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Insolubles

Walter Segrave

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Coriscus cognoscitur a te, Coriscus est veniens, ergo veniens cognoscitur a te,

accipitur enim iste terminus 'veniens', vel saltem intelligi debet cum reduplicatione, et ita variatur suppositio extremi. Et similiter hic:

Omnis triangulus habet tres angulos per se et primo, ysoceles est triangulus, ergo habet tres angulos per se et primo.

Et deficit hic paralogismus sicut in insolubilibus quod medius terminus aliter supponit ⟨in maiori⟩ respectu huius predicati: ⟨habet tres angulos⟩ per se et primo, quam facit in minori, ex qua variatione deficit | a sillogismo. E_8 27vb

Capitulum Sextum

⟨Solutio insolubilium cathegoricorum et ypotheticorum⟩

6.1 Iam restat secundum dictum modum solvere paralogismos ut ⟨dicta⟩ sic applicata magis appareant, et primo de cathegoricis, deinde de ypotheticis.

6.1.1 Ponatur ergo quod sint ⟨tantum⟩ iste tres propositiones:

Deus est,

Homo est,

et

Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum,

et demonstro illas duas, et hoc dictum proponatur

Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum.

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3 enim] autem O || intelligi debet] intelligitur O 4 Et] ita *add.* O 5 Omnis] aliquis O || angulos] et *add.* O || per ... primo] primo et per se O 6 ergo] ysoceles *add.* O 8 hic paralogismus] iste sillogismus O || quod] quia O 10 facit] faciat O || variatione] varietate E_8 O 12 Capitulum Sextum] *rubr. in textu et etiam in marg.* E_8 14 secundum ... solvere] solvere secundum dictum modum O || dictum modum] *inv.* E_4 15 applicata] amplicata E_4 ampliata O || appareant] appareatur E_4 || cathegoricis] cathegoricos E_4 || deinde] secundo O 15–16 de ypotheticis] in ypotheticos E_4 20 et] *om.* E_4 22 duas et *corr.*] deus est E_4 22–23 et ... istorum] *om. hom.* E_8 O

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> Coriscus is known by you, Coriscus is approaching, therefore the one who is approaching is known by you,[77]

for the term 'approaching' is taken or at least should be understood re-duplicatively, and so the supposition of the extreme varies.[78] And similarly here:

> Every triangle has three angles by definition, an isosceles is a triangle, therefore it has three angles by definition.[79]

And this paralogism is defective in that, just as in insolubles, ⟨in the major⟩ the middle term supposits differently with respect to the predicate ⟨'has three angles'⟩ by definition than it does in the minor. From this variation ⟨of the middle, this paralogism⟩ is defective as a syllogism.

Chapter 6

⟨Solutions to subject-predicate and compound insolubles⟩

6.1 It now remains to solve paralogisms according to the way described, so that ⟨what has been said⟩ will be clearer when so applied, and applied first to subject-predicate ⟨insolubles⟩, then to compound ones.

6.1.1 So suppose that there are ⟨only⟩ these three propositions:

> God exists,
>
> A man exists

and

> Every truth is one of these,

referring ⟨by 'these'⟩ to the ⟨first⟩ two propositions, and this one is proposed:

> Every truth is one of these.[80]

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[77] This isn't an insoluble. Segrave is saying that one argues in insolubles in the same way as in the Hidden Man paralogism, that is, as committing the fallacy of accident.

[78] Typical cases of reduplication employ the expressions 'qua' or 'insofar as', e.g., 'I know Coriscus qua the one approaching'. The medievals often used reduplication as a test for whether the fallacy of accident was present. See, e.g., Gelber, 'The Fallacy of Accident and the "dictum de omni"', §IV. So, e.g., Ockham complains that it is commonly said that the Hidden Man paralogism is shown to commit a fallacy of accident since "that he is approaching is distinct from Coriscus insofar as he is known ⟨by you⟩" ([…] dicitur communiter quod hic est fallacia accidentis […] quia extraneatur Corisco quod sit veniens in quantum cognoscitur): Ockham, *Expositio super libros Elenchorum*, II 9, pp. 231–32.

[79] Cf. Scotus, *Quaestiones super Librum Elenchorum*, Q. 45: "An fallacia accidentis possit causari ex variatione termini', §10 (in *Opera Philosophica*, ed. Andrews et al., vol. II, p. 478), where Scotus has 'figura' in place of 'isosceles'. The question of whether a triangle or an isoceles has three angles by definition alludes to the distinction between two kinds of essential or per se predication: see Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I 4, (73a34 ff.). The first is where the definition of the subject includes the predicate, e.g., species and genus; the second where the definition of the predicate includes the subject, e.g., 'risible' and 'man'.

[80] See Dumbleton, 'Insolubles', §18.2.2 and Brinkley, *Insolubilia*, p. 85 (§160).

Et si negetur, ergo hec est falsa, ergo tantum relique due sunt vere, ergo quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum, quia quelibet est singularis vera. Sed contra: tunc si hec est vera et hoc non est aliquod istorum, ergo aliquod verum non est aliquod istorum, ergo non quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum.

6.1.2 Simile est: ponatur quod tantum iste tres propositiones sint:

Deus est,

Homo est,

et

Ista sunt vera omnia

—demonstratis illis duabus, et patet deductio.

6.1.3 Similiter, posito quod tantum iste sint:

Deus est,

Homo est,

et

Tantum duo sunt vera,

et patet deductio, quia si sit falsa, tunc duo sunt vera et non plura, ergo tantum duo. Si vera, ergo tria sunt vera, ergo non tantum duo sunt vera.

6.2 Ad solutionem istorum et aliorum, primo videndum est quibus terminis fiat huiusmodi paralogismus. Pro quo est sciendum quod numquam fit iste paralogismus, qui dicitur insolubile, nisi respectu alicuius istorum terminorum: verum, vel: falsum, vel convertibilium suorum—et hoc vel ut nunc [vel hic] vel simpliciter—vel respectu alicuius quod expresse dat intelligere verum vel falsum tamquam partem sui significati, ut: scitum ⟨esse verum⟩, et: scitum esse falsum. Omne enim scitum esse verum est verum, et omne scitum esse falsum est falsum. Tales namque | non possunt E$_8$ 28ra supponere pro totis nec convertibilibus nec oppositis nec antecedentibus, ut illos sic supponere foret totum significare se esse falsum vel non esse

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1 falsa] fallacia O ‖ tantum] unum E$_4$ ‖ relique due sunt] sunt due relique O 2 est singularis] *inv.* E$_8$ O ‖ Sed] si sic E$_4$ 3 si] sic E$_4$ ‖ hec est] hee essent O ‖ et hoc non est] *om.* O 4 aliquod^1] alterum O 6 est] istorum *add.* E$_4$ 8–9 est et] *om.* E$_4$ 10 omnia] *om.* O 12 Similiter] simile O ‖ sint] *om.* O 14 est] *om.* E$_4$ 16 vera] vere O 17 plura] falsa O 18 duo sunt] *inv.* E$_4$ 19 videndum] sciendum E$_4$ ‖ est] *om.* O in *add.* E$_4$ 20 huiusmodi] iste O ‖ est] *om.* E$_4$ O 21 iste] hic O ‖ dicitur] est O 22 terminorum] qui dicimus (*dub.*) *add.* O ‖ et hoc vel] *om.* E$_8$ O 24 partem] *om.* E$_4$ ‖ ut] et hoc E$_4$ 24–25 scita ⟨esse verum⟩ et] scitis O 25 Omne enim] esse et O ‖ esse verum^2] *om.* E$_4$ 26 et omne scitum] tunc scitis O ‖ namque] *om.* O, soli *add.* E$_4$ 28 supponere] suppositis O ‖ vel] se *add.* O

If you deny it, then it is false, therefore only the other two are true, therefore every truth is one of these because each of them is a true singular proposition. But on the contrary: then if it is true and it is not one of these, therefore some truth is not one of these, therefore it is not the case that every truth is one of these.

6.1.2 It is the same if one supposes that there are only these three propositions:

God exists,

A man exists,

and

These are all the truths,

referring ⟨by 'these'⟩ to the ⟨first⟩ two propositions, and the argument is clear.[81]

6.1.3 Similarly, supposing that there are only these propositions:

God exists,

A man exists,

and

Only two things are true,

the argument is clear, because if ⟨'Only two things are true'⟩ is false, then two things are true and no more, therefore only two. If ⟨'Only two things are true'⟩ is true, then three things are true, therefore not only two things are true.[82]

6.2 To solve these and other paralogisms, one should first consider which terms give rise to this kind of paralogism. Here it should be realised that the kind of paralogism called insoluble only occurs in relation to one of the terms 'true' or 'false' or what is convertible with them—and this either as a matter of fact or without qualification[83] —or in relation to ⟨an expression⟩ in which we expressly understand 'true' or 'false' as part of its significate, such as 'known ⟨to be true⟩', and 'known to be false'. For everything known to be true is true and everything known to be false is false. In fact such ⟨terms⟩ cannot supposit for wholes nor for convertibles nor for opposites nor for what imply them, as their so suppositing would

[81] For those who think that the argument is not so clear after all, they can find it fully developed in Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §4.2.7. See also Bradwardine's response, *ibid*. §ad 4.2.7 in ch. 12. See also Dumbleton, 'Insolubles', §18.2.4.
[82] Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §§8.6.3 – ad 8.6.3.1.
[83] For this distinction see §ad 5.8.2 above.

verum. Et quia ista duo solum repugnant significato copule, videlicet verum negari a toto et falsum affirmari de toto, et ideo isti soli termini restringuntur per copulam ne possint supponere pro totis et oppositis et convertibilibus in casu ubi alterum istorum accideret.

ad 6.1.1 Ad primum igitur dico, illo casu posito, quod hec est vera:

Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum,

et nego consequentiam:

Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum, hoc est verum, ergo hoc est aliquod istorum.

Medium enim variatur, in minori namque supponit pro hoc vero:

Quodlibet verum est aliquod istorum,

sed in maiori non et ita non sequitur conclusio. Unde sensus maioris est:

Quodlibet verum aliud ab hoc, vel convertibile cum eo et ita de aliis pro quibus non supponit, est aliquod istorum

et non supponit pro hoc.

ad 6.1.2 Ad aliud:

Ista sunt omnia vera

⟨est vera⟩. Contra tamen:

Hec est vera, et hec non est aliqua illorum, ergo illa non sunt omnia vera.

Patet responsio quia iste terminus 'verum' pro alio supponit in maiori quam in conclusione. Sensus enim conclusionis est iste:

Ista non sunt omnia vera alia ab A,

sit A:

Ista sunt omnia vera.

