

# INSOLUBLES

WALTER SEGRAVE

CRITICAL EDITION WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION  
BY BARBARA BARTOCCI AND STEPHEN READ





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Nulla pars A supponit pro A;  
et ita semper sequitur quod pars A non supponit pro A. |

E<sub>8</sub> 26rb

## Capitulum Quintum

### 5 <Obiectiones contra positionem auctoris et responsiones eiusdem>

5.0 Contra istam positionem arguitur multipliciter. Primo contra hoc quod ponitur quod pars non supponit pro toto nec opposito totius, ubi partem sic supponere sequitur totum esse falsum.

10 5.1 Primo per auctoritatem Aristotelis: 4<sup>o</sup> Metaphysice in fine dicit Aristoteles sic arguendo contra illos qui posuerunt omnia <esse> vera et illos qui posuerunt omnia <esse> falsa:

Accidit et quod est famatum de omnibus talibus orationibus <ipsas> se ipsas destruere. Nam qui omnia vera dicit, orationis sue contrariam veram facit, quare eiusdem non veram; contraria enim non dicit <ipsam esse veram>. Qui vero omnia falsa et se ipsum.

Ex hac auctoritate videtur quod subiectum in ista:

Omnia sunt vera,

supponit pro eius opposito, ex quo tamen sequitur hanc esse falsam.

20 Similiter hic:

Omnia sunt falsa,

subiectum supponit pro toto, ex quo tamen sequitur totum esse falsum.

5.2 Secundo arguitur sic: Idem est subiectum huius:

Falsum est,

25 et predicatum huius:

Hoc <est> falsum,

demonstrato: 'falsum est', et hoc intellectu, quia aliter recipiens non denudaretur a natura recepti. Sed predicatum huius:

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2 supponit ] supponat E<sub>8</sub> 3 Capitulum Quintum ] *in marg.* E<sub>8</sub> 8 partem ] ex parte E<sub>4</sub> 12 et ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> || famatum de *corr.* ] factum *mss* || talibus ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 15 contraria *corr.* – *vide Moerbeke tr.* ] contrariam *mss* 19 quo ] qua E<sub>8</sub> 22 totum esse falsum ] quod totum est falsum E<sub>4</sub> 23 huius ] hoc E<sub>4</sub> 27 hoc ] hec E<sub>8</sub> 28 recepti ] rei recepte E<sub>4</sub>

No part of A supposits for A;  
and thus it follows either way that part of A does not supposit for A.

## Chapter 5

### ⟨Objections to the author's solution and his replies⟩

**5.0** One may argue against this solution in numerous ways. First of all, ⟨one may argue⟩ against the claim that a part does not supposit for its whole nor for the opposite of the whole, where from the part suppositing in this way it follows that the whole is false.<sup>57</sup>

**5.1** First, by the authority of Aristotle: in *Metaphysics* Γ 8, when he argues against those claiming that everything is true and those claiming that everything is false, Aristotle says:

“And, as is widely known, it happens that all such utterances destroy themselves. For one who says that everything is true, makes the contrary of his own utterance true and so makes his own utterance not true, for the utterance contrary ⟨to his own⟩ denies ⟨that it is true⟩. However, one who ⟨says⟩ that everything is false, ⟨says it⟩ of himself.”<sup>58</sup>

From this authoritative passage it appears that the subject of this proposition:

Everything is true,

supposits for its opposite, from which, however, it follows that this proposition is false. Similarly, here:

Everything is false,

the subject supposits for the whole, from which, however, it follows that the whole is false.

**5.2** Secondly, one ⟨may⟩ argue like this: the subject of

A falsehood exists

and the predicate of

This ⟨is⟩ a falsehood,

referring to ‘A falsehood exists’, are the same in the mind, because otherwise the receiver would not have been stripped of the nature of what was received.<sup>59</sup> But the predicate of

<sup>57</sup> Cf. §4.2.

<sup>58</sup> See Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, tr. Moerbeke, p. 91; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Γ 8, 1012b14–18, Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §§3.1.1 and 3.2.1.

Hoc est falsum,  
 supponit pro A (sit A ista: Falsum est), ergo subiectum ipsius A supponit  
 pro A.

### 5.3 Preterea: sic dicto:

5 Aliquid est,  
 vel:  
 Verum est,  
 subiectum supponit pro toto, ergo (similiter) sic dicto:  
 Falsum est,  
 10 vel:  
 Nullum verum est.

