

# INSOLUBLES

WALTER SEGRAVE

CRITICAL EDITION WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION  
BY BARBARA BARTOCCI AND STEPHEN READ





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## Capitulum Quartum

### ⟨Solutio auctoris⟩

4.0 Istis premissis sine preiudicio aliorum dico quod omnia insolubilia solvenda sunt penes fallaciam accidentis. Dico quod isti sunt paralogismi difficillimi accidentis qui redarguunt sapientes, de quibus loquitur Aristoteles primo Elenchorum.

Pro quo sciendum est quod secundum fallaciam accidentis dupliciter fiunt paralogismi, vel ex variatione medii vel alterius extremorum: ex variatione medii ut si medium pro alio supponat in maiore quam faciat in minore vel pro alio supposito medii verificetur maior et minor; et ex variatione extremi similiter.

4.1 Dico ergo quod Sorte dicente:

Sortes dicit falsum,

Sortes non dicit falsum.

15 4.1.1 Et cum arguitur:

Hoc est falsum (demonstrato dicto a Sorte) | et Sortes dicit hanc, ergo Sortes dicit falsum,

E<sub>8</sub> 25ra

dico quod est fallacia accidentis ex variatione extremi. Iste enim terminus 'falsum' pro aliquo supponit in maiori pro quo non supponit in conclusione. Similiter si arguitur ex opposito dicti a Sorte:

20 Nullum falsum dicitur a Sorte, hoc est falsum, ergo hoc non dicitur a Sorte,

hec est fallacia accidentis ex variatione medii; pro aliquo enim supponit iste terminus 'falsum' in minori pro quo non supponit in maiori. Sicut est de hoc paralogismo, ita est de omnibus similibus.

1 Capitulum Quartum ] *in marg.* E<sub>8</sub> 3 insolubilia ] principaliter *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 4–5 paralogismi ] sillogismi E<sub>4</sub> 7 est ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 9 alio ] aliquo E<sub>4</sub> 10 pro *corr.* ] per E<sub>8</sub> || medii ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 10–11 ex variatione *corr.* ] variationem *mss* 11 similiter ] consimiliter E<sub>4</sub> 15 cum ] hoc *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 16 dicto ] dictum E<sub>8</sub> 17 dicit<sup>1</sup> ] dicat E<sub>4</sub> 18 extremi ] medii E<sub>4</sub> || enim ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 19 maiori *corr.* ] minore *mss* 24 falsum ] *om.* E<sub>8</sub>

## Chapter 4

### ⟨The author's solution⟩

4.0 Given these preliminaries, I say, without prejudging the views of others, that all insolubles ought to be solved by the fallacy of accident. I say that these are the most difficult paralogisms of accident, which confute the wise, of which Aristotle speaks in the first book of the *Sophistical Refutations*.<sup>40</sup>

Here one should be aware that according to the fallacy of accident paralogisms arise in two ways, either from variation of the middle term, or of one of the extremes: from variation of the middle if the middle term supposit for something else in the major premise than it does in the minor, or the major and minor are true for a different suppositum of the middle; and variation of an extreme is similar.

4.1 Hence I say that, if Socrates says:

Socrates says a falsehood,

Socrates does not say a falsehood.<sup>41</sup>

4.1.1 And when one argues:

This is a falsehood (referring to what was said by Socrates)

and Socrates says this, hence Socrates says a falsehood,

I say that there is a fallacy of accident from variation of the extreme. For this term 'falsehood' supposit for something in the major premise for which it does not supposit in the conclusion. Similarly, if one argues from the opposite of what was said by Socrates:

No falsehood is said by Socrates, this is a falsehood, hence  
this is not said by Socrates,

this is a fallacy of accident by variation of the middle, for this term 'falsehood' supposit for something in the minor premise for which it does not supposit in the major.<sup>42</sup> Just as it is for this paralogism, so it is for all similar ones.

<sup>40</sup> *Sophistical Refutations* 6, 168a6–10.