Similiter si sic arguatur:

Ista sunt omnia vera,

demonstratis illis tribus, hec est concedenda. Et tunc arguatur sic:

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1 Et] *om.* O 3 possint] possent E_4 5 quod] *om.* O 8 hoc est verum] *iter.* O 10 minori] maiori E_4 12 in maiori] minori (*dub.*) E_4 13 eo] hoc E_4 14 ita] sic O 18 Contra] et *add.* O E_8 19 Hec] hoc E_4 || hec] *om.* O || illorum] illarum E_4 O 21 alio] aliquo E_4 23–27 alia ... vera] *om. hom.* E_4 28 arguatur] arguitur E_4

mean that the whole signified itself to be false or not true. And since only these two possibilities—*viz* 'true' when denied of the whole and 'false' when affirmed of the whole—are inconsistent with the significate of the copula, for that reason these terms alone are restricted by the copula so that they cannot suppose for wholes and opposites and convertibles in a scenario where one of these ⟨inconsistencies⟩ would occur.

ad 6.1.1 Then to the first paralogism I reply that assuming this scenario, this is true:

> Every truth is one of these,

and I deny the validity of the inference:

> Every truth is one of these, this is a truth, therefore this is one of them.

For the middle term varies because in the minor premise it supposits for this truth:

> Every truth is one of these,

but in the major it does not. And so the conclusion does not follow from the premises. For the meaning of the major is:

> Every truth other than ⟨the major premise⟩ (or what is convertible with it and so on for others for which ⟨the subject⟩ does not supposit), is one of these,

and ⟨the subject⟩ does not supposit for ⟨the major premise⟩.

ad 6.1.2 To the next paralogism,

> These are all the truths

⟨is true⟩. To the contrary, however:

> This is a truth, and this is not one of these, therefore these are not all the truths.

The response is clear, because the term 'truth' supposits for something different in the major than in the conclusion.[84] For the meaning of the conclusion is:

> These are not all the truths other than A,

where A is:

> These are all the truths.

Similarly, if one argues like this:

> These are all the truths,

referring to the three propositions, it should be granted.[85] And then if one argues like this:

[84] The conclusion is the negation of the insoluble, so subject to the same restrictions.

[85] This is a fourth proposition, like the third, but is true only referring to the first three. It's rather similar to the Revenge Paradox: see, e.g., Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, 'Introduction', pp. 20–23.

Ista sunt omnia vera (demonstratis illis tribus), et ista sunt omnia vera (demonstratis illis duobus), ergo ista tria sunt ista | duo, E_8 28rb

ad illud patet quod non sequitur quia variatur medium. Pro pluribus namque supponit in una quam in alia.

ad 6.1.3 Ad tertium patet responsio similiter, quia hec est vera:

Tantum duo sunt vera,

et non sequitur:

Hec est vera, ergo non tantum duo sunt vera,

quia ⟨li⟩ 'verum' in antecedente non supponit pro toto nec pro antecedente ad totum suum. Ergo sensus:

Tantum duo sunt vera, idest tantum duo sunt vera alia ab A (sit A totum) vel alia ab antecedentibus ad A etc,

non enim supponit pro A nec antecedentibus ad A.

Sed si arguatur sic:

Hec tria sunt vera, et alia duo sunt vera, ergo tria sunt vera, ergo non tantum duo sunt vera,

negatur prima consequentia, sed sequitur:

Ergo ista tria sunt vera et ista plura duobus sunt vera,

et non sequitur ultra:

Ergo tria ⟨sunt vera et plura duobus sunt vera⟩;

sicut non sequitur:

Hoc dictum a Sorte est falsum, ergo dictum a Sorte est falsum,

et causa est quia sic dicto:

Ista tria sunt vera,

subiectum est terminus singularis et predicatum supponit | pro omnibus demonstratis nec potest restringi. O 1va

Sed sic dicto:

28–1 hec ... tribus] *om. hom.* O 4 illud] idem O E_8 || quod non sequitur] solutio O 5 supponit in una] una supponit O 9–11 tantum ... sensus] *om. hom.* O 12 idest] *om.* O || vera[2]] *om.* E_4 13 etc] *om.* O 14 nec] pro *add.* O 16 sunt vera[1]] est vera E_4 *inv.* O 18 negatur] illa *add.* O 17–19 ergo non ... vera] *om. hom.* E_4 20 ultra] ultimo O 22 sequitur] et *add.* O 23–24 ergo ... falsum] *om. hom.* O 25 dicto] dicendo O 27 predicatum] tria *add.* O 28 demonstratis] *om.* O 29 dicto] dicendo O

> These are all the truths (referring to the three propositions), and these are all the truths (referring to the two propositions), therefore these three are these two,

in response to this it is clear that this inference is not valid because the middle term varies. In fact it supposits for more propositions in one premise than in the other.

ad 6.1.3 Similarly, the response to the third paralogism is clear because this is true:

> Only two things are true,

and the inference

> ⟨'Only two things are true'⟩ is true, therefore not only two things are true

is not valid because 'true' in the premise does not supposit for the whole nor for what implies the whole.[86] So the meaning ⟨of 'Only two things are true' is⟩:

> Only two things are true, that is, only two things are true other than A (where A is the whole, ⟨'Only two things are true'⟩) or other than what implies A, etc.,

for ⟨'true'⟩ does not supposit for A nor for what implies A.

But if one argues like this:

> These three things are true and the other two are true, therefore three things are true, therefore not only two are true,

I deny the first inference, but this follows:

> therefore these three are true and these more than two are true,

and the further conclusion:

> therefore three things ⟨are true and more than two are true⟩

does not follow; just as:

> This utterance of Socrates' is false, therefore an utterance of Socrates' is false

is not valid and the reason is because if one says:

> These three things are true,

the subject is a singular term and the predicate supposits for all the propositions referred to and cannot be restricted.

But if one says:

[86] That is, 'true' cannot supposit for 'Two things are true and no more' (see §6.1.3), as stated in §6.2, since it implies 'Only two things are true'.

Tria sunt vera et plura duobus sunt vera,

li 'verum' non supponit pro A nec antecedentibus ad A, sicut nec facit ⟨in⟩ ista:

Non tantum duo sunt vera,

hec enim includitur in illa, sed est sensus:

Plura duobus sunt vera, idest plura duobus sunt vera alia ab hac vel ab antecedentibus ad hanc etc.

6.3.1 Similiter paralogizatur sic: sint tantum hoc:

Falsum est,

et

Falsum est hoc,

et sit prima A et demonstretur in secunda A. Tunc aut A est verum vel falsum. Si verum, ergo nihil est falsum, quia nec hoc nec aliud ab hoc, sicut manifeste patet; ergo si falsum | est, nullum falsum est. Si A sit falsum, ergo falsum est hoc, ergo falsum est quia arguitur ab inferiori | ad superius suum. E$_8$ 28va E$_4$ 160vb

Simile est de omnibus talibus:

Nullum tibi propositum est verum,

proponatur tantum illa; et similiter:

Nullum tibi propositum est concedendum;

et similiter in isto particulari:

Aliquod propositum tibi non est concedendum.

6.3.2 Simile est: dicat Sortes tantum istam:

Sortes dicit falsum

et similiter:

Sortes intelligit falsum,

Sortes credit falsum,

Sortes decipitur,

posito quod: decipi, et: credere falsum, convertantur.

Simile accidit respectu veri negando sic:

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1 et] vel E$_4$ *om.* O 2 nec^2] non O 3 ista] a E$_4$ 5 hec] hoc E$_4$ hic O || enim includitur] inducitur O 6 idest ... vera] *om. hom.* E$_8$ 7 ab^2] *om.* E$_4$ E$_8$ 8 sint] si O 9 Falsum est] *inv.* E$_4$ 10 et] *om.* O hoc *add.* E$_4$ 11 est] cum O 12 demonstretur] denominetur E$_4$ E$_8$ || Tunc] queritur *add.* O || vel] aut O 14 sicut ... patet] si nullum est O || est^1] *om.* E$_4$ 16 suum] *om.* E$_4$ E$_8$ 21 similiter] simpliciter E$_8$ simile O 22 propositum tibi] *inv.* O 25 similiter] simile O 29 decipi] decipitur E$_4$ || et] *om.* E$_4$ 30 respectu veri] *lacuna in O* || sic] istam O

Three things are true and more than two are true,

'true' does not supposit for A nor for what implies A, just as ⟨in⟩ this

Not only two things are true

⟨'true'⟩ does not ⟨supposit for A nor for what implies A⟩, for ⟨'More than two are true'⟩ implies it, but the meaning ⟨of 'More than two are true'⟩ is

More than two things are true, that is, more than two things are true other than this one or what implies it etc.

6.3.1 Similarly, a paralogism is made like this: let there be only:

A falsehood exists,

and

A falsehood is this,

where the first proposition is A and A is referred to ⟨by 'this'⟩ in the second. Then either A is true or false. If ⟨A⟩ is true, then nothing is false, because neither this nor anything other than this ⟨is false⟩, as is manifestly clear; therefore if a falsehood exists ⟨that is, A is true⟩, no falsehood exists, ⟨therefore A is false⟩. If A is false, then a falsehood is this, therefore a falsehood exists ⟨that is, A is not false⟩, because it is argued from an inferior term to its superior.[87]

It is the same concerning all of these:

Nothing proposed to you is true,

when only this proposition is proposed; and similarly:

Nothing proposed to you should be granted;

and similarly in this particular proposition ⟨proposed to you⟩:

Something proposed to you should not be granted.[88]

6.3.2 It is the same if Socrates says only:

Socrates says a falsehood,

and similarly:

Socrates understands a falsehood,

Socrates believes a falsehood,

Socrates is deceived,

supposing that 'to be deceived' and 'to believe a falsehood' are convertible.[89]

The same happens with respect to negating 'truth', like these:

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[87] As we will see in Segrave's reply (§ad 6.3.1), the inference here is taken not as one "a tertio adiacente ad secundum adiacens" (from a proposition with the copula as third component to one with it as second component), but taking 'hoc' ('this') as inferior to 'ens' ('existing' or 'being').

[88] The allusion here is to *proposita* in an *obligatio*. See 'Introduction', §4.

[89] See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, ch. 9.

Nullum verum est,

posito quod tantum sit ista,

Nullum verum intelligitur a te,

et ita de consimilibus.

ad 6.3.1 Pro istis: dico ad primam quod hec est falsa:

Falsum est,

et concedo 'falsum est hoc', et nego consequentiam:

Hoc est falsum et hoc est, ergo falsum est,

quia iste terminus 'falsum' pro aliquo supponit in maiori pro quo non supponit in conclusione.

Sed arguatur contra hoc:

Ergo de aliquo dicitur 'hoc' de quo non dicitur 'ens', quod tamen est falsum quia 'hoc' est inferius ad 'ens'.

Ad illud dicitur concedendo quod de aliquo subiecto vere affirmeretur 'ens' et 'hoc', pro aliquo significato eius, de quo subiecto non vere affirmatur antecedens pro illo; et causa est quia illud subiectum non supponit pro illo in tali propositione, sed tamen de illo significato affirmetur 'ens', sic dicto hoc:

Falsum est ens,

et ita non sequitur quod aliquid sit hoc quod non est ens.

6.3.3 Ad aliam similiter dicitur quod hec est falsa:

Falsum dicitur a Sorte

et ad deductionem patet.