5.4 Preterea: pars A significat totum A (sit A: falsum est), ergo pot-  
 est supponere pro A eadem ratione quod significat totum. Patet quia  
 idem significat in oratione et extra, sed extra A significat A, ergo in A  
 15 significat A. |

E<sub>8</sub> 26va

5.5 Preterea: ista vox B significat se ipsam, ergo B multo fortius potest  
 significare totum hoc:

B est falsum,  
 et hoc cum voces sint ad placitum; potest ergo Sortes velle B ita significare  
 20 | et ita significabit.

E<sub>4</sub> 160rb

### 5.6 Preterea: sic dicto:

Nullum falsum dicitur a Sorte,  
 hic est dici de nullo, ergo nihil contingit sumere sub subiecto quin ab eo  
 removeatur terminus predicatus, et si sic per ipsum denotatur predicatum  
 25 removeri ab hoc 'falsum', demonstrato hoc  
 Falsum dicitur a Sorte,  
 cum ista contineatur sub subiecto.

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2 ista ] est *add.* E<sub>4</sub> || subiectum ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 3 pro ] per E<sub>4</sub> 8 pro ] A *add.* E<sub>8</sub> 14 in<sup>2</sup> ]  
 oratione *add.* E<sub>4</sub> || A<sup>3</sup> ] sic *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 16 B<sup>1</sup> ] A E<sub>8</sub> || B<sup>2</sup> ] A E<sub>8</sub> 23 hic ] hoc E<sub>4</sub> 24 terminus  
 predicatus ] quare cuius(*dub.*) terminus(*dub.*) E<sub>4</sub> || et ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 25 falsum *corr.* ] falso *mss*  
 26 Falsum ] falso E<sub>8</sub>

This is a falsehood  
 supposits for A (where A is 'A falsehood exists'),<sup>60</sup> therefore the subject  
 of A supposits for A.

5.3 Moreover:<sup>61</sup> if one says:

Something exists

or

A truth exists,

the subject supposits for the whole, therefore (so too) if one says:

A falsehood exists

or

No truth exists.

5.4 Moreover:<sup>62</sup> a part of A signifies the whole of A (where A is 'A falsehood exists'), therefore, (a part of A) can supposit for (the whole of) A for the same reason that it signifies the whole. This is clear because it signifies the same thing placed within and outside an utterance, but placed outside of A it signifies A, therefore placed within A it signifies A.

5.5 Moreover:<sup>63</sup> the expression B signifies itself, therefore *a fortiori* B can signify the whole:

B is a falsehood,

and this is possible since expressions are at the pleasure (of the impositor); therefore Socrates can wish that B signifies in this way and it will signify in this way.

5.6 Moreover:<sup>64</sup> if one says:

No falsehood is said by Socrates,

here we have the *dici de nullo*,<sup>65</sup> therefore nothing can be taken under the subject without removing the predicate term from it. And if so, it means that the predicate is removed from 'falsehood' referring to this:

A falsehood is said by Socrates,

since this proposition is contained under the subject.

<sup>59</sup> Averroes, *On the Soul*, I, comm. 4 (*Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. Crawford, 385–86); Hamesse, *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 191, n. 212; Aristotle, *On the Soul*, I, 4, 429a15–23. Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §3.1.3.

<sup>60</sup> At long last Segrave says what he's taken A to be ever since §ad 4.6.1.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §3.1.4.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §3.2.3.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §3.1.6.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §3.1.7.

<sup>65</sup> See n. 14.

### 5.7 Preterea: hec exceptiva est vera:

Nullum falsum preter A dicitur a Sorte.

Sit A hoc 'falsum dicitur a Sorte'. Queritur ergo utrum subiectum preiacentis supponat pro A vel non. Si sic, habetur propositum. Si non, ergo

5 non est ibi extra captio partis a toto, ergo non exceptiva.

Preterea: in omni exceptiva preiacens repugnat exceptive, quod non est verum in proposito nisi in preiacente subiectum supponat pro A.

#### 5.8.1 Preterea: subiectum huius:

Falsum est

10 (que sit B) supponit pro ista:

Falsum est dictum a Sorte

(que sit A). Sed idem est subiectum B et A, ergo subiectum ipsius A supponit pro A.