<sup>41</sup> Both manuscripts read 'does not say' (*non dicit*). However, Paul of Venice (*Logica Magna: The Treatise on Insolubles*, ed. and tr. Bartocci and Read, §1.14.1.1), in his presentation of Segrave's solution, cites this passage almost verbatim, except that (in both the ms and the incunabulum) he attributes to Segrave the claim that if Socrates says only 'Socrates says a falsehood', then Socrates says a falsehood, and repeats this in his discussion at several points. The arguments that follow here show that Segrave's claim is that Socrates does not say a falsehood.

<sup>42</sup> Note that the major premise is the contradictory opposite of what was said by Socrates (in §4.1). So in the minor premise, both 'this' and 'falsehood' supposit for what was said by Socrates, but in the major premise, 'falsehood' cannot supposit for what was said by Socrates, by Segrave's principle, that no term can supposit for the opposite of the whole of which it is part. See also §6.8.1 and for further discussion, see Pozzi, *Il Mentitore e il Medioevo*, p. 59.

4.2 Sed quia recta solutio est manifestatio falsi sillogismi, oportet istam responsionem manifestare. Ad cuius manifestationem dico quod in nulla propositione supponit pars pro suo toto nec convertibili cum toto nec opposito totius nec antecedenti ad totum, ubi ex parte sic supponente  
 5 sequitur evidenter totum esse falsum nisi forte fuerit propositio composita ex terminis repugnantibus, ex qua repugnantia terminorum expressam contradictionem claudit, ut hec:

Quodlibet impossibile est possibile.

Sed de talibus nihil ad presens.

- 10 4.3 Istam propositionem probare volumus, et illius causam demonstrare est totam responsionem manifestare, pro quo premictam unam diffinitionem eius quod dico 'supponere' et unam aliam suppositionem ex qua sequitur intentum.

### ⟨Diffinitio suppositionis⟩

- 15 4.4 Pro quo sciendum ⟨est⟩ quod non quodlibet significare termini est ipsum supponere. ⟨Terminus⟩ significat enim in oratione, et extra contextum non supponit sed suppositionem habet ex hoc quod est pars propositionis. Nec etiam quodlibet significatum eius in propositione supponitur, quia sic dicendo:

- 20 Animal rationale est homo,

li 'animal' quodlibet animal significat, sed tantum hominem supponit. Supponere ergo pro aliquo est significare ipsum extremum unionis significare per copulam. Et 'est' in propositionibus, ut dicitur in libro Peryarmenias, significat quamdam compositionem mentalem quam sine | extremis  
 25 non est intelligere. Et ista compositio mentalis significat compositionem talem esse ex parte rei et similiter divisio mentalis negativa significat talem divisionem in re. Extrema igitur propositionis suppositionem capiunt a tali copulatione. Supponere pro suis suppositis est significare illa esse extrema illius unionis ex parte rei quam significat copula. Et hoc faciunt  
 30 aliquando copulative aliquando disiunctive, secundum quod diversum modum supponendi habent ex adiunctis.

E<sub>8</sub> 25rb

1 solutio ] solutione a.c. solutio p.c. E<sub>8</sub> 4 ubi ] quia E<sub>4</sub> || sic ] sit E<sub>8</sub> || supponente ] suppositio E<sub>4</sub> supponere E<sub>8</sub> 5 forte ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 6–7 expressam contradictionem ] expressum contradictio E<sub>4</sub> 9 Sed ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 16 contextum ] conceptum (dub.) E<sub>8</sub> 17 suppositionem ] non add. E<sub>4</sub> || hoc ] quod E<sub>4</sub> 18 eius ] om. E<sub>4</sub> || quia ] si add. E<sub>4</sub> 21 hominem ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 22 ergo ] autem add. E<sub>4</sub> 22–23 significare ] significare E<sub>4</sub> 23 Et est ] est enim E<sub>4</sub> 25 significat ] quamdam add. E<sub>8</sub> 26 talem<sup>1</sup> ] unionem add. E<sub>8</sub> || mentalis ] etiam add. E<sub>8</sub> 28 copulatione corr. ] copulativa mss || esse ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 29–30 faciunt aliquando ] inv. E<sub>4</sub> 30 aliquando ] om. E<sub>4</sub>