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3 te] Sorte O 5 primam] primum E_8 7 est] *om.* E_4 E_8 8 est^3] *om.* E_4 9 quia ... falsum] *om.* O || pro aliquo supponit] supponit pro aliquo E_4 9–10 in maiori pro quo non supponit] potest supponere O *om.* E_4 13 tamen] *om.* O 14 illud] aliud O || dicitur] *om.* O || affirmeretur] affirmantur O 15 et] *om.* E_8 O || significato eius] *inv.* E_4 17 pro] *om.* E_4 || propositione] supponere E_4 || tamen] cum E_8 O 18 sic dicto] sicut de subiecto O 20 aliquid sit hoc] sit aliquid O || est] sit O 21 aliam ... dicitur] aliud simili contra O

No truth exists,

supposing that is the only proposition,

No truth is understood by you,

and so on for similar paralogisms.[90]

ad 6.3.1 With regard to these propositions: I say to the first that this is false:

A falsehood exists,

and I grant 'A falsehood is this', and I deny the validity of the inference:

This is a falsehood and this exists ⟨i.e., is a being⟩, therefore a falsehood exists ⟨i.e., is a being⟩,

because the term 'falsehood' supposits for something ⟨*sc.* A⟩ in the major premise[91] for which it does not supposit in the conclusion ⟨*sc.* A itself⟩.[92]

But if one may argue against this response:

Therefore 'this' is said of something of which 'being' is not said, which, however, is false because 'this' is inferior to 'being'.

I reply to this by granting that 'being' and 'this' would be truly affirmed of some subject ⟨*sc.* 'falsehood'⟩ for one of its significates ⟨*sc.* A⟩ , while the premise is not truly affirmed of that subject for that significate ⟨*sc.* A⟩; and the reason is that the subject ⟨of A⟩ does not supposit for that significate in that proposition ⟨A⟩, while in an utterance like

A falsehood is a being

'being' is affirmed for that significate, and thus it does not follow that something is this which is not a being.[93]

6.3.3 To another proposition:

A falsehood is said by Socrates,

I reply similarly that this is false and the response to the argument is clear.

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[90] See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §12.2.

[91] The major premise is often taken to be that containing the major term, that is, the predicate of the conclusion. But Segrave seems to be following Peter of Spain and others who define the first premise as the major premise: see Peter of Spain, *Summaries of Logic*, ed. Copenhaver, ch. 4 §2: "Omnis autem sillogismus constat ex tribus terminis et duabus propositionibus. Quarum propositionum prima vocatur maior propositio, secunda minor."

[92] We have expanded the translation in this paragraph to make the argument clearer. Segrave's solution entails that A ('A falsehood exists', equivalently, 'A falsehood is existing' or 'A falsehood is a being') is false and that a falsehood is this, *sc.* A, even though, or rather because, 'falsehood' in A cannot supposit for A. But from 'A falsehood is this' it seems to follow by an expository syllogism that a falsehood is a being, or exists, contradicting his solution. On the expository syllogism, also known as 'ecthesis', see, e.g., Parsons, 'The Power of Medieval Logic', pp. 192–93 and Buridan, *Treatise on Consequences*, 'Introduction', pp. 21–23.

[93] Recall from Segrave's reply in §ad 5.8.2 that he accepts that for discrete terms, like 'hoc falsum' ('this falsehood'), signification is the same as supposition.

6.3.3.1 Sed si arguatur sic:

> Aliquid dicitur a Sorte et nihil aliud a propositione dicitur a Sorte, ergo aliqua propositio dicitur a Sorte,

conceditur quia iste terminus propositio bene potest supponere pro hoc dicto a Sorte, sicut dictum est prius. Et sequitur ultra:

> Propositio dicitur a Sorte, | omnis propositio est vera vel falsa, ergo verum vel falsum dicitur a Sorte. E8 28vb

Et sequitur ultra:

> Verum vel falsum dicitur a Sorte, et non verum, ergo falsum;

iste discursus patet per regulam in disiunctivis.

ad 6.3.3.1 Ad istud: conceditur

> Propositio dicitur a Sorte

et

> Aliquale dicitur a Sorte

et omnia talia; et minorem concedo similiter, sed consequentiam distinguo eo quod potest esse disiunctiva vel de disiuncto extremo. Si disiunctiva, falsa et non sequitur ex premissis. Si de disiuncto extremo, vera est; et sic est unus terminus universalis et communior quam falsum et quam verum simpliciter et potest supponere pro aliquo supposito falsi pro quo non potest iste terminus 'falsum' supponere respectu eiusdem predicati, sicut potest iste terminus 'propositio'. Et sic non sequitur ultra

> Verum vel falsum dicitur a Sorte, et non verum, ergo falsum,

maior enim verificatur pro aliquo pro quo non potest conclusio verificari.

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1 Sed] *om.* E_4 4 propositio] suppositio O 5–7 Et sequitur ... Sorte] *om. hom.* O 11 iste *corr.*] prius E_4 E_8 primus O || disiunctivis] discernins E_4 dysamis (*dub.*) E_8 12 istud] aliud O || conceditur] concedo quod O 14 et] quod *add.* O 15 Aliquale] aliquid O 16 similiter] simili O 17 disiuncto extremo] disiuncto predicato E_4 *inv.* O 19 sic est] si O || terminus] talis O || et[1]] *om.* O 20 et] *om.* O || falsi] *dub.* E_4 21 supponere] *post* potest E_4 25 conclusio verificari] *inv.* O

6.3.3.1 But if one argues like this:

> Something is said by Socrates and only a proposition is said by Socrates, so some proposition is said by Socrates,

the inference is granted because the term 'proposition' can rightly suppose for what is said by Socrates, as was said earlier.[94] And further, this is valid:

> A proposition is said by Socrates, every proposition is true or false, therefore a truth or a falsehood is said by Socrates.

And this too is valid:

> A truth or a falsehood is said by Socrates, but not a truth,[95] therefore a falsehood;

this reasoning is clear through the rule of disjunctive syllogism.[96]

ad 6.3.3.1 To this objection, ⟨I respond⟩ by granting

> A proposition is said by Socrates

as well as

> Something true or false is said by Socrates

and all such claims, and I grant the minor premise as well, but I disambiguate the inference insofar as ⟨the conclusion⟩ can be either a disjunction or a proposition with a disjunct extreme.[97] If it is a disjunction, it is false and it does not follow from the premises. If it is a proposition with a disjunct extreme, it is true; and so ⟨its subject⟩ is a universal term and more general than just falsehood or just truth and it can supposit for some suppositum of 'falsehood' for which the term 'falsehood' cannot supposit with respect to the same predicate, as, e.g., the term 'proposition' can. And thus the final inference:

> A truth or a falsehood is said by Socrates, but not a truth, therefore a falsehood,

is not valid, for the major is true of something of which the conclusion cannot be true.

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[94] See §6.2.

[95] That is, a truth is not said by Socrates.

[96] Literally, "by a rule in disjunctive ⟨propositions⟩". The *Logica Oxoniensis* (the standard logic textbook in Oxford from the mid-fourteenth century) gives two rules for disjunctive propositions: Addition (from one part of an affirmative disjunction to the whole) and Disjunctive Syllogism (from an affirmative disjunction with the denial of one part to the other part). See, e.g., Pironet, *Guillaume Heytesbury: Sophismata Asinina*, p. 563.

[97] That is, the conclusion of the first inference, 'A truth or a falsehood is said by Socrates' can be read either as a disjunctive proposition, 'A truth is said by Socrates or a falsehood is said by Socrates', or as a simple subject-predicate proposition with a disjunct term as subject, 'A truth or falsehood is said by Socrates'. For this distinction, and its importance in the development of the theory of supposition in the fourteenth century, see, e.g., Read, 'Thomas of Cleves and Collective Supposition', esp. §1.

ad 6.3.2 Ad consimilia patet per idem.

6.4 Et similiter ad exclusivas et exceptivas consimili modo est respondendum ut hic:

Tantum Sortes dicit falsum,

dicat Sortes tantum istam et non loquatur alius; et similiter:

Nullus homo preter Sortes dicit falsum.

6.5 In disiunctivis et copulativis ut hic:

Homo est asinus vel disiunctiva tibi proposita est falsa,

et proponatur tibi hec disiunctiva. Si conceditur, ergo secunda pars est falsa et prima similiter, ergo tota disiunctiva. Si negatur, ergo hec est falsa et hec disiunctiva tibi proposita est falsa et hec est secunda pars, ergo secunda pars est vera, ergo disiunctiva est vera.

ad 6.5 Pro istis est sciendum quod disiunctiva, cum hoc quod ipsa sit, significat se esse veram sicut cathegorica, et hoc pro altera parte, unde neganda est ista disiunctiva. Et non sequitur:

Hec est falsa et hec est disiunctiva tibi proposita, ergo disiunctiva tibi proposita est falsa,

in hac enim

Disiunctiva tibi proposita est falsa,

que est secunda pars, non | supponit pro ipsa. Sed est sensus: E8 29ra

Disiunctiva tibi proposita alia ab hac est falsa

et hec est falsa quia nulla alia tibi proponitur.

6.6 Aliter paralogizatur sic: sit A altera istarum:

Deus est,

vel

Nullum propositum Sorti est concedendum a te,

---

1 consimilia] similia O || per] propter E_4 2 exclusivas et exceptivas] exceptivas et exclusivas O || consimili] simili O 3 ut] *om.* O 4 dicit] dicat E_4 5 loquatur] loquitur E_4 E_8 6 homo ... falsum] dicit falsum preter Sortes O 10 negatur] negetur O || ergo^2] *om.* E_8 O 11 et^1] *om.* O || disiunctiva] disiuncta E_8 12 ergo ... vera] *om. hom.* O 13 est sciendum] dicendum O || quod^2] cum E_4 14 significat] significet O 15 Et non sequitur] *om.* O 16 et] *om.* O || est^2] *om.* E_8 O 17 falsa] et hec secunda pars ergo secunda pars est vera *add.* O 19 tibi proposita] *inv.* O || falsa] falsum E_4 22 alia] *om.* E_8 23 Aliter] alius O || paralogizatur] paralogismus ponatur O 24 est] *om.* E_4 26 Sorti] *om.* O

ad 6.3.2 The response to similar insolubles, ⟨such as those in 6.3.2,⟩ is clear from that.

6.4 And correspondingly, one should respond to exclusive and exceptive propositions in a similar way, as here:

Only Socrates says a falsehood,

when Socrates says only that and no one else speaks; and similarly ⟨here⟩:

No man besides Socrates says a falsehood.