5.8.2 Aliter sic: isti duo termini convertuntur: 'falsum', et: 'hoc falsum vel

15 illud et sic de singulis', ergo de quocumque vere predicatur unus, vere predicatur et reliquus. Sed hec est vera:

Sortes dicit hoc falsum vel illud et sic de singulis,  
ergo erit hec vera:

Sortes dicit falsum.

20 Similiter si convertuntur, pro quocumque potest unus terminus supponere potest alius supponere.

5.9 Ultimo sic: si tales paralogrammi solvendi essent secundum accidens, cum non sit verisimile tales latuisse Aristotelem, ergo solvisset tales paralogrammos secundum accidens ubi ergo solvit illos.

25 Ad ista respondeo faciliter.

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5 ibi ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> || extra captio ] excipi E<sub>4</sub> 8-9 huius ... est ] hoc est falsum E<sub>4</sub> 10 supponit ] supponat E<sub>8</sub> 12 B *corr.* ] *om. mss* 16 et ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 18 hec ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 19 falsum ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 20 terminus ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 23 sit ] sint E<sub>8</sub> || tales<sup>1</sup> ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> || ergo solvisset ] vel solvisse E<sub>4</sub> 25 respondeo ] respondetur E<sub>4</sub>

5.7 Moreover:<sup>66</sup> this exceptive is true:

No falsehood except A is said by Socrates.

Let A be 'A falsehood is said by Socrates'. It is then asked if the subject of the prejacet<sup>67</sup> (sc. 'No Falsehood is said by Socrates') supposits for A or not. If so, we have what we claimed. If not, then here there is no excepting of a part from the whole, therefore it is not an exceptive.

Moreover: in every exceptive, the prejacet is incompatible with the exceptive, which is not true in the above case unless in the prejacet the subject supposits for A.

5.8.1 Moreover:<sup>68</sup> the subject of

A falsehood exists,

call it B, supposits for

A falsehood is said by Socrates,

call it A. But the subject of B and of A is the same, therefore the subject of A supposits for A.

5.8.2 (One can argue) in another way like this: the two terms 'falsehood' and 'this falsehood or that and so on for every instance' are convertible, therefore of anything of which one is truly predicated the other is truly predicated as well. But this is true:

Socrates says this falsehood or that and so on for every instance,

therefore this will be true:

Socrates says a falsehood.

Similarly, if they are convertible, one term can supposit for anything for which the other can supposit.

5.9 Finally, (one can argue) like this: if these paralogisms were to be solved by the fallacy of accident, then since it not likely that they passed unnoticed by Aristotle, he would have solved such paralogisms, where he does solve them, by the fallacy of accident.

I easily respond to these arguments.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §3.2.2.

<sup>67</sup> See Paul of Venice, *Logica Magna*, f. 38ra: "The prejacet of an exceptive is said to be what remains with the exceptive word and the excepted part removed" (Preiacens exceptive dicitur esse illud quod remanet dempta dictione exceptiva cum parte extra capta). More generally, 'prejacet' seems to have been used to refer to the unmodified form of a modal or similar proposition: see, e.g., Ockham, 'Modal Consequences' (*Summa Logicae*, III-3 ch. 10, 13) in Kretzmann and Stump, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, vol. I, pp. 320, 329.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §3.2.4.



**ad 5.1** Ad primum dico quod Aristoteles ibi arguit contra Eraclitum | qui posuit omnia aliquando esse in motu et tunc omnia <esse> falsa, et aliquando omnia in quiete et tunc omnia esse vera; et contra illos est argumentum bonum, quia ex eadem causa habent hii dicere quod hec est falsa:

Eg 26vb

Omnia sunt falsa,

sicut eius oppositum. Et hoc est quod dicit Commentator quod isti dicunt quod omnia opposita sunt vera et omnia opposita sunt falsa. Et similiter qui dicunt omnia esse vera quia aliquando sunt in quiete omnia, habent dicere ex eadem causa quod oppositum huius est verum, non quia in ista:

Quodlibet est verum,

subiectum supponat pro eius opposito, sed quia ex eadem ratione qua dicunt unum esse verum, debent dicere eius oppositum esse verum. Et ista auctoritas sic intellecta nihil facit ad propositum nec contra dicta.