4.2 But because the correct solution is the exhibition<sup>43</sup> of a false syllogism, it is necessary to exhibit this response. For its exhibition I say that in no proposition does a part supposit for its whole (nor for what is convertible with the whole nor for the opposite of the whole nor for what implies the whole), where from the part suppositing in this way it clearly follows that the whole is false—unless perhaps the proposition were composed of inconsistent terms and from the inconsistency of those terms it includes an express contradiction, e.g.,

Everything impossible is possible.

But such cases are not relevant to our present concerns.

4.3 We want to prove this claim, and showing its cause is to exhibit the whole response, for which I shall put forth my own definition of ‘supposit’ and one other postulate from which what is wanted follows.

### ⟨Definition of supposition⟩

4.4 To this end it should be noted that not every signifying of a term is its suppositing. For ⟨a term⟩ signifies in an utterance, and outside the context ⟨of an utterance⟩ it does not supposit but ⟨only⟩ has supposition from being part of a proposition. Nor even is every one of its significates supposit ⟨for⟩ in a proposition. Because, saying this:

A rational animal is a man,

‘animal’ signifies every animal, but only supposits ⟨for⟩ a man.<sup>44</sup> Therefore, to supposit for something is to signify an extreme of the union signified by the copula. And ‘is’ in propositions, as is said in the *Perihermeneias*, signifies some mental composition which is not comprehensible without the extremes.<sup>45</sup> And this mental composition signifies that there is such composition in reality, and similarly, mental division and a negative proposition signify such division in things. Therefore, the extremes of a proposition take supposition from such a coupling. To supposit for its supposita is to signify them to be the extremes of that union in reality which the copula signifies. They do this sometimes conjunctively, sometimes disjunctively, insofar as they receive a different mode of suppositing from what is adjoined to them.

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<sup>43</sup> See §3.4 above.

<sup>44</sup> The supposition of ‘man’ is restricted by the adjoining of ‘rational’. See §ad 5.4 below.

<sup>45</sup> Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, ch. 3, 16b24 (tr. Boethius, p. 7, 18–19); Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 305, # 7.

### ⟨Suppositio de significatione⟩

4.5 Suppositio est hec: quod quelibet propositio denotat ita esse ex parte rei sicut ⟨ipsa⟩ significat. Hec est manifesta per se et patet per philosophum et commentatorem 5° metaphysice commento 14 et in littera illius  
 5 commenti per totum, copula enim in propositione significat esse verum, ut ibi declarabitur.

4.5.1 Ex hac sequitur alia quod quelibet propositio non includens contradictionem significat ita esse ex parte rei sicut ipsa significat, et non significat ita non esse, quia si significaret illa duo expressam contradictionem  
 10 includeret, quod est contra ypotesim.

4.5.2 Ex hac sequitur demonstrative propositum sic: quelibet propositio non includens contradictionem significat ita esse ex parte rei sicut ipsa significat, et non significat ita non esse; sed ita esse ex parte rei sicut ipsa  
 15 propositio significat et non ita non esse est propositionem esse veram et non falsam, et hoc si illa propositio est; ergo quelibet propositio non includens contradictionem, cum hoc quod ipsa est, significat se esse veram et non falsam.

Et hoc patet de qualibet propositione inductive. Sequitur enim:

20 Ita est ex parte rei in toto sicut significat ista ‘tu sedes’, et  
 hec est, ergo hec est vera et non falsa,

et ita de aliis. Ergo quelibet propositio non includens contradictionem, cum hoc quod ipsa est, significat se esse | veram et non falsam.