6.5 In disjunctions and conjunctions, such as here:

A man is an ass or a disjunction proposed to you is false;

let this disjunction be proposed to you. If you grant it, then the second disjunct is false and the first as well, therefore the whole disjunction ⟨is false⟩. If you deny it, then it is false and ⟨so⟩ the disjunction proposed to you is false, and this is the second disjunct, therefore the second disjunct is true, therefore the disjunction is true.

ad 6.5 With regard to these insolubles, it should be recalled that a disjunction, assuming that it exists, signifies itself to be true just as does a subject-predicate proposition, and ⟨to be true⟩ in virtue of one or other disjunct, and for this reason this disjunction should be denied. And the following inference is invalid:

This is false and this is the disjunction proposed to you,
therefore a disjunction proposed to you is false,

for in this:

A disjunction proposed to you is false,

which is the second disjunct,[98] ⟨'false'⟩ does not supposit for the disjunction. But the meaning ⟨of the second disjunct⟩ is:

A disjunction proposed to you other than this one is false

and this is false because no other disjunction is proposed to you.[99]

6.6 A paralogism can be made in another way like this: let A be one of these:

God exists,

or

Nothing proposed to Socrates should be granted by you,

[98] That is, the second disjunct of the insoluble in §6.5.
[99] For Segrave's account of conjunctive insolubles, promised in §6.5, see §6.7.

et lateat te, et proponatur Sorti hec:

A est vera,

et nulla alia; deinde proponatur tibi ista:

A est verum.

6.6.1 Si ne|ges, contra: sequitur: O 1vb

A est 'Deus est', ergo A est verum.

6.6.2 Si dubitetur, contra:

Quodcumque istorum A significat, A est verum, sed A est alterum istorum, ergo A est verum.

Consequentia patet et minor est vera per positum, maiorem probo quia:

6.6.2.1 si A sit ista

Deus est,

A est verum.

6.6.2.2 Si sit illa:

Nullum propositum Sorti est concedendum a te,

A est verum, quia si A sit illa, ex A esse falsum sequitur ipsum esse verum. Sequitur enim:

A est falsum, ergo 'A est verum' non est concedendum,

et ita nullum propositum sorti est concedendum, quia tantum 'A est vera' proponitur sorti. Et si A sit ista, ergo ex A esse falsum sequitur A esse verum, si A sit hoc

Nullum propositum sorti et cetera.

6.6.3 Ideo dico ad illud concedendum sicut oportet quod A sit verum.

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1 te] que *add.* E_4 3 proponatur] proponitur E_4 O || tibi] *om.* E_8 || ista] istam E_8 O 7 contra] *om.* E_4 8 Quodcumque] pro quocumque E_8 O || A^2] *om.* E_4 || sed] et O 11 ista] a E_4 16 A^1] *om.* E_4 || ipsum] A O 18 concedendum] ergo *scr. et del.* E_8 19 tantum ... vera *coniecimus*] nullum A *mss* 20 ergo] A est verum ergo *add.* E_8 O 24 Ideo] *om.* O || concedendum] concedo E_4 O quod *add.* O

and let it be unknown to you ⟨which A is⟩; and let

A is true,

and no other proposition, be proposed to Socrates; then let this be proposed to you:

A is true.[100]

6.6.1 If you deny ⟨'A is true'⟩, on the contrary, this is valid:

A is 'God exists', therefore A is true.

6.6.2 If you express doubt about it, on the contrary:

Whichever of these A signifies, A is true, but A is one of these, so A is true.

The inference is clear and the minor is true by hypothesis. I prove the major because:

6.6.2.1 if A is

God exists,

A is true.

6.6.2.2 If ⟨A⟩ is:

Nothing proposed to Socrates should be granted by you,

A is true because if A is that proposition, from A's being false it follows that A is true. For this is valid:

A is false, therefore 'A is true' should not be granted,

and so nothing proposed to Socrates should be granted, because only 'A is true' is proposed to Socrates. And if A is that, ⟨that is,⟩ if A is:

Nothing proposed to Socrates ⟨should be granted by you⟩,

from A's being false it follows that A is true.

6.6.3 Hence I say that ⟨the insoluble⟩ should be granted, as it is necessary that ⟨either way, whichever proposition A is,⟩ A is true.[101]

[100] This paralogism is essentially the same as a slightly simpler one in Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §9.5.3, where 'Nothing proposed to Socrates should be granted by you' is replaced by 'Nothing proposed should be granted by you', since in Segrave's case what is proposed to Socrates ('A is true'—'A est vera') and to you ('A is true, or a truth'—'A est verum') are equivalent. Bradwardine helpfully labels 'God exists' B, 'Nothing proposed should be granted by you' C and 'A is a truth' D. Segrave will later (§6.6.3.2) label 'Nothing proposed to Socrates should be granted by you' B.

[101] This is Segrave's verdict on the insoluble: 'A is a truth' can't be denied (by the argument in §6.6.1) and it can't be doubted (by the argument in §6.6.2) so 'A is a truth' must be granted. Nonetheless, as we will see, A itself must be doubted.

6.6.3.1 Sed arguatur sic: hoc est verum (demonstrando hoc 'A est verum'), et hoc est propositum sorti, ergo aliquod propositum sorti est concedendum a te, ergo hec est falsa:

Nullum propositum sorti est concedendum a te,

et tu dubitas an sit ista, ergo male concessisti.

ad 6.6.3.1 Ad illud respondeo et dubito hanc consequentiam:

Hoc est concedendum a te, et hoc est propositum sorti,
ergo aliquod propositum sorti est concedendum a te,

quia si A sit:

Deus est,

consequentia est bona. Si A sit alia, non valet propter causas predictas.

6.6.3.1.1 Sed arguatur contra hoc sic: concessa hac

A est verum,

proponitur | hec: E_8 29rb

Nullum propositum Sorti est concedendum a te,

hec est dubitanda, ut patet, sit illa B, et arguatur sic:

B est tibi dubium, et A est B, ergo A est tibi dubium.

Consequentia est bona et antecedens est tibi dubium, ergo consequens non est a te negandum, sed consequens est falsum quia: A est verum, est scitum a te.

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1 arguatur] arguitur O 3–4 ergo ... a te] *om. hom.* E_8 O 5 ista] ita O || male *coniecimus*] multa *mss* 6 respondeo] respondetur E_8 11 predictas] prius dictas E_4 9–15 quia ... te] *om. hom.* O 16 arguatur] arguitur O

6.6.3.1 But one may argue like this: this is true (referring to 'A is true') and this is proposed to Socrates, therefore something proposed to Socrates should be granted by you, therefore

> Nothing proposed to Socrates should be granted by you

is false, and you are in doubt whether ⟨A⟩ is this, therefore you have granted it badly.

ad 6.6.3.1 In response to this, I express doubt about this inference:

> This should be granted by you and this is proposed to Socrates, therefore something proposed to Socrates should be granted by you,

because if A is:

> God exists

the inference is valid. ⟨But⟩ if A is the other proposition, the inference is invalid for the reasons expressed before.[102]

6.6.3.1.1 But one may argue to the contrary like this: having granted

> A is true,

this is proposed:

> Nothing proposed to Socrates should be granted by you.

call it B. This should be doubted, as is clear.[103] And one may argue like this:

> B is uncertain for you and A is B, therefore A is uncertain for you.[104]

The inference is valid and the ⟨minor⟩ premise is uncertain for you, therefore the conclusion should not be denied by you;[105] but the conclusion is false because 'A is true' is known by you.

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[102] Note that if A is 'Nothing proposed to Socrates should be granted by you', the conclusion of the inference is the contradictory of A and so by Segrave's lights, 'proposed to Socrates' cannot supposit for 'A is true', and accordingly the conclusion is false since its subject is empty. But in the minor premise, 'proposed to Socrates' does supposit for 'A is true'. Hence, in that case, the inference is invalid and commits a fallacy of accident by the variation of supposition of the minor term.

[103] We have seen that Segrave cannot grant the conclusion of the inference in §ad 6.6.3.1 or its contradictory. So although he grants 'A is true', he doubts A, if A is B.

[104] 'dubium' means not knowing either way, connoting ignorance rather than doubt. So we have rendered 'dubium' as "to be uncertain", in line with its role in obligations treatises (see, e.g., Paul of Venice, *Logica Magna: Tractatus de scire et dubitare*, tr. Clarke, pp. xix–xx and Paul of Venice, *Logica Magna: Tractatus de obligationibus*, ed. and tr. Ashworth, p. xv), although we have kept 'express doubt' for 'dubitare'.

[105] An example of Kilvington's notorious disputational meta-argument: see Richard Kilvington, *Sophismata*, sophisms 45–48 *passim*, and Kretzmann's commentary, pp. 316, 324.

ad 6.6.3.1.1 Ad istud responditur concedendo ultimam consequentiam et dubitando antecedens et consequens; bene ista stant simul:

'A est verum' est scitum a me,

et

A est mihi dubium,

quia si A sit illa

Deus est,

A non est mihi dubium. Si A sit B, tunc est mihi dubium A; et quia nescio utrum A sit

Deus est,

vel alia, nescio utrum sit mihi dubia vel non.

6.7 Eodem modo respondendum est ad copulativas cuiusmodi sunt iste:

Deus est et nulla copulativa tibi proposita est vera,

et hec:

Homo est asinus et copulativa tibi proposita est a te neganda,

et ad omnia similia est eodem modo respondendum.

6.8 Ut autem facilius respondere sciatur ad insolubile propositum, sciendum quod in propositione affirmativa ubi subicitur iste terminus 'verum' respectu termini transcendentis vel cuiuscumque predicati superioris ad verum vel respectu convertibilis numquam accidit insolubile, sed potest pars supponere pro toto et totum verificari pro se, et omnis talis est concedenda:

Omne verum est ens,

Verum est propositio,

Verum est aliquale,

Verum est verum,

et similia. | In affirmativa vero ubi subicitur predicato inferiori ad ipsum bene potest accidere insolubile et quod pars non supponat pro toto cuius est pars, ut hic: E$_4$ 161ra

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1 responditur] respondetur E$_4$ respondeo O ‖ ultimam] *om.* E$_8$ O 2 bene] sive (*dub.*) E$_4$ unde(*dub.*) O 5 A] *om.* O 8 sit] est E$_4$ ‖ A; et] *om.* O 9 A sit] *om.* E$_4$ E$_8$ 11 alia] aliud O ‖ sit mihi] *inv.* E$_4$ 12 est] *om.* E$_4$ ‖ cuiusmodi] ut O 13 copulativa] est *add.* O ‖ vera] una E$_4$ 15 proposita] a me *add.* O 17 similia] alia E$_8$ O ‖ est eodem modo] eodem modo est E$_4$ ‖ respondendum] *om.* O 18 respondere sciatur] *inv.* E$_8$ O ‖ propositum] proponenda O 18–19 sciendum] est *add.* O 19 subicitur] est subiectum O 20 vel] *om.* O 22 et omnis] *om.* O 27 Verum est verum] *om.* O 28 In] nam O ‖ vero] vera O ‖ subicitur] subiecto O 30 pars] *om.* E$_4$ E$_8$

ad 6.6.3.1.1 I respond to this by granting the last inference[106] and expressing doubt about the premise and the conclusion; these can stand together

'A is true' is known by me,

and

A is uncertain for me,

because if A is

God exists,

A is not uncertain for me, ⟨while⟩ if A is B, then A is uncertain for me. And because I do not know whether A is

God exists

or the other proposition, I do not know if it is uncertain for me or not.

6.7 One should respond in the same way to conjunctions like these:[107]

God exists and no conjunction proposed to you is true,

and

A man is an ass and a conjunction proposed to you should be denied by you,

and one should respond in the same way to all similar insolubles.