**ad 5.2** Ad aliud conceditur quod eadem intentio est subiectum huius:

Falsum est,

et predicatum huius:

Hoc est falsum.

Et nego consequentiam:

Ergo si predicatum huius: Hoc est falsum, supponit pro A, ergo subiectum ipsius A supponit pro A et hoc in ipso A.

Bene potest esse quod illa | intentio,\* que est subiectum A, in alia propositione supponat <pro A>.

O 1ra

**ad 5.8.1** Et per hoc solvitur unum aliud argumentum videlicet quod etsi idem est subiectum huius:

Falsum est,

et:

Falsum est dictum a Sorte,

non tamen sequitur quod respectu istorum diversorum predicatorum supponat pro eodem vel in respectu diverse copule.

\*Incipit ms O

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1 ibi ] ubi E<sub>8</sub> 8 opposita<sup>1</sup> ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 9 omnia<sup>2</sup> ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 10 quia ] quod E<sub>4</sub> 12 subiectum supponat ] inv. E<sub>4</sub> || quia ] quod E<sub>4</sub> 13 Et ] etiam E<sub>8</sub> 14 sic ] recto E<sub>4</sub> est add. E<sub>8</sub> || ad ... nec ] om. E<sub>4</sub> 21 et ] in add. E<sub>4</sub> || hoc ] hic E<sub>8</sub> 23 alia ] alio E<sub>4</sub> 24 supponat ] supponit O 25 videlicet ] scilicet O || etsi ] si E<sub>4</sub> O 29 dictum ] tantum add. O 30 quod ] in add. O

**ad 5.1** To the first argument: I say that here Aristotle is arguing against Heraclitus, who claimed that sometimes everything is in movement and so everything *⟨is⟩* false, and sometimes everything is at rest and so everything is true. And the argument is valid against those people, because for the very same reason they have to say that this is false:

Everything is false,

just as its opposite is. And this is what the Commentator says: that they say that all opposites are true and all opposites are false.<sup>69</sup> And similarly, those who say that everything is true because sometimes everything is at rest, for the same reason they have to say that its opposite is true, not because in

Everything is true

the subject supposits for its opposite, but because for the same reason for which they say that the one is true they have to say that its opposite is true. And understood in this way this authoritative passage is irrelevant for our purposes nor does it go against what was claimed.

**ad 5.2** To the next argument: I grant that the same intention<sup>70</sup> is the subject of

A falsehood exists

and the predicate of

This is a falsehood.

And I deny that one can validly infer:

therefore if the predicate of ‘This is a falsehood’ supposits for A *⟨sc. ‘A falsehood exists’⟩*, then the subject of A supposits for A, and this in A itself.

It can well be the case that the intention which is the subject of A supposits *⟨for A⟩* in another proposition.

**ad 5.8.1** And another argument is solved by this, namely that although the subject of

A falsehood exists

and

A falsehood is said by Socrates

is the same, yet it does not follow that with respect to these different predicates or with respect to a different copula the subject supposits for the same thing.

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<sup>69</sup> Averroes, *On Metaphysics*, Γ 8, comm. 29 (in Averroes, *Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIII cum Averrois Commentariis*, f. 99E–M: [https://archive.org/details/bub\\_gb\\_u\\_T0u0luuyIC/page/n215/mode/2up](https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_u_T0u0luuyIC/page/n215/mode/2up)).

<sup>70</sup> On the concept of intention in medieval philosophy, see, e.g., David C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler*, p. 259 n. 27: “an intention is that which acts upon and can be grasped by the interior senses or the intellect (as opposed to the five exterior senses).”

**ad 5.3** Ad aliud concedo quod si nulla alia propositio fieret nisi ista:

Verum est,

quod hec foret vera et hoc pro se, et nego consequentiam:

ergo ista: falsum est, posset consimiliter,

- 5 quia quod propositio verificetur pro se, hoc non repugnat significato copule, que significat esse verum, ideo non repugnat copule quod subiectum | sic supponat, sed repugnat propositioni non includenti contradictionem quod denotat se esse veram pro se falsa, et ita non sequitur intentum.

E<sub>8</sub> 27ra

**ad 5.4** Ad aliud patet per predicta quod non sequitur:

- 10 Iste terminus 'falsum' significat totum cuius est pars,  
ergo supponit pro toto.