E<sub>4</sub> 160ra

4.5.3 Ex hac | sequitur ulterius quod extrema propositionis tantum illa  
 25 supponunt pro quibus totum potest denotare se esse verum, cum hoc quod ipsum est, et non supponunt talia pro quibus totum, cum hoc quod ipsum est, denotaret se esse falsum. Et hoc est propositum. In ista ergo:

E<sub>8</sub> 25va

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8 esse ] om. E<sub>8</sub> || ipsa ] propositio E<sub>4</sub> 9 non ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 8–11 et non significat ... propositio ] in marg. E<sub>4</sub> 12 ipsa ] propositio E<sub>4</sub> 13 esse<sup>2</sup> corr. ] est E<sub>8</sub> om. E<sub>4</sub> 13–14 non significat ... et non ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 14 esse<sup>1</sup> ] om. E<sub>4</sub> || est propositionem ] iter. et del. E<sub>8</sub> 15 si ] in E<sub>4</sub> 19 in toto ] note E<sub>8</sub> 20 hec<sup>1</sup> corr. ] hoc E<sub>4</sub> homo E<sub>8</sub> || ergo ] om. E<sub>8</sub> || hec<sup>2</sup> ] hoc E<sub>4</sub> 22 falsam ] et add. E<sub>4</sub> 25 cum ] om. E<sub>8</sub>

### ⟨A postulate about signification⟩

4.5 The postulate is this: that every proposition means things being in reality as it signifies. This is self-evident and is clear from the Philosopher and the Commentator in comment 14 on the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* and throughout the text of that comment:<sup>46</sup> for the copula in the proposition signifies being true, as elucidated there.

4.5.1 From this it follows further that every proposition not involving a contradiction signifies things being in reality as it signifies, and does not signify things not being (in reality as it signifies), because if it signified them both it would involve an express contradiction, which is contrary to the hypothesis.

4.5.2 From this, what was claimed follows ostensibly in this way: every proposition not involving a contradiction signifies things being in reality as it signifies, and does not signify things not being (in reality as it signifies). But things being in reality as the proposition signifies, and not things not being (in reality as it signifies) is for a proposition to be true and not false, provided the proposition exists; so every proposition not involving a contradiction, assuming it exists, signifies itself to be true and not false.

And this is clear of every proposition one by one. For this inference is valid:

Things are in reality wholly as the proposition ‘You are sitting’ signifies, and it exists, therefore this proposition is true and not false,

and the same is true of other propositions. Therefore, every proposition not involving a contradiction, assuming it exists, signifies itself to be true and not false.<sup>47</sup>

4.5.3 From this it follows further that the extremes of a proposition only supposit ⟨for⟩ those things about which the whole can mean that it itself is true, assuming that it exists, and those extremes do not supposit ⟨for⟩ those things about which the whole, assuming that it exists, would mean that it itself is false. And this is what I claim. Therefore, in this:

<sup>46</sup> See *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentaria*, vol. VIII In *Metaphysicen* V 7, de ente, comm. 14 f. 117E: [https://archive.org/details/bub\\_gb\\_u\\_T0u0IuuyIC/page/n251/mode/2up](https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_u_T0u0IuuyIC/page/n251/mode/2up) (ed. Ponzalli, pp. 131–32), commenting on Aristotle’s text at 1017a31–35.

<sup>47</sup> Note that in this argument, Segrave implicitly appeals to Bradwardine’s famous second postulate (Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §6.3): “Every proposition signifies or means as a matter of fact or absolutely everything which follows from it as a matter of fact or absolutely” (quelibet propositio significat sive denotat ut nunc vel simpliciter omne quod sequitur ad istam ut nunc vel simpliciter). Segrave’s disagreement with Bradwardine is over his third postulate: “The part can supposit for its whole and for its opposite and for what is equivalent to them” (pars potest supponere pro suo toto et eius opposito et convertilibus earundem), which Segrave explicitly denied at §4.2.



Falsum est

non supponit subiectum pro toto quia tunc posset denotare se esse verum pro se falso sine contradictione, quod tamen est falsum quia hoc esse verum pro se falso includit contradictionem.

5 **4.6** Ideo forte dicitur quod hec:

Falsum est,

et quelibet consimilis ubi cadit insolubile, includit contradictionem aliquo casu posito.