6.8 To know how to respond more easily to a proposed insoluble, note that in ⟨the case of⟩ an affirmative proposition whose subject is the term 'truth' with respect to a transcendental term or any predicate superior to ⟨the term⟩ 'truth' or with respect to a convertible term, an insoluble never results, but the part can suppose for the whole and the whole can be truly said of itself;[108] and all such propositions should be granted:

Every truth is a being,

A truth is a proposition,

A truth is true or false,

A truth is true,

and the like. However, in ⟨the case of⟩ an affirmative proposition where ⟨the term 'truth'⟩ is the subject of a predicate inferior to ⟨the term 'truth'⟩ an insoluble can readily result, and ⟨then⟩ the part does not suppose for the whole of which it is part, as here:

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[106] That is, that the conclusion is false because 'A is true' is known by you.

[107] This paragraph is perhaps misplaced, and should follow §ad 6.5.

[108] See Paul of Venice, *Logica Magna, Tractatus de terminis*, ed. and tr. Kretzmann, p. 291, note *p* to p. 13: "A transcendental term is a simple term (e.g. 'Being') that can be the predicate term in a true affirmative proposition about absolutely anything there is [...] Each transcendental term can therefore be the predicate term in a true affirmative proposition in which any other transcendental term is the subject term."

Quodlibet | verum est aliquod istorum, E$_8$ 29va

Quodlibet verum est A vel B,

Quodlibet verum est: Deus est.

In talibus enim non potest totum denotare se esse verum pro se et ideo pars non supponit totum in talibus propositionibus, sed sunt tales propositiones concedende pro aliis ab illis propositionibus. Sed e contra est in negativis ubi subicitur iste terminus 'verum' predicato superiori vel convertibili: numquam supponit pars totum sed tantum pro aliis a toto, ut hic:

Nullum verum est,

Nullum verum est verum,

et similia. Est enim sensus:

Nullum verum est aliud ab hoc vel convertibili vel antecedente ad hoc,

et similiter respectu predicati inferioris ut hic:

Nullum verum est aliquod istorum

est sensus:

Nullum verum aliud ab hoc etcetera est aliquod istorum,

unde pro eisdem supponit terminus in affirmativa et in sui contraria.

6.8.1 Sed iste terminus 'falsum' respectu predicati transcendentis vel cuiuscumque superioris vel convertibilis vel etiam inferioris numquam supponit pro toto in affirmativa.

Et quelibet talis est neganda, si non sit alia ab ista, ut sic dicto:

Falsum est,

Falsum dicitur a Sorte;

respectu tamen predicati inferioris est concedenda in casu ut hic:

Quodlibet falsum est aliquod istorum,

demonstratis

Homo est asinus

et

Deus non est,

---

1 istorum] et *add.* O 3 verum] talem E$_8$ || Deus est] deus E$_8$ de se intelligibile O 4 non] nec E$_4$ || totum denotare se] denotare se totum E$_4$ || pro] per O 5 totum] pro toto O || propositionibus] *om.* E$_4$ E$_8$ || sunt tales] sicut E$_4$ 6 concedende] accipiende O sunt *add.* E$_4$ 8 totum] vel pro suo toto *add.* O 10 est] verum *add.* E$_8$ 11 Nullum] *om.* E$_8$ O || verum^2] *om.* O 13 est] *post* ad hoc E$_4$ || aliud] a E$_4$ 15 hic] *om.* E$_4$ 16 Nullum] nullus E$_4$ 17 est sensus] *inv.* O 18 aliud] *om.* E$_8$ || etcetera] *om.* O 19 eisdem] eadem E$_4$ || sui] sua O 20 vel] ut O 21 convertibilis] eius *add.* O || etiam] eius O 23 dicto] dicendo O 27 falsum] verum O 28 demonstratis] istis *add.* O

Every truth is one of these,

Every truth is A or B,

Every truth is 'God exists'.

For in such propositions the whole cannot mean that it is true of itself and so the part does not supposit for the whole in such propositions, but they should be granted as speaking of propositions other than these. But on the other hand, in negative propositions in which the term 'truth' is the subject of a superior or convertible predicate: the part never supposits for the whole, but only for things other than the whole, as here:

No truth exists,

No truth is true,

and the like. For the meaning is:

No truth exists other than this or one convertible with or implying it;

and it is the same with respect to an inferior predicate, as here:

No truth is any of these,

the meaning is:

No truth other than this ⟨or one convertible with or implying it⟩ is any of these,

because a term supposits for the same things in an affirmative proposition and in its contrary.

6.8.1 But the term 'falsehood' ⟨as subject⟩ with respect to a transcendental or any superior or convertible or even inferior predicate never supposits for the whole in an affirmative proposition.

And if there is no proposition other than this one, every proposition like the utterances:

A falsehood exists,

A falsehood is said by Socrates,

should be denied. However, ⟨an affirmative proposition where the term 'falsehood' is the subject⟩ with respect to an inferior predicate should be granted in a scenario like this:

Every falsehood is one of these,

referring to

A man is an ass,

and

God does not exist;

et in tali casu numquam accidit insolubile.

Similiter et in negativa iste terminus 'falsum' non supponit pro toto ut hic:

Nullum falsum est,

Nullum falsum est propositio,

unde bene iste terminus 'falsum' numquam supponit totum cuius est pars nec in affirmativa nec in negativa, sed est sensus semper | talis: E$_8$ 29vb

Falsum est, idest falsum aliud ab hoc est,

similiter

Nullum falsum est, idest nullum falsum aliud ab hoc.

Et iste regule intelligende sunt in propositionibus non includentibus contradictionem ex repugnantia terminorum.

6.9 Sed contra ista arguitur quod iste terminus 'verum' numquam supponit | pro toto sicut nec iste terminus 'falsum', et hoc sic quia si ista O 2ra propositio:

Verum est

posset verificari pro se vera, cum illud pro quo verificatur propositio sit causa veritatis propositionis et prius naturaliter ⟨quam veritas eius⟩, sequitur quod istam propositionem esse veram foret causa sue veritatis. Consequens est falsum. Et istam positionem ponunt illi quare in insolubilibus non supponit pars pro toto nec convertibili etc.

ad 6.9 Ad illud dico quod illud pro quo verificatur propositio non semper est causa veritatis propositionis nec prius naturaliter quam veritas eius. Hoc patet, nam hec est vera:

Chymera non est

per non esse chymere. Non esse tamen chymere nihil ponit, ergo nullius positivi est causa. Et similiter de aliis negativis; privatio enim vel non

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1 et] *om.* E$_8$ O || insolubile] *om.* E$_8$ O 2 et] *om.* O || toto] tota E$_8$ 4 Nullum] verum E$_8$ O || est propositio] proponitur O 6 pars] *om.* E$_4$ E$_8$ || affirmativa ... negativa] negativa nec in affirmativa E$_4$ 7 idest] illud E$_4$ esse *add.* E$_8$ 10 intelligende] intendende E$_4$ || includentibus] concludentibus E$_4$ 12 arguitur] scilicet *add.* E$_8$ sic O 12–13 supponit] supponitur E$_4$ 13 toto] tota E$_8$ 17 et] *om.* O 18 quod] *om.* O || esse] fore O || foret] esset O 19 est falsum] ergo etiam antecedens *add.* O || quare] quia O 22 propositionis] ut prius *add.* O || naturaliter] est *add.* O 25 nullius] illius E$_4$ 26 vel] et O

and in such a scenario an insoluble never results.

Similarly, even in a negative proposition the term 'falsehood' does not supposit for the whole, as here:

> No falsehood exists,
>
> No falsehood is a proposition,[109]

for the term 'falsehood' never properly supposits for the whole of which it is part either in an affirmative or in a negative proposition, and the meaning is always:

> A falsehood exists, that is, a falsehood other than this one exists,

similarly

> No falsehood exists, that is, no falsehood other than this one.

And these rules ⟨that is, in §§6.8 and 6.8.1⟩ should be understood concerning propositions not implying a contradiction arising from the incompatibility of the terms.

6.9 But one can argue against these claims that the term 'truth' never supposits for the whole just like the term 'falsehood', and this is so because if the proposition

> A truth exists,

could be true about its true self—since that about which a proposition is true is the cause of truth of the proposition and naturally prior ⟨to its truth⟩[110]—it follows that this proposition's being true would be the cause of its truth. The conclusion is false. And those who make this claim[111] do so on the ground that in insolubles the part does not supposit for the whole nor for what is convertible etc.

ad 6.9 I reply to this objection that that about which a proposition is true is not always the cause of truth of the proposition nor is it naturally prior to its truth. This is clear since the proposition:

> A chimera does not exist

is true on account of the chimera's non-being. However, the chimera's non-being does not posit anything, therefore it is the cause of nothing

[109] See §4.1.1. Just as there, the actual insoluble proposition is not spelled out by Segrave. These two propositions do not seem to be insolubles themselves, but are the contradictory of the insolubles 'A falsehood exists' and 'A falsehood is a proposition'. So just as in §4.1.1, we can present a problematic argument which is solved by Segrave's principle that neither 'truth' nor 'falsehood' can supposit for the opposite of the whole proposition of which it is part any more than for the proposition itself.

[110] Added in light of the reply in §ad 6.9.

[111] This claim can be found in the *Tractatus Sorbonniensis Alter*: see Pozzi, *Il Mentitore e il Medioevo*, p. 57 (and pp. 76 and 82, §§1.043 and 1.0721).

esse non est causa alicuius rei positive. Et similiter in propositionibus falsis, hec:

Homo est asinus

falsa est pro eo quod non est ita sicut significat, sed non esse ita sicut significat nihil ponit, ergo non est causa alicuius.

Et similiter veritas huius:

Antichristus erit,

non presupponit illud pro quo verificatur tamquam prius naturaliter ⟨quam veritas eius⟩. Causa ergo veritatis propositionis non semper est illud | pro quo verificatur nisi causa sine qua non sit. Ideo est propositio E_8 30ra vera quia significat esse quod est vel non esse quod non est; et ideo falsa est quia significat esse quod non est vel non esse quod est. Et ideo sumitur illud pro quo verificatur propositio sicut prius sive posterius sive simul natura cum veritate propositionis. Deinde propositio significat esse quod est et solum illud, vel non esse quod non est. Hoc sufficit ad veritatem propositionis.

Similiter secundum istum modum dicendi, ut videtur, non potest dari causa quare pars non potest supponere pro antecedente ad totum, cum antecedens ad totum sit causa et prius naturaliter multotiens suo consequente. Similter convertibile cum toto multotiens est prius tempore et secundum istum modum dicendi nihil obstaret quin pro eo fieret suppositio in suo convertibili. Consequens falsum quia utroque modo multotiens accidit insolubile.