Restringitur enim per copulam vel per predicatum respectu cuius supponit, unde non est idem significare et supponere sicut prius probatum est. Et accipitur hic supponere communiter prout est commune ad suppositionem subiecti et ad appellationem predicati. Nec istud videtur mirabile  
15 quod iste terminus 'verum' et 'falsum' restringantur per copulam vel predicatum. Videmus enim quod respectu alicuius predicati ampliatur suppositio termini, ut supponat pro hiis que non sunt supposita eius in re, sicut sic dicto:

- 20 Homo erit,  
Homo fuit,  
Homo est mortuus,  
Homo potest esse,

- 25 et huiusmodi. Si igitur extrema ex adiunctis copulis vel predicatis talem suppositionem capiunt magis amplam, non videtur mirabile si in aliis possunt termini restringi ne supponant pro omnibus suis significatis. Et hoc patet sic dicendo:

Homo qui sedet disputat,

- non stat hic iste terminus 'homo' pro omni homine. Similiter et modum  
30 supponendi multotiens capit subiectum a suo predicato, ut hic:

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1 aliud ] aliam O 3 quod ] et O quia E<sub>8</sub> || pro ] per O 4 ista ] illud O || consimiliter ] similiter O simpliciter E<sub>4</sub> 5 quia quod ] quorum O || pro ] per O 6 que ... copule ] *om.* hom. O 7 includenti ] propriam *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 8 ita ] ideo O 9 aliud ] aliam O 10 pars ] *om.* E<sub>8</sub> 11 toto ] tota E<sub>8</sub> 12 Restringitur ] restringit E<sub>8</sub> || per<sup>2</sup> ] *om.* E<sub>8</sub> 13 unde ] tamen O 14 Et ] *om.* O 15 appellationem ] suppositionem O || istud ] id E<sub>4</sub> 16 restringantur ] restringatur E<sub>4</sub> || vel ] per *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 17 ampliatur ] appropriatur O 18–19 in re, sicut ] sicut in re E<sub>8</sub> 19 dicto ] dicendo O 20 Homo erit ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 21 fuit ] homo *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 24 et huiusmodi ] *om.* E<sub>8</sub> || Si ] sic E<sub>8</sub> || extrema ] extra E<sub>8</sub> 25 videtur ] videatur O || in ] eis vel *add.* O 26 ne ] ut O 28 sedet ] sedens E<sub>4</sub> 29 non ] nec O || et ] *om.* O 30 predicato ] diversum secundum modum a diverso predicato *add.* in *marg.* E<sub>4</sub>

**ad 5.3** To the next argument: I grant that if the only proposition were

A truth exists,

this would be true about itself, and I deny that one can validly infer:

therefore so too could 'A falsehood exists',

because that a proposition is true about itself is not inconsistent with the signification of the copula, which signifies that the proposition is a truth. So it is not inconsistent with the copula that the subject supposits in this way. But it is inconsistent with a proposition that does not involve a contradiction that it means that it is itself true about its false self. And so what was claimed does not follow.

**ad 5.4** To the next argument: it is clear from what has been said that the inference:

The term 'falsehood' signifies the whole of which it is a  
part, therefore it supposits for the whole

is invalid. For <its supposition> is restricted by the copula or by the predicate relative to which it supposits. Thus signifying and suppositing are not the same thing, as was proved earlier.<sup>71</sup> And here suppositing is taken broadly insofar as it is common to the supposition of the subject and to the appellation of the predicate. Nor should it be considered strange that the terms 'truth' and 'falsehood' are restricted by the copula or the predicate. For we appreciate that with respect to some predicates a term's supposition is amplified so that it supposits for things which are not among its presently existing supposita,<sup>72</sup> as in utterances like these:

A man will exist,

A man existed,

A man is dead,

A man could exist,

and suchlike. Therefore if in this way the extremes receive this broader supposition from the adjoined copulas or predicates, it does not seem strange if in other cases terms can be restricted so that they do not supposit for all their significates. And this is clear in saying, for example:

The man who is sitting is disputing;

here the term 'man' does not stand for every man. And similarly, the subject often takes the mode of suppositing from its predicate, e.g.,

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<sup>71</sup> In §4.2.

<sup>72</sup> Ampliation is one of the properties of terms, recognising that some verbs and some terms affect the range of supposition of the subject of the proposition to a broader extension. See, e.g., Read, 'Medieval Theories of Properties of Terms', §4.