10 **ad 4.6** Sed istud nihil est quia ista propositio non significat illum casum poni nec esse verum, quia secundum sic dicentes

Falsum est

non significat se esse falsum nisi ipso existente et nullo alio falso. Sed manifestum est quod ista:

Falsum est

15 non significat nullum aliud falsum esse. Semper enim uno modo significat quantum est ex parte sua, cum non sit agens cognoscens, sicut primum argutum est.

**4.6.1** Sed forte dicitur quod non sequitur:

20 A non significat nullum aliud falsum esse, ergo non significat se esse falsum.

**ad 4.6.1** Sed contra: ista consequentia est necessaria:

A est falsum, ergo nullum aliud falsum ab A est,

25 quia si foret aliud falsum, tunc A esset verum, ergo quicquid infert vel significat antecedens significat consequens, ergo, ex opposito, quod non significat consequens non significat antecedens.

**4.6.2** Sed dicis: ista iam dicta bene probant quod ita est quod pars non supponit pro toto nec convertibili et ita de aliis, sed non dicunt causam quare | ita est.

E<sub>8</sub> 25vb

30 **ad 4.6.2** Et dico quod causa patet ex predictis et est hec: quia extrema suppositionem capiunt a copula cuius significatum est esse verum, ut dictum est, ideo non supponit pro aliquo pro quo totum denotaret se

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3 falso *corr.* ] falsa *mss.* 5 hec ] hoc E<sub>4</sub> 12 falsum ] falsam E<sub>4</sub> || nullo alio ] *inv.* E<sub>4</sub>  
 12–13 sed manifestum ... ista ] in quantum est ex parte sui E<sub>4</sub> 15 Semper enim uno ] enim  
 semper opposito E<sub>4</sub> 16 quantum ... sua ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 18 Sed ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 21 ista consequentia ]  
*inv.* E<sub>8</sub> 26 dicis ] dicet E<sub>4</sub> || probant ] probat E<sub>8</sub> 30 suppositionem capiunt ] *inv.* E<sub>4</sub>  
 31 denotaret ] denotat E<sub>4</sub>

A falsehood exists,  
the subject does not supposit for the whole because then it could mean that it itself is true about its false self without contradiction, which, however, is false because ‘being true about its false self’ involves a contradiction.

**4.6** For this reason one might perhaps say that this:

A falsehood exists,  
and every similar proposition where an insoluble occurs, involves a contradiction in some assumed scenario.

**ad 4.6** But this cannot be right because this proposition does not signify that this scenario is assumed nor that it is true, because according to those advocating this solution,

A falsehood exists  
does not signify that it itself is a falsehood except when it exists and no other falsehood exists. But it is evident that this:

A falsehood exists,  
does not signify that no other falsehood exists. For it always signifies in one way for its own part, since it does not have a mind of its own, as was argued earlier.<sup>48</sup>

**4.6.1** But perhaps one can say that this inference is not valid:

A does not signify that no other falsehood exists, so it  
does not signify that it itself is false.

**ad 4.6.1** But on the contrary: this inference is necessary:

A is false, therefore no other falsehood than A exists,  
because if there were another falsehood, then A would be true, so whatever implies or signifies the premise signifies the conclusion,<sup>49</sup> so from the opposite, the premise does not signify what the conclusion does not signify.

**4.6.2** But you object: what has already been said confirms that the part does not supposit for the whole nor for what is convertible with it, and so on, but they do not give a reason why this is.

**ad 4.6.2** I say that the reason is clear from what has been said, and it is because the extremes take their supposition from the copula, whose significate is that the proposition is true, as was said. So the extreme

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<sup>48</sup> See §2.2.8.