6.10 In aliis casibus verum vel falsum tamquam partem sui significati paralogizatur sic: proponatur hec:

Aliquod tibi propositum est nescitum a te,

que sit A, et queratur aut A est verum vel falsum. Si verum, et tantum A est propositum, ergo nullum tibi propositum est nescitum a te, quia

---

4 est^2] *om.* E_4 || ita^1] *om.* O 4–5 sed non ... significat] igitur respondendo (*dub.*) E_4 4 esse *corr.*] est *mss* 5 ponit] et *add.* O 6 Et] *om.* O || huius] huiusmodi E_4 7–8 erit non] non est E_8 O 10 causa] *om.* E_4 || sit] *om.* E_8 O 11 significat] ita *add.* O || quod^1] sicut O 12 est^1] *om.* E_4 E_8 || significat] non *add.* O || non^1] *om.* O || vel] et E_8 O || non^2] *om.* O || quod^2] non *add.* O || sumitur] sumuntur O 15 est^2] et *add.* O 16–17 propositionis similiter] *inv.* E_4 17 ut videtur] *om.* O || potest] posset O 18 potest] *om.* E_4 19–20 suo consequente] subiecto consequentis O 21 dicendi] ponendi E_4 E_8 || quin] quando E_4 E_8 || fieret] sic esset E_8 sic O 22 in] et O || Consequens] est *add.* O 23 accidit] est O 24 casibus *corr.*] conclusionibus *mss* || partem] parte O || significati] *om.* O 25 paralogizatur] *post* falsum O || sic] sicut O 27 et^1] tunc O || verum vel falsum] falsum vel verum O 27–28 tantum A est] tantum E_4 tamen E_8

positive. And it is the same concerning other negative propositions, for privation or non-being is not the cause of any positive thing. And it is the same in false propositions; this proposition:

A man is an ass

is false because things are not as it signifies; but things not being as the proposition signifies does not posit anything, therefore it is not the cause of anything ⟨positive⟩.

And similarly, the truth of

The Antichrist will exist,

does not require that about which it is true to be naturally prior ⟨to its truth⟩. Therefore the cause of the truth of a proposition is not always that about which it is true unless it is the cause *sine qua non*. For that reason, a proposition is true because it signifies that what is, is or that what is not, is not; and for the ⟨same⟩ reason, a proposition is false because it signifies that what is not, is or that what is, is not.[112] And for the same reason, that about which a proposition is true is supposed to be naturally either prior to or posterior to or simultaneous with the proposition's truth. Then, a proposition signifies that what is, is and only that, or that what is not, is not. This suffices for the truth of a proposition.

Similarly, according to this way of speaking ⟨in terms of causes⟩ it is not possible, as we have seen, that a cause be given why a part cannot supposit for what implies the whole, since what implies the whole is a cause ⟨of the whole⟩ and often naturally prior to what it implies. Similarly what is convertible with the whole is often temporally prior to it and according to this way of speaking ⟨in terms of causes⟩ nothing would stand in the way of its suppositing for it in what is convertible with it. The conclusion ⟨that nothing would stand in the way ...⟩ is false because an insoluble often results in both ways, ⟨temporal and natural⟩.

6.10 In other cases, a paralogism can be made with truth or falsehood as part of its significate like this: let this be proposed to you:

Something proposed to you is unknown by you,[113]

call it A, and ask if A is true or false. If ⟨you reply that A is⟩ true, and only A is proposed to you, then nothing proposed to you is unknown by

[112] A paraphrase of Aristotle's famous definition of truth and falsehood at *Metaphysics*, Γ 7, 1011b25–27: "dicere namque ens non esse aut hoc esse, falsum, ens autem esse et non ens non esse, verum est".

[113] Cf. Pozzi, *Il Mentitore e il Medioevo*, p. 340 example (35): "aliquod tibi propositum nescitur a te".

tu scis A esse verum. Si negatur A, contra tunc sic: tu scis A esse falsum, et A est tibi propositum, ergo tibi propositum est nescitum a te, ergo A est verum. Si dubitatur, ergo A est non scitum, ergo est nescitum, ergo aliquod propositum est nescitum a te.

ad 6.10 Pro quo sciendum est quod aliud est nescire quam non scire sicut aliud est nolle quam non velle. Non scire enim | nihil ponit sed nescire E8 30rb ponit actum scire contrarium. Unde nescire proprie est cognoscere aliquod esse falsum vel errare circa verum.

Hoc posito hec est neganda:

Aliquod tibi propositum est nescitum a te,

quia est sensus iste:

Aliquod tibi propositum est scitum a te esse falsum,

et patet quod extrema propositionis non supponunt pro toto, sicut nec in ista:

Propositum tibi est falsum.

Et ita non sequitur:

A tibi propositum est nescitum a te, ergo aliquod tibi propositum est nescitum a te,

quia extrema in conclusione non supponunt pro A pro quo supponunt in antecedente.

6.10.1 Alia opinio que ponit partem supponere pro toto aliter responderet ad huiusmodi sophysmata. Concedit namque hec positio quod A est falsum, et cum arguitur:

A est nescitum a te, et A est tibi propositum, ergo ⟨aliquod⟩ tibi propositum est nescitum a te,

concedit conclusionem, sed dicit quod hec non est A, sed similis ei.

ad 6.10.1 Sed hec responsio faciliter improbatur quia ponendo quod subiectum ipsius A supponit pro A, tunc A non significat nisi A nescitur a

1 scis[1]] sis E_4 || negatur] negetur O || A[2]] *om.* E_8 || contra tunc] tunc O *om.* E_4 || scis[2]] sis E_4 2 et] *om.* E_4 || a te] *om.* E_4 E_8 3 dubitatur] dubitetur E_8 O || est ... ergo] *om.* O 4 a te] *om.* E_4 E_8 5 sciendum est] *inv.* O || nescire ... scire] non scire quam nescire O 6 nolle ... velle] non velle quam nolle O || enim] *om.* O || nihil] non E_4 || sed] *om.* O || nescire] aut *add.* O 7 scire contrarium] *inv.* E_4 || aliquod] aliquid O 10 tibi propositum] *inv.* E_4 11 est sensus] *inv.* E_4 12 tibi] *om.* E_8 13 quod] quia E_8 O 17 nescitum a te] a te nescitum O 19 conclusione] propositione O || pro A] *om.* O || supponunt[2]] supponit E_8 21 partem] parte E_4 || pro toto] *om.* E_4 22 huiusmodi sophysmata] hoc sophysma O || hec positio quod] depositio quia O 23 cum] tamen E_4 est tunc O 24 nescitum] negatum E_4 25 nescitum] negatum E_4 26 sed[1]] et O || hec] hoc O || ei] a O 27 responsio] sic *add.* E_4 || ponendo] in posito O 28 supponit] supponat O

you, because you know that A is true. If you deny A, then I argue to the contrary like this: you know that A is false, and A is proposed to you, therefore something proposed to you is unknown by you, therefore A is true. If you express doubt ⟨about A⟩, then A is not known, therefore it is unknown, therefore something proposed to you is unknown by you.

ad 6.10 Here it should be realised that to be unknown is not the same as not to know, just as to be unwilling is not the same as not to be willing. For not to know does not affirm anything, while to be unknown affirms an act contrary to knowing.[114] Thus, properly, to be unknown is to know that something is false or to be mistaken about the truth.[115]

Having stated that, this should be denied:

> Something proposed to you is unknown by you,

because the meaning is

> Something proposed to you is known by you to be false,

and it is clear that the extremes of the proposition do not supposit for the whole, just as they ⟨do not supposit for the whole⟩ in

> What is proposed to you is false.

And so the inference:

> A, which is proposed to you, is unknown by you, therefore something proposed to you is unknown by you,

is not valid because the extremes in the conclusion do not supposit for A, for which they do supposit in the premise.

6.10.1 Another opinion, which claims that a part can supposit for the whole, would respond differently to sophisms of this kind. For this solution grants that A is false, and when it is argued:

> A is unknown by you and A is proposed to you, therefore ⟨something⟩ proposed to you is unknown by you,

it grants the conclusion but says that it is not A, but a proposition similar to it.[116]

ad 6.10.1 But this response can be easily disproved because, assuming that A's subject supposits for A, then A signifies only that A is unknown

[114] That is, *non scire/velle* is a negatio negans, *nescire/nolle* a negatio privans. See, e.g., Ashworth, *Logic and Language in the Post-Medieval Period*, p. 190.

[115] Even if what is said here is true of the Latin verb 'nescire' and adjective 'nescitum', it is not true of the English adjective 'unknown'. According to Segrave, 'nescire' means "to know not to be the case", and there seems to be no verb or adjective in English corresponding exactly to this. So faute de mieux we continue to use 'unknown' (since Segrave clearly equates 'nescire' with 'esse nescitum'), but the reader should bear this always in mind.

[116] See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §ad 9.2.

te, et hoc est verum secundum istam positionem, ergo A significat verum et solum verum, ergo A est verum. Assumptum patet quia subiectum A non supponit nisi pro A, ergo tantum denotat predicatum sibi inesse, et hoc est verum, ergo etc. Et ita patet insufficientia istius responsionis.

6.11 Aliter paralogizatur sic: proponatur ista:

Aliquod tibi propositum non est scitum a te,

vel ista

Nullum tibi propositum est scitum a te,

que sit A. Et queratur | de A: aut sit vera aut falsa, et patet deductio. E$_8$ 30va

ad 6.11 Ad illud respondeo concedendo A, et cum arguitur:

A scitur | a te, et A est tibi propositum, ergo aliquid tibi propositum scitur a te, O 2rb

dico quod consequentia hec non valet. Non enim potest subiectum huius:

Aliquod tibi propositum est scitum a te,

supponere pro A, que est eius contradictoria, quia hoc foret significare seipsam esse falsam. Et ita patet quod nec in A subiectum supponat nec in eius contradictorio quia in contradictoriis termini pro eodem supponunt.

6.12 Aliter paralogizatur sic: proponatur hec:

Hoc tibi propositum est tibi dubium,

que sit A, et queratur aut A sit verum vel falsum. Si concedatur, aliquod tibi propositum est tibi dubium, contra: | nec A est tibi dubium nec aliquod aliud propositum ab A, ergo nullum propositum est tibi dubium. Si dubitetur A, contra: A est tibi dubium, et A est tibi propositum, ergo propositum est tibi dubium. Similiter patet quod non potest dubitari quia nec pro alio nec pro se. Pro alio non est A dubitanda quia constat quod nihil aliud ab A est tibi propositum; nec est dubitanda pro se ipsa quia si subiectum supponat pro toto, hec consequentia est bona: E$_4$ 161rb

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1 A] *om.* O 4 hoc] hec E$_8$ || est verum] *om.* E$_4$ 5 sic] et *add.* O || ista] *om.* O 6 scitum] nescitum O 7 ista] illud O 9 que] *om.* E$_4$ || queratur] queritur E$_8$ || sit^2] est O || aut^2] est *add.* O 10 respondeo] responditur O || concedendo] maiorem *add.* O 12 scitur] est scitum O 13 consequentia hec] conclusio illa O || Non] nec O || huius] scilicet *add.* O 15–17 contradictoria ... eius] *om. hom.* O 15 quia] quod E$_8$ 16 supponat] supponit E$_4$ 17 eodem] eisdem E$_8$ 18 proponatur] proponitur E$_8$ ponatur O 19 Hoc] *om.* E$_4$ 20 vel] aut O 21 A est] *inv.* E$_4$ 22 aliud] *om.* E$_4$ E$_8$ || propositum^2] tibi *add.* O || est tibi] *inv.* O 23–24 si ... dubium] *om. hom.* O 24 Similiter patet] simile *vel* simul (*dub.*) potest E$_4$ 24–25 quia ... nec] *om.* O 25–26 Pro alio non... pro se] *om. hom.* O 26 ipsa] ipso O 27 supponat] supponit O || toto] tota O

by you, and this is true[117] according to this solution, therefore A signifies a truth and only a truth, therefore A is true. The assumption is clear because A's subject does not supposit except for A, therefore it means only that the predicate inheres in ⟨A⟩ itself, and this is true,[118] therefore ⟨A is true⟩. And so the inadequacy of this response is clear.