Homo est animal,

Homo est species,

aliter supponit subiectum in una quam in alia. Dico igitur quod isti termini ‘verum’ et ‘falsum’ et eorum consimilia restringuntur per copulam, que  
5 significat esse verum, ut supponant talia pro quibus tota propositio sine contradictione poterit denotare ⟨se⟩ esse veram.

**ad 5.5** Ad aliud concedo quod B potest significare totum, sicut dictum est, saltem ⟨per⟩ intentionem universalem, et nego consequentiam:

ergo respectu | cuiuscumque predicati potest supponere  
10 totum.

E<sub>8</sub> 27rb

Quomodo autem potest significare totum per intentionem singularem et quomodo non, apparebit post.

**ad 5.6** Ad aliud, cum dicitur:

“Hic est dici de nullo: ‘Nullum falsum dicitur a Sorte’”,

15 concedo; et cum arguitur:

“Nihil est accipere sub subiecto quin ab eo denotatur  
predicatum removeri”,

si illud sic intelligatur:

Nihil est accipere sub subiecto pro quo subiectum sup-  
20 ponit quin ab eo denotatur predicatum removeri,

concedo. Et sic intelligit Aristoteles et aliter non.

**ad 5.7** Ad aliud concedo quod hec exceptiva est vera:

Nullum falsum preter A dicitur a Sorte,

pro quo sciendum est quod aliqua est exceptiva propria et aliqua impropria. Propria quando fit extra captio partis a suo toto supponente pro illa  
25 et intelligitur quod exceptiva repugnat sue preiacenti. Impropria quando

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1 Homo ] hoc E<sub>4</sub> 3 supponit subiectum ] *inv.* E<sub>4</sub> 4 et<sup>1</sup> ] *om.* O || et ... copulam ] iterum convertibilia restringuntur per copulam E<sub>8</sub> restringuntur per copulam etiam per eorum convertibilia O 5 ut supponant *corr.* ] ut supponat E<sub>4</sub> E<sub>8</sub> *om.* O || pro ] de O || quibus ] quo E<sub>4</sub> 5–6 propositio ... veram ] de quo vel pro quo potest esse verum denominare O 6 poterit ] potest E<sub>4</sub> 7 aliud ] aliam O || sicut ] nunc *add.* E<sub>4</sub> 9 cuiuscumque ] *om.* O 11 autem ] universaliter O || totum ] *om.* O || intentionem ] intellectum O || et ] quantum vel O 13 aliud ] aliam et O 14 Hic ] hoc E<sub>4</sub> 15 concedo ] conceditur O || arguitur ] dicitur O 16 accipere ] nunc O || eo ] ipso O 19 accipere ] capere O 19–20 supponit ] supponat O 20 eo denotatur ] eodem notatur E<sub>8</sub> 21 intelligit ] intelligitur O 22 aliud ] aliam O || exceptiva est ] *inv.* E<sub>4</sub> 24 est<sup>1</sup> ] *om.* O 25 extra captio ] exceptio O || supponente ] supposite *vel* supponente O supposito E<sub>4</sub> supponere E<sub>8</sub>

Man is an animal,

Man is a species;

here the subject supposits differently in the one than in the other. Therefore I say that the terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsehood’ and those similar to them are restricted by the copula, which signifies that the proposition is a truth, to supposit for those about which the whole proposition can mean, without contradiction, that it ⟨itself⟩ is true.

**ad 5.5** To the next argument: I grant that the expression B can signify the whole, as was said, at least ⟨by means of⟩ the universal intention, and I deny that one can validly infer:

therefore with respect to any predicate it can supposit  
for the whole.

And later<sup>73</sup> it will be evident how it can signify the whole by means of a singular intention and how it cannot.

**ad 5.6** To the next argument: when it is said:

“Here we have the *dici de nullo*: ‘No falsehood is said by Socrates’”

I grant it; and when it is argued:

“nothing is taken under the subject without it being meant  
that the predicate is removed from it”,

if this is understood in this way:

Nothing for which the subject supposits is taken under  
the subject without it being meant that the predicate is  
removed from it,

I grant it. And Aristotle understands it in this way and not otherwise.