<sup>49</sup> If it were not for the implicit appeal to Bradwardine’s second postulate in §4.5 (see n. 36) one might suspect that his use of it here was *ad hominem*, since he is here presumably arguing against Bradwardine. Bradwardine would presumably concede that A does signify that no other falsehood than A exists, since that follows from the claim that A is false.

esse falsum vel non esse verum, quia hoc repugnaret significato copule et ideo restringantur per copulativam rationem. Unde hec opinio dicta est opinio restringentium. Aliquando tamen accidit quod extrema supponunt contrarium illius quod significatur per copulam et hoc accidit ex  
 5 repugnantia extremorum ad invicem vel ex aliqua repugnantia inclusa in altero extremorum.

Sic igitur patet quia est et propter quid est.

4.7 Istud idem potest aliter probari sic supponendo cum philosopho quod ex universali contingit inferri quodlibet pro quo subiectum supponit, super hoc enim dependet omnis evidentia sillogistica, sicut patet  
 10 primo Priorum. Ex hoc sequitur quod ex singulari contingit inferre suam particularem ubi supponit pro illa singulari.

4.7.1 Hiis positis, partem non supponere pro suo toto et hoc in talibus ubi si faceret sequeretur ipsam esse falsam sequitur ex utraque parte contradictionis cum istis positionibus iam suppositis. Hoc arguo sic:  
 15 Sequitur

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2 restringantur ] restringatur E<sub>4</sub> 4 illius ] illo E<sub>4</sub> 5 inclusa ] inclusi E<sub>8</sub> 7 quia ] quare E<sub>8</sub>  
 8 Istud ] illud E<sub>4</sub> 10 super hoc ] semper E<sub>4</sub> 14 sequeretur ] sequitur E<sub>4</sub> 15 iam  
 suppositis ] *inv.* E<sub>4</sub> 16 Sequitur ] sequeretur E<sub>8</sub>

does not supposit for anything about which the whole would mean that it itself is false or is not true, because this would be inconsistent with the significate of the copula, and so the extremes should be restricted by the meaning of the copula. So this solution<sup>50</sup> is called the solution of the restrictivists. Sometimes, however, it happens that the extremes supposit for the contrary of what is signified by the copula, and this results from the mutual inconsistency of the extremes or from some inconsistency involved in one of the extremes.

In this way, therefore, it is clear that ⟨the part does not supposit for its whole⟩ and why.<sup>51</sup>

**4.7** That same ⟨claim, viz that the part does not supposit for its whole where it would mean that it itself is false⟩ can be proved in another way by assuming with Aristotle that from a universal proposition one can infer anything for which the subject supposits, since the evidential force of all syllogistic reasoning depends on this assumption,<sup>52</sup> as is clear from the first book of the *Prior Analytics*. From this it follows that from a singular proposition one can infer the corresponding particular proposition where ⟨the subject⟩ supposits for that singular.<sup>53</sup>

**4.7.1** With these assumptions in place, ⟨the claim⟩ that the part does not supposit for its whole in cases where if it did it would follow that it was false follows from each member of a contradictory pair with the assumptions already assumed.<sup>54</sup> I argue for it like this: the inference

<sup>50</sup> That is, Segrave's own solution.

<sup>51</sup> Segrave is alluding here to the distinction between two forms of explanation: *quia et propter quid* (the reason and the reason why). See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I 13, and, e.g., Longeway, 'Medieval Theories of Demonstration', §1.

<sup>52</sup> Presumably what Segrave is referring to here is the *dici de omni et nullo*: *Prior Analytics*, I 1, 24b29–32.

<sup>53</sup> If from 'All A is/is not B' we can infer 'This A is/is not B', then by contraposition, from 'This A is not/is B' (equivalently, 'This A is/is not B') we can infer 'Some A is not/is B' (equivalently, 'Some A is/is not B').