6.11 A paralogism can be made in another way like this: let this:

Something proposed to you is not known by you,

or

Nothing proposed to you is known by you,

be proposed, call it A, and ask about A if it is true or false, and the argument is clear.[119]

ad 6.11 To this I respond by granting A and when it is argued:

A is known by you and A is proposed to you, therefore something proposed to you is known by you,[120]

I reply that this inference is not valid. For the subject of

Something proposed to you is known by you

cannot supposit for A, which is its contradictory, because it would make it signify that it itself is false. And so it is clear that neither in A nor in its contradictory does the subject supposit ⟨for A⟩, because in contradictories the terms supposit for the same thing.

6.12 A paralogism can be made in another way like this: let this:

This, which is proposed to you, is uncertain for you,

be proposed, call it A, and ask if A is true or false. If you grant it, something proposed to you is uncertain for you—on the contrary: neither A nor anything proposed other than A is uncertain for you, therefore nothing proposed is uncertain for you. If you express doubt about A—on the contrary: A is uncertain for you and A is proposed to you, therefore what is proposed is uncertain for you. Similarly it is clear that ⟨A⟩ cannot be doubted either as regards another or itself. A should not be doubted as regards another because it is certain that nothing other than A is pro-

[117] That is, that A is unknown by you is true, since it was granted by the proponent of this solution.
[118] Again, as in n. 117.
[119] It is only a paralogism if nothing else is proposed to you, in which case 'Something proposed to you is not known by you' and 'Nothing proposed to you is known by you' are equivalent. Suppose A is known by you. Since A was proposed to you, something proposed to you is known by you. But only A was proposed to you. So everything proposed to you is known by you, so A is false. This contradicts the assumption that A is known by you, so by reductio, A is not known by you. So something proposed to you is not known by you, but that is what A signifies, so A is true and you've proved it. So A is known by you. Paradox.
[120] If you grant A, then A is known by you, so since A was proposed to you, something proposed to you is known by you, which contradicts A. So you've granted badly.

Hoc tibi propositum est tibi dubium, ergo aliquod tibi propositum est tibi dubium,

quia arguitur a singulari ad eius indefinitam.

ad 6.12 Ideo dico quod A est falsum nec potest hic deduci ad aliquid inconveniens nec est hoc insolubile, sicut ut hic proponatur hec:

Nullum ⟨tibi⟩ propositum est tibi dubium.

Si enim conceditur, nullum inconveniens accidit. Similiter si proponatur

Hoc tibi propositum est scitum a te,

si conceditur, numquam accidit insolubile.

6.13 Sed in disiunctivis maior est difficultas. Proponatur hec:

Rex | sedet vel disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia, E8 30vb

que sit A. Non potest concedi quia non pro prima parte nec pro secunda quia tunc secunda est falsa. Nec potest negari eadem ratione. Si dubitetur, tunc sic: A est tibi dubium, ergo disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia, et hec est secunda pars disiunctive, ergo secunda pars est vera, ergo tota vera.

ad 6.13 Ad illud dico dubitando istam:

Rex sedet vel disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia,

et nego consequentiam:

Ista disiunctiva est tibi dubia, ergo disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia,

quia extrema consequentis non supponunt pro A quia ista propositio disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia nec potest verificari nec denotare seipsam esse veram pro hac disiunctiva, hoc posito quod homo consideret de illa sicut considerare debeat. Et hoc probatur sic. Si enim posset verificari pro A disiunctiva tibi dubia, ergo aliqua disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia, et antecedens est verum per ypothesim, ergo consequens;

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3 indefinitam] infinitam E_4 4 dico] dicit O || hic] *om.* O 7 nullum] enim *add.* E_8 8 Hoc] hec O || tibi] *om.* E_4 *p.c.*E_8 9 conceditur] concedit O 10 disiunctivis] hec in quibus *add.* O || maior est] *inv.* O || Proponatur] proponitur E_8 *post* disiunctivis O 11 tibi proposita] *om.* E_4 12 parte] tibi sit dubia *add.* E_4 || secunda] parte *add.* E_4 13 secunda] *om.* E_4 || est] esset O || dubitetur] dubitatur O 14 sic] est E_4 || disiunctiva] *om.* O 15 pars^2] disiunctive *add.* O || tota] toto E_4 est *add. O* 16 dubitando istam] istud dubito E_4 18–19 et nego ... dubia] *om. hom.* E_8 19 tibi^2] *om.* E_4 18–22 et nego ... dubia] *om. hom.* O 23 seipsam] se E_4 O || homo] hoc E_4 24 debeat] debet O || enim] *om.* O 25 aliqua] consequentia E_4 26 et] *om.* O || ergo] et *add.* O

posed to you. And it should not be doubted as regards itself because if the subject supposits for the whole, this inference:

> This, which is proposed to you, is uncertain for you, therefore something proposed to you is uncertain for you,

is valid because it argues from a singular proposition to its indefinite.

ad 6.12 For that reason[121] I reply that A is false and that here one cannot deduce anything inconsistent, nor is this an insoluble, any more than if, for example, this:

> Nothing proposed ⟨to you⟩ is uncertain for you,

is proposed: for if it is granted no inconsistency results. Similarly if:

> This, which is proposed to you, is known by you,

is proposed: if it is granted an insoluble never results.

6.13 But in disjunctions there is a greater difficulty. Let this:

> The king is sitting or a disjunction proposed to you is uncertain for you,

be proposed, call it A.[122] It cannot be granted either as regards the first disjunct, or the second—because then the second is false. Nor can it be denied, for the same reason.[123] If it is doubted, then I argue like this: A is uncertain for you, therefore a disjunction proposed to you is uncertain for you, and this is the second disjunct of the disjunction, therefore the second disjunct is true, therefore the whole disjunction is true.

ad 6.13 To this I reply by expressing doubt about:

> The king is sitting or a disjunction proposed to you is uncertain for you,

and I deny the inference:

> This disjunction is uncertain for you, therefore a disjunction proposed to you is uncertain for you,

because the extremes of the conclusion do not supposit for A, because the disjunctive proposition proposed to you is uncertain for you, and cannot be true about nor mean that it itself is true of this disjunction, provided that someone thought about it as it should be thought about. And this is proved like this. For if 'disjunction uncertain for you' could be true of A, then some disjunction proposed to you is uncertain for you, and

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[121] Having shown in §6.12 that you can't grant and can't doubt the paralogism, the response is to deny it. It is strange that Segrave does not show that A is a paralogism, as he claimed at the start of §6.12. So he does not apply his diagnosis showing that the paralogism depends on the fallacy of accident.

[122] Cf. Bradwardine, §§9.7.3–9.7.5. Cf. §8.4.

[123] 'The king is sitting' is a standard example in Obligations treatises of a proposition whose truth-value in the scenario is not known.

et consequens est altera pars disiunctive, ergo disiunctiva est vera; et antecedens est verum per ypothesim et scitum a te si consideres, ergo consequens, ergo disiunctiva non est tibi dubia, ergo si verificatur ista propositio:

Aliqua disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia

pro A, sequitur quod non verificatur pro illa, ergo illam non supponunt extrema, sicut prius patuit evidenter.

6.13.1 Sed queritur quomodo est hoc insolubile cum hic non ponatur iste terminus 'verum', nec iste terminus 'falsum'.

ad 6.13.1 Ad quod dico quod hic ponitur equivalens, dubium namque est quod est apprehensum nec cognitum esse verum nec scitum esse falsum et ita ponuntur isti termini | implicite licet non explicite. Si autem E_8 31ra disiungatur hec propositio:

Aliqua disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia,

cum propositione vera tota disiunctiva foret concedenda, si tamen falsa scita esse falsa foret neganda nec accideret insolubile. Si etiam poneretur hec:

Rex sedet vel nulla disiunctiva tibi proposita est tibi dubia,

si hec conceditur, numquam accidit insolubile, sicut responsum est. Ad hec consimiliter et ad omnia similia respondendum est.

6.14 Aliter paralogizatur sic: sit A altera istarum:

⟨D⟩ Deus est,

et

⟨C⟩ Nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te,

et lateat te que illarum sit A.

Et proponatur ista sorti ⟨et nulla alia⟩:

⟨B⟩ A est scitum a te,

et queratur de ista:

⟨B⟩ A est scitum a te,

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1 consequens] antecedens O 2 consideres] consideras E_8 5 disiunctiva] *om.* E_4 E_8 6 pro[1]] per E_4 || supponunt] supponit E_4 E_8 7 prius] *om.* E_8 O 8 est hoc] *inv.* O 9 nec iste terminus] vel O 10 quod[1]] hoc O 11 cognitum] scitum O 12 et ita] si O 13 disiungatur *corr.*] distinguatur E_8 O distinguetur E_4 || hec] ista O 16 foret] esset O || accideret] accidet E_8 || etiam] enim O 18 proposita] dicta *add.* O 20 accidit] accidet E_8 21 consimiliter] *post* similia O || est] *om.* E_4 E_8 26 te] *om.* E_4 E_8 || illarum] illorum E_8 || sit A] *om.* E_4 E_8 27 proponatur] proponitur E_4 || et nulla alia *coniecimus ex fontis* (Kilvington, Bradwardine)] *om. mss*

the premise[124] is true by hypothesis, therefore the conclusion ⟨is true as well⟩; and the conclusion is one disjunct of the disjunction, therefore the disjunction is true; and the premise[125] is true by hypothesis and known by you if you think about it, therefore so too is the conclusion; therefore the disjunction is not uncertain for you, therefore if this proposition:

Some disjunction proposed to you is uncertain for you

is true about A, it follows that it is not true about it, therefore the extremes do not supposit for it, as was manifestly clear before.

6.13.1 But one may ask in what way this is an insoluble, since the term 'true' does not appear here nor the term 'false'.

ad 6.13.1 To this I reply that a term equivalent to these does appear here, for what is uncertain is understood as what is neither recognized to be true nor known to be false, and so the terms ⟨'true' and 'false'⟩ appear implicitly, although not explicitly. If this proposition

Some disjunction proposed to you is uncertain for you

is disjoined with a true proposition ⟨known to be true⟩, the whole disjunction should be granted. If however it is disjoined with a false proposition known to be false, the whole disjunction should be denied and no insoluble results. And if:

The king is sitting or no disjunction proposed to you is uncertain for you,

is proposed: if it is granted, an insoluble never results, as in the previous response. One should respond to this and to all similar propositions likewise.