**ad 5.7** To the next argument: I grant that this exceptive is true:

No falsehood except A is said by Socrates,

about which it should be noted that some exceptives are proper and others are improper.<sup>74</sup> An exceptive is proper when a part is removed from a whole suppositing for that part and it is acknowledged that the exceptive is inconsistent with its prejacent. An exceptive is improper

<sup>73</sup> Perhaps a reference to §ad 7.1.1.2.

<sup>74</sup> On proper and improper exceptives, see, e.g., ‘Logica Oxoniensis, De Consequentis’, in Pironet, *Guillaume Heytesbury: Sophismata Asinina*, p. 545. A proper exceptive is one where the items excepted constitute a non-empty proper subset of that from which they are excepted; an improper exceptive is one for which they do not.

fit extra captio alicuius quod significatur per illud a quo fit exceptio, licet pro illo non supponat, et sic est in proposito. Aliquando est exceptiva quando neutro modo fit <extra captio>, et tunc est improprissima, ut hec:

Nullus asinus preter hominem currit.

- 5 **ad 5.8.2** Ad aliud concedo quod isti termini convertuntur: 'falsum', et: 'hoc falsum vel illud et sic de singulis', et hoc ut nunc et quoad significata, sed non simpliciter et quoad modum significandi. Et ideo potest unus terminus illorum pro aliquo supponere pro quo non potest alius respectu eiusdem | predicati. Iste enim terminus 'hoc falsum vel illud et sic de singulis', quia significat multa sub disiunctione, scilicet quodlibet illorum significatur singulariter, ideo talis terminus non potest restringi pro uno significato illius | termini in propositione supponere. Et hoc patet in exemplo. Isti termini convertuntur: 'homo' et 'iste homo vel ille et sic de singulis'. Et non sequitur, si iste terminus 'homo', sic dicto:

E<sub>4</sub> 160vaE<sub>8</sub> 27va

- 15 Homo est species,  
posset habere suppositionem simplicem et propositio est vera, quod iste terminus 'iste homo vel ille etc.' posset consimilem habere respectu eiusdem termini, ymmo hoc est simpliciter falsum:

Iste homo vel ille et sic de singulis est species,

- 20 vel saltem non admittitur a philosophiis a quibus tamen admittitur alia.

- ad 5.9** Ad ultimum dico quod Aristoteles ubi solvit paralogismos secundum accidens docet huiusmodi paralogismos solvere, quia isti peccant secundum eundem defectum, sicut prius probatum est. Variatur enim semper in insolubilibus suppositio termini medii vel extremi; et hoc est  
25 facere accidens. Unde tales paralogismi sunt similes insolubilibus ubi medio existente hoc aliquid non coniunguntur extrema. Sic enim arguitur in | insolubilibus, ut:

O 1rb

1 extra captio ] exceptio O || a quo *corr.* ] aliud quod *vel* aliquod quod (*dub.*) E<sub>4</sub> ad quod E<sub>8</sub> aliud pro quo O 2 exceptiva ] exceptio E<sub>4</sub> 3 hec ] hic E<sub>4</sub> dicendo O 5 aliud ] aliam O || termini ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 6 et<sup>2</sup> ] *om.* O || hoc ut ] hic et E<sub>8</sub> hoc O || nunc et ] *om.* O 7 sed ] et E<sub>4</sub> 9 eiusdem *corr.* ] alterius *mss.* || enim ] *om.* O 10 singulis ] aliis O || scilicet *corr.* ] si *mss.* 11 singulariter ] et *add.* O 11–12 pro uno significato *corr.* ] uno significato E<sub>4</sub> E<sub>8</sub> ymmo significatum O 12 propositione ] est *add. mss.* 13 homo<sup>1</sup> ] *om.* O || vel ] et O 14 homo ] potest *add.* O || dicto ] dicendo O 16 posset ] *om.* O 17 posset *corr.* ] possunt E<sub>4</sub> E<sub>8</sub> possint O || consimilem habere ] *inv.* O 19 ille ] homo *add.* O 20 vel ] et E<sub>4</sub> sed O || admittitur<sup>2</sup> ] admittuntur O 21 ultimum ] aliam O || solvit ] solvat E<sub>4</sub> 22 docet ] de *add.* O || paralogismos ] sillogismos E<sub>8</sub> paralogismis O 23 enim ] *om.* O 24 semper ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub> 25 Unde ] omnes *add.* E<sub>4</sub> || insolubilibus ] insolubiles E<sub>4</sub> 26 coniunguntur ] coniungit O || enim ] *om.* O 27 in ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub>

when something is removed which is signified by that from which the exception is made, although it does not supposit for it. And so it is in the present case. Sometimes a proposition is an exceptive when ⟨the exception⟩ is made in neither of these ways, and then it is most improper, like this:

No ass except a man runs.