<sup>54</sup> The structure of the argument to follow is proof by cases from an instance of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), whose parts constitute a contradictory pair. By LEM, either the subject of A supposits for A or the subject of A does not supposit for A. Suppose the subject of A supposits for A, where A is 'A falsehood exists'. Then by the contrapositive of the *dici de nullo*, from 'This falsehood (viz A) exists' we can infer 'A falsehood exists' (that is, A), so A is true, so A is not false, and so the subject of A does not supposit for A. But clearly, if the subject of A does not supposit for A then the subject of A does not supposit for A. So either way, the subject of A does not supposit for A. (Another way of construing this proof is as an instance of *consequentia mirabilis*: if p then not-p, so not-p. See, e.g., Kneale, 'Aristotle and the Consequentia Mirabilis'.) The proof then needs to be generalized in order to conclude that, quite generally, the part cannot supposit for the whole. Moreover, the derivation of not-p from p (i.e., if the subject of A supposits for A then the subject of A does not supposit for A) seems to depend on previously showing that A is false. So Segrave seems to accept the standard argument that an insoluble, if true, is false, and so is false; but rejects the further argument that if false, it's true, inferring from the contradiction (that otherwise it would be both true and false) that the subject of A does not supposit for A. That move is usually rejected as being *ad hoc*, in the absence of any explanation why the subject of A does not supposit for A.

In ista 'falsum est', subiectum non supponit pro toto, ergo  
subiectum non supponit pro toto.

Ista consequentia, etsi sit petitio principii, necessaria est quia arguitur ab  
eodem ad idem, et hoc sufficit ad propositum.

- 5 **4.7.2** Sequitur ex alia cum aliis | veris positis quod non supponit. Hoc Eg 26ra  
probo sic: si subiectum supponat pro A, sit A totum, ergo sequitur:

A, est ergo falsum est,

per suppositum, quia singularis infert suam particularem, et antecedens  
in hac consequentia est verum, ergo consequens est verum. Et sequitur

- 10 ultra: hoc consequens est verum, ergo non supponit pro A.

**4.7.3** Ergo a primo, ex utraque parte contradictionis cum quibusdam veris  
alteri parti additis sequitur partem ipsius A non supponere pro A. Ultima  
consequentia patet quia subiectum A non supponit nisi pro falsis, cum  
sit iste terminus 'falsum'.

- 15 **4.7.4** Dicitur forte quod non sequitur:

Partem ipsius A non supponere pro A sequitur ex utra-  
que parte contradictionis cum quibusdam additis veris  
alteri parti contradictionis, ergo partem A non supponere  
pro A est verum,

- 20 quia potest esse quod illa vera repugnant illi parti cui adduntur.

**ad 4.7.4** Contra: illud non vetat sive prohibet quia ex hac parte contra-  
dictionis:

Pars A non supponit pro A,

sequitur partem A non supponere pro A et hoc absque alio vero addito. Si  
25 igitur vera addita alteri parti repugnant illi, cum verum vero non repugnet,  
ergo ista pars contradictionis est falsa, ergo hec est falsa:

Pars A supponit pro A,

ergo eius oppositum est verum:

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1 est ] falsum *add.* E<sub>8</sub> 2 toto ] tota E<sub>8</sub> 3 petitio principii ] *inv.* E<sub>4</sub> || arguitur ] argu-  
menta E<sub>4</sub> 4 et ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> || propositum ] et *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 7 A ] *scr. et del.* E<sub>8</sub> || est<sup>2</sup> ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub>  
9 consequentia ] antecedens *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 12 alteri ] alteri *vel* alicui (*dub.*) *p.c.* E<sub>8</sub> || parti ]  
particulariter E<sub>8</sub> || A<sup>2</sup> ] alia E<sub>4</sub> 13 falsis ] falsa (*dub.*) E<sub>4</sub> 14 terminus ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 15 forte ]  
a Sorte E<sub>4</sub> *a.c.* E<sub>8</sub> 20 vera ] prima E<sub>8</sub> || repugnant *corr.* ] repugnat *mss* 25 vero ] *post*  
repugnet E<sub>4</sub> 27 A<sup>1</sup> ] non *add.* *mss*

The subject of 'A falsehood exists' does not supposit for the whole, so the subject does not supposit for the whole, even if it begs the question, holds of necessity because it proceeds from the same to the same, and this is enough for my purposes.