6.14 A paralogism may be made in another way like this: let A be one of these:

⟨D⟩ God exists,

and

⟨C⟩ Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you,

where it is unknown to you which of these is A.

And let the proposition:

⟨B⟩ A is known by you,

be proposed to Socrates ⟨and nothing else⟩ and ask about:

⟨B⟩ A is known by you

[124] *Sc.* "'disjunction uncertain for you' could be true of A".

[125] *Sc.* "the conclusion is one disjunct of the disjunction". Segrave is here ignoring the difference between 'a disjunction' and 'some disjunction'.

utrum sit vera vel falsa.

6.14.1 ⟨B⟩ negari non potest, quia sequitur:

A est 'Deus est', ergo A est scitum a te.

Antecedens est dubium, ergo consequens non est negandum.

6.14.2 Nec est hoc ⟨B⟩ dubitandum quia sequitur:

Hoc propositum sorti est tibi dubium, ergo hoc non est scitum a te,

et sequitur ultra:

Hoc propositum sorti non est scitum a te, ergo nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te.

Consequentia patet quia tantum hec est proposita sorti; et antecedens est scitum a te, ergo consequens. Et tunc arguitur sic:

Hec est scita a te: Nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te, et: Deus est est scita a te, ergo utrumque istorum est scitum a te; A est alterum istorum, ergo A est scitum a te.

6.14.3 Tunc concedo istam:

⟨B⟩ A est scitum | a te. O 2va

Qua concessa proponatur hec:

⟨C⟩ Nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te.

6.14.3.1 Hoc negari non potest quia sequitur: | E_8 31rb

Hec est falsa, et hec est A, ergo A est falsum,

et ultra:

Ergo A non est scitum a te.

30–1 a te utrum] aut O 1 vel] aut est O 4 non est] *add. in marg.* E_4 3–4 Deus ... est] ergo aliquid est, ergo Deus est. Ista consequentia est bona, scita a te esse bona, et antecedens est scitum a te, ergo et consequens non est tibi dubium, ergo consequens non est a te O 6 hoc] *om.* O 8 ultra] ulterius O 9 nullum] se *add.* E_4 11 patet] apparet E_4 12 ergo] et *add.* O || Et] *om.* O 13 Hec] hoc O || scita] scitum O *om.* E_4 et *add.* O 14 Deus] *del. p.c.* E_4 || est[1]] *om.* E_4 E_8 || scita] scitum E_8 O || istorum] istarum O 15 scitum[1]] scita O || te[1]] et *add.* O || istorum] istarum O || te[2]] et *add.* O 16 Tunc] *om.* E_4 17 a te] *om.* E_4 O 18 Qua] contra E_8 19 sorti] *om.* O 20 sequitur] ergo *add.* O 21 Hec] ergo O || falsa] falsum O || hec] hoc E_8 22 ultra] ulterius O 23 a te] *om.* O

whether it is true or false.[126]

6.14.1[127] ⟨B⟩ cannot be denied because the inference:

> A is 'God exists', therefore A is known by you,

is valid. The premise is uncertain, therefore the conclusion should not be denied.[128]

6.14.2[129] Nor should ⟨B⟩ be doubted, because the inference:

> This, which is proposed to Socrates, is uncertain for you, therefore this is not known by you,

is valid, and moreover this is valid:

> This, which is proposed to Socrates, is not known by you, therefore nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you.

The validity of the latter inference is clear because only ⟨B⟩ is proposed to Socrates; and the premise is known by you, therefore the conclusion ⟨is known by you⟩. And then one argues like this:

> 'Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you' ⟨*sc.* C⟩ is known by you, and 'God exists' is known by you, therefore each of them is known by you; A is one of these, therefore A is known by you.

6.14.3[130] Then I grant:

> ⟨B⟩ A is known by you.

Once ⟨B⟩ is granted, let

> ⟨C⟩ Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you be proposed.

6.14.3.1 ⟨C⟩ cannot be denied because the inference:

> This is false, and this is A, therefore A is false,

is valid, and furthermore:

> Therefore A is not known by you

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[126] See Kilvington, *Sophismata*, sophism 48, and Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, Appendix A, §A.1 (with 'concessum' in place of 'propositum'). Kilvington and Bradwardine add that only B is granted by Socrates ('et nulla alia'), and Segrave's argument at §6.14.3.2 assumes this. Segrave introduces the designation 'B' for 'A is known by you' in §6.14.3.3 below (following Kilvington—it's called 'D' by Bradwardine, who dubs 'God exists' B). John Dumbleton also claims in his *Summa Logicae*, ch. 25 (part of his 'De Scire'), without spelling it out, that his solution solves it.

[127] Cf. Kilvington, *Sophismata*, S48(e), where Kilvington shows that the sophismatic proposition, B, cannot be denied; also Bradwardine §A.1.2.

[128] Again, use of Kilvington's disputational meta-argument. See n. 104 above.

[129] Cf. Kilvington, *Sophismata*, S48(c), where Kilvington shows that B cannot be doubted; also Bradwardine, *Inoslubilia*, §A.1.3.

[130] Cf. Kilvington, *Sophismata*, S48(d), where Kilvington shows that B cannot be granted; also Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §§A.1.1–A.1.1.3.

Consequentia est bona, et antecedens est dubium, ergo consequens non est negandum; tamen consequens est falsum quia concessisti quod A est scitum a te.

6.14.3.2 Similiter nec dubitari potest ⟨C⟩ quia sequitur:

Hec est tibi dubia et hec est A, ergo A est tibi dubium.

Consequens est falsum quia A est scitum a te.

6.14.3.3 Ideo concedo istam similiter

⟨C⟩ Nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te.

Sed arguitur tunc sic:

⟨E⟩ Nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te, B est propositum sorti, ergo B non est scitum a te,

(sit B ista 'A est scitum a te'). Consequens est falsum quia B est scitum a te et concessum.

ad 6.14 Ideo dubito istam consequentiam ⟨E⟩, quia si A sit hec:

⟨C⟩ Nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te,

consequentia ⟨E⟩ non valet; si sit

⟨D⟩ Deus est,

consequentia ⟨E⟩ bona est.

Et similiter dubito consequentiam ex opposito, hanc videlicet:

⟨E'⟩ B est scitum a te, et B est propositum sorti, ergo aliquod propositum sorti est scitum a te,

quia si A sit ista:

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2 tamen consequens] *inv.* E_4 || est^2] *om.* E_4 E_8 5 Hec] hoc O || dubia] dubium O || hec] hoc O || A^2] *om.* E_4 E_8 6 est^1] *om.* E_4 E_8 || te] et *add.* O 12 A] *om.* E_4 13 concessum] et *add.* O 18 consequentia] *om. p.c* E_4 19 dubito] *om.* O || videlicet] scilicet O 21 aliquod] aliquid O

follows. The inference is valid and the ⟨second⟩ premise ⟨'This is A'⟩ is uncertain, so the conclusion should not be denied;[131] yet the conclusion is false because ⟨in §6.14.1.3⟩ you have granted that A is known by you.

6.14.3.2 Similarly, ⟨C⟩ cannot be doubted because the inference:

> This is uncertain for you and this is A, therefore A is uncertain for you,

is valid. The conclusion is false because A is known by you.[132]

6.14.3.3[133] So I also grant:

> ⟨C⟩ Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you.

But then one argues like this:

> ⟨E⟩ Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you, B is proposed to Socrates, therefore B is not known by you,

where B is 'A is known by you'. The conclusion is false because B is known and was granted by you ⟨in §6.14.1.3⟩.[134]

ad 6.14 So I question the validity of inference ⟨E⟩ because if A is:

> ⟨C⟩ Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you,

inference ⟨E⟩ is not valid; while if ⟨A⟩ is:

> ⟨D⟩ God exists,

inference ⟨E⟩ is valid.[135]

And similarly, I question the validity of the inference drawn from the opposite ⟨of E's conclusion⟩,[136] namely:

> ⟨E´⟩ B is known by you and B is proposed to Socrates, therefore something proposed to Socrates is known by you,[137]

because if A is:

---

[131] Again, note the use of Kilvington's disputational meta-argument.

[132] Presumably, 'this' in §§6.14.3.1–2 refers to C. Note that, given the correction of the scenario to specify that only B is proposed to Socrates (see n. 116), C is equivalent to 'B is not known by you'.

[133] Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §A.1.1.1, where he introduces inference E. 'E' is Bradwardine's designation for the inference.

[134] To complete the sophism: the minor premise is given in the scenario, so the major premise, that is, C, cannot be granted. So C cannot be denied, doubted or granted, and so B cannot be granted, as it was in §6.14.1.3. So B cannot be denied, doubted or granted.

[135] If A is C, E commits a fallacy of accident, for in that case, in the first premise 'is known by you' cannot supposit for A, while it does in the conclusion; while if A is 'God exists', E is valid but its first premise is false, as is its conclusion.

[136] ⟨E⟩ and ⟨E´⟩ are equivalent by the rule that "when there are many premises [...] it is necessary that from the opposite of the consequent with one premise the opposite of the other premise follows" (Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, III-3 ch. 38: "[...] quando antecedens continet plures propositiones [...] oportet quod ex opposito consequentis cum una propositionum sequatur oppositum alterius propositionis").

[137] Cf. Kilvington, *Sophismata*, S48(k).

⟨C⟩ Nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te,

tunc in ista:

Aliquod propositum sorti est scitum a te,

extrema non supponunt pro B quia si supponerent pro B esset scitum, cum B antecedat ad contradictorium huius:

Aliquod propositum sorti est scitum a te,

ista significaret suum contradictorium esse verum et ita significaret se esse veram pro suo contradictorio vero, quod non potest. Et ita patet quod similiter in ista:

⟨C⟩ Nullum propositum sorti est scitum | a te E$_8$ 31va

subiectum non supponit pro B, cum A significaret istam:

Nullum propositum sorti est scitum a te.

Ex illo dicto patet quomodo sit respondendum ad talia sophysmata.

6.15 Ponatur quod tantum iste due propositiones:

Deus est,

et

Deus est ⟨est⟩ maxima propositio vera,

que sit A, et queratur an A sit vera vel falsa.

---

4 esset] essent E$_8$ 5 cum] cum *vel* tamen (*dub.*) E$_4$ 9 similiter] sicut O 13 illo dicto] illa dicta E$_4$ || talia] *om.* O 14 Ponatur] proponatur E$_8$ O 16 et] *om.* O 17 maxima] maxime E$_8$ O 18 falsa] vera E$_8$

⟨C⟩ Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you,

then in:

Something proposed to Socrates is known by you

the extremes do not supposit for B because if they did supposit for B, ⟨'Something proposed to Socrates is known by you'⟩ would be known.[138] But, since B implies the contradictory of:

Something proposed to Socrates is known by you,

⟨which is the contradictory of C⟩, this proposition would signify that its contradictory ⟨*sc*. C⟩ was