**ad 5.8.2** To the next argument: I grant that the terms ‘falsehood’ and ‘this falsehood or that and so on for every instance’ are convertible as a matter of fact,<sup>75</sup> and with respect to the significates, but not simply and with respect to the mode of signifying. And thus, one of these terms can supposit for something with respect to the same predicate for which the other cannot. For the term ‘this falsehood or that and so on for every instance’, since it signifies many things disjunctively (that is, each of these things is signified singularly), for that reason such a term cannot be restricted to supposit for one significate of this term in a proposition. And this is clear in an example. The terms ‘man’ and ‘this man or that and so on for every instance’ are convertible. And it does not follow that if the term ‘man’, in an utterance like this:

Man is a species

could have simple supposition and the proposition be true, that the term ‘this man or that and so on’ can have similar supposition with respect to the same term. On the contrary, this:

This man or that man and so on for every individual is a species,

is unconditionally false and it is not accepted even by those philosophers by whom the other proposition is nonetheless accepted.

**ad 5.9** To the final argument: I say that where Aristotle solves paralogisms by the fallacy of accident, he shows how to solve paralogisms of this kind, because they have the same defect, as was proved before.<sup>76</sup> For in insolubles the supposition of the middle or extreme term always varies; and this is to commit the fallacy of accident. Thus these paralogisms are similar to insolubles in which, since the middle term is a this-something, the extremes are not connected. For one argues like this in insolubles, just as here:

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<sup>75</sup> See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §§6.5.1–2 et alibi.

<sup>76</sup> Chapter 4.



Coriscus cognoscitur a te, Coriscus est veniens, ergo  
veniens cognoscitur a te,

accipitur enim iste terminus 'veniens', vel saltem intelligi debet cum  
reduplicatione, et ita variatur suppositio extremi. Et similiter hic:

- 5        Omnis triangulus habet tres angulos per se et primo,  
ysoceles est triangulus, ergo habet tres angulos per se et  
primo.

Et deficit hic parallogismus sicut in insolubilibus quod medius terminus  
aliter supponit <in maiori> respectu huius predicati: <habet tres angu-  
los> per se et primo, quam facit in minori, ex qua variatione deficit | a  
sillogismo.

Eg 27vb

## Capitulum Sextum

### <Solutio insolubilium cathegoricorum et ypotheticorum>

- 15        6.1 Iam restat secundum dictum modum solvere parallogismos ut <dic-  
ta> sic applicata magis appareant, et primo de cathegoricis, deinde de  
ypotheticis.

6.1.1 Ponatur ergo quod sint <tantum> iste tres propositiones:

Deus est,  
Homo est,

- 20        et

Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum,  
et demonstro illas duas, et hoc dictum proponatur  
Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum.

3 enim ] autem O || intelligi debet ] intelligitur O 4 Et ] ita add. O 5 Omnis ] aliquis O  
|| angulos ] et add. O || per ... primo ] primo et per se O 6 ergo ] ysocles add. O 8 hic  
parallogismus ] iste sillogismus O || quod ] quia O 10 facit ] faciat O || variatione ]  
varietate E<sub>8</sub> O 12 Capitulum Sextum ] *rubr. in textu et etiam in marg.* E<sub>8</sub> 14 secundum  
... solvere ] solvere secundum dictum modum O || dictum modum ] *inv.* E<sub>4</sub> 15 appli-  
cata ] amplicata E<sub>4</sub> ampliata O || appareant ] appareatur E<sub>4</sub> || cathegoricis ] cathegori-  
cos E<sub>4</sub> || deinde ] secundo O 15–16 de ypotheticis ] in ypotheticos E<sub>4</sub> 20 et ] *om.* E<sub>4</sub>  
22 duas et *corr.* ] deus est E<sub>4</sub> 22–23 et ... istorum ] *om. hom.* E<sub>8</sub> O