**4.7.2** That ⟨the subject⟩ does not supposit ⟨for the whole⟩ follows from the other ⟨part of the contradictory pair⟩ with other truths in place. I prove it like this: if the subject ⟨of 'A falsehood exists'⟩ supposits for A, where A is the whole, then

A exists, therefore a falsehood exists

is valid (by assumption because a singular proposition implies the corresponding particular), and the premise in this inference is true, so the conclusion is true. And given that the conclusion is true, it follows that ⟨the subject⟩ does not supposit for A.<sup>55</sup>

**4.7.3** Therefore from the beginning, that is, from each part of a contradictory pair with certain truths added to one part, it follows that part of A does not supposit for A. The last inference is clear because the subject of A supposits only for falsehoods, since it is this term 'falsehood'.

**4.7.4** But perhaps someone objects that this is invalid:

That part of A does not supposit for A follows from each part of the contradictory pair with certain truths added to one part of the contradictory pair, therefore it is true that part of A does not supposit for A,

because it can be that those truths are inconsistent with the part to which they are added.<sup>56</sup>

**ad 4.7.4** On the contrary: that does not block the argument, because from this part of the contradictory pair:

Part of A does not supposit for A,

it follows that part of A does not supposit for A, and it does so without another truth added. Therefore, if the truths added to the other part are inconsistent with it, since truth is not inconsistent with truth, then this part of the contradiction is false, so this is false:

Part of A supposits for A,

therefore, its opposite is true:

<sup>55</sup> For we have just proved that A is true—as Segrave himself explains in the last sentence of the paragraph.

<sup>56</sup> The objection seems to be that what is added to one part of the contradictory pair might be inconsistent with that part, so the premises as a whole would be false, and so would not warrant inferring the conclusion. The reply will be that the addition was of truths, and it was only added to the affirmative part of the contradictory pair, so that part must be false and we have what we wanted.

Nulla pars A supponit pro A;  
et ita semper sequitur quod pars A non supponit pro A. |

E<sub>8</sub> 26rb

## Capitulum Quintum

### 5 <Obiectiones contra positionem auctoris et responsiones eiusdem>

5.0 Contra istam positionem arguitur multipliciter. Primo contra hoc quod ponitur quod pars non supponit pro toto nec opposito totius, ubi partem sic supponere sequitur totum esse falsum.

5.1 Primo per auctoritatem Aristotelis: 4° Metaphysice in fine dicit Aristoteles sic arguendo contra illos qui posuerunt omnia <esse> vera et illos qui posuerunt omnia <esse> falsa:

Accidit et quod est famatum de omnibus talibus orationibus <ipsas> se ipsas destruere. Nam qui omnia vera dicit, orationis sue contrariam veram facit, quare eiusdem non veram; contraria enim non dicit <ipsam esse veram>. Qui vero omnia falsa et se ipsum.

Ex hac auctoritate videtur quod subiectum in ista:

Omnia sunt vera,

supponit pro eius opposito, ex quo tamen sequitur hanc esse falsam.

Similiter hic:

Omnia sunt falsa,

subiectum supponit pro toto, ex quo tamen sequitur totum esse falsum.

5.2 Secundo arguitur sic: Idem est subiectum huius:

Falsum est,

et predicatum huius:

Hoc <est> falsum,

demonstrato: 'falsum est', et hoc intellectu, quia aliter recipiens non denudaretur a natura recepti. Sed predicatum huius:

2 supponit ] supponat E<sub>8</sub> 3 Capitulum Quintum ] *in marg.* E<sub>8</sub> 8 partem ] ex parte E<sub>4</sub> 12 et ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> || famatum de *corr.* ] factum *mss* || talibus ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 15 contraria *corr.* – *vide Moerbeke tr.* ] contrariam *mss* 19 quo ] qua E<sub>8</sub> 22 totum esse falsum ] quod totum est falsum E<sub>4</sub> 23 huius ] hoc E<sub>4</sub> 27 hoc ] hec E<sub>8</sub> 28 recepti ] rei recepte E<sub>4</sub>