄ 18 manet] videt E₄ 19 verificabitur] verificatur E₄ 20 est¹] om. E₄ || oratio ... est] est oratio vera vel falsa E₄ 22 ex] in E₈ 23 est] om. E₄ 26 in domo] om. E₄ 27 est] om. E₄ 28 ergo] totum add. E₄

2.2.5 Moreover: suppose that Socrates and Peter are together in the same house and Socrates says:

A falsehood exists inside the house,
call it A, and Peter says at the same time:

A falsehood exists inside the house,
call it B. Then I ask whether A is true or false. If it is true, then B is true for the same reason; and moreover, therefore no falsehood exists inside the house, supposing that there are only these two propositions. Hence it is said that both are false.

But on the contrary: if Socrates were to say this proposition outside the house:

A falsehood exists inside the house,
then it would be true about proposition B spoken by Peter inside the house, according to this solution. But it is evident that this proposition signifies altogether the same and in the same way uttered outside the house and inside. But uttered outside the house it is true about B, so inside the house too.

And this is confirmed by the fact that a proposition does not change from truth to falsehood except through a change made in reality, but everything about which it is true when outside the house remains unchanged when it is inside the house. Therefore if it is true about that thing when outside the house, it will be true about the same thing when inside the house. For an utterance is true or false insofar as things are or are not the case.

2.2.5.1 Moreover: the significate of a ⟨propositional⟩ complex derives from the mutual conjoining of the significates of the simple expressions, as is clear from the reasoning in the third book of the *De Anima* and from the *Perihermeneias*.¹⁹ But it is evident that the simple terms of this proposition:

A falsehood exists inside the house
signify the same thing inside the house and outside the house and signify in the same way in themselves and are mutually conjoined in the same way inside the house and outside the house. Therefore the significate which derives from those significates conjoined in this way will be the same inside the house and outside the house. But this solution claims the opposite.

¹⁹ *On the Soul* III ch. 6 (430a26 ff.) and *De Interpretatione*, chs. 4–5.

2.2.6 Preterea: posito quod Sortes dicat:

Falsum dicitur a vidente,

et Plato sic dicat:

Nullum falsum dicitur a vidente,

- 5 posito quod uterque habeat oculos apertos, uterque contradiceret alteri secundum istam positionem, sed posito quod Plato clauderet oculos et diceret illud idem, non contradiceret Sorti. Sequitur ergo ex ista positione quod contradictio tollitur inter propositiones per motum palpebre, quod tamen est omnino irrationale.

2.2.7 Preterea: ista propositio:

Falsum dicitur a Sorte,

non plus significat se dici a Sorte quam aliam quia supposito quod subiectum supponat pro tota <propositione> adhuc non plus supponit pro ista quam pro alia, sicut posito quod tantum Sortes curreret non plus significat ista propositio:

- 15

Homo currit

Sorte currente quam Platone currente; subiectum enim equaliter significat Sortem et Platonem. Ex modo etiam supponendi non habet quod plus supponat pro uno quam pro alio quia supponit pro suis suppositis disiunctive, sed disiunctiva non plus significat unam suam partem esse veram quam aliam.

- 20

2.2.8 Preterea: significare est actio significantis, sed hec propositio:

Falsum est

quantum est ex parte | sua eodem modo agit nullo alio falso existente et alio falso existente, quia non est agens cognoscens, sed nullo alio falso existente significat se esse falsam et hoc secundum sic dicentes, ergo alio | falso existente significabit se esse falsam et hoc passo eodem modo disposito, ut posito quod etsi aliud falsum sit, lateat tamen illud cum proponitur ista:

E₄ 159va

E₈ 23vb

3 dicat *corr.*] dicit *mss* et *add.* E₄ 5 habeat] haberet E₄ || apertos] vides E₄ 8 tollitur inter propositiones] inter propositiones tollitur E₄ 9 est omnino] *inv.* E₄ 17 equaliter] equale E₈ 18 supponendi] supponendo E₈ || quod] *om.* E₈ 20 suam] *om.* E₈ 22 hec] *om.* E₈ 24 sua] sui E₄ 26 falsam *corr.*] falsum *mss* 26–27 secundum sic ... et hoc] *add.* *supra lineam* E₄ 28 illud] illum E₈ 29 proponitur] proponi E₄

2.2.6 Moreover: supposing that Socrates says:

A falsehood is said by one seeing,
and Plato says this:

No falsehood is said by one seeing,
supposing that both have their eyes open, each would contradict the other according to this solution. But supposing that Plato closed his eyes and said the same thing, he would not contradict Socrates. Therefore, it follows from this solution that a contradiction between propositions is removed through the movement of the eyelid, which, however, is completely unreasonable.²⁰

2.2.7 Moreover: this proposition:

A falsehood is said by Socrates,
no more signifies itself to be said by Socrates than it does any other proposition. For, supposing that the subject supposits for the whole proposition, still, it no more supposits for this proposition than for another; just as supposing that only Socrates were running, this proposition:

A man is running,
no more signifies ⟨that Socrates is running⟩ when Socrates is running than ⟨it signifies that Plato is running⟩ when Plato is running. For the subject equally signifies Socrates and Plato. Also from the mode of supposition²¹ it does not supposit more for one than for the other, because it supposits for its supposita disjunctively, but a disjunctive proposition no more signifies one of its disjuncts to be true than another.

2.2.8 Moreover: to signify is an act of the one who signifies, but this proposition:

A falsehood exists,
in itself acts in the same way whether no other falsehood exists or another falsehood exists, because it does not have a mind of its own. But if no other falsehood exists it signifies itself to be false, at least according to those advocating this solution. Therefore even if another falsehood exists it will still signify itself to be false, and this while the words are arranged in the same way. E.g., supposing that even if another falsehood exists, yet let it be hidden when this is proposed:

²⁰ Segrave appears here to adapt Burley's notorious refutation of Ockham's account of the signification of terms, which seems to imply that it could be affected merely by the movement of a finger: see, e.g., Read, 'Logic in the Latin West in the Fourteenth Century', pp. 147–48.

²¹ On modes of supposition, see, e.g., Read, 'Medieval Theories of Properties of Terms', §3. In 'A man is running', 'man' has determinate supposition, which is explained by Ockham and others in terms of descent to and ascent from a disjunction of singulars of the original proposition.

Falsum est,

et ita posito alio falso, foret hec falsa:

Falsum est;

consequens est falsum, et ita patet falsitas illius dicti voluntarii et absque
5 ratione.

Capitulum Tertium

⟨Solventes secundum peccatum in forma⟩

3.0 Preter positiones iam dictas sunt alie ponentes insolubilia peccantia
in forma, et illi sunt bipartiti. Quidam solvunt illa secundum quid et
10 simpliciter, et quidam secundum fallaciam accidentis.

⟨Solventes secundum fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter⟩

3.1 Solventes secundum quid et simpliciter negant consequentiam:

Hoc falsum dicitur a Sorte, ergo falsum dicitur a Sorte.

15 Dicunt quod pars in talibus ubi accidit reflexio eiusdem supra se cum
verbo pertinente ad motus anime non supponit pro toto, et ideo dicens
hoc falsum non dicit falsum simpliciter sed secundum quid. Isti etiam sic
dicentes diversimode dicunt.

20 3.2 Quidam dicunt quod dicens se dicere falsum nihil dicit, nec aliquale
dicit nec propositionem dicit; sed dicit hoc aliquid, et hoc est dicere ali-
quid secundum quid et ⟨non⟩ simpliciter, hoc aliquale et non simpliciter
aliquale. Sed constat quod isti errant. Talis enim sic dicens loquitur, ergo
aliquid loquitur. Similiter sic dicens dicit litteras et sillabas, ergo aliquid
dicit et aliquale. Similiter videns istam:

2 alio falso] alia falsa E₄ 6 Capitulum Tertium] *in marg.* E₈ 8 positiones] ponentes E₄
|| dictas *corr.*] dictis E₈ dicto E₄ || alie] alii E₄ || peccantia] peccante E₄ 9 Quidam]
enim *add.* E₄ 15 reflexio] inflexio E₄ 23 loquitur] *om.* E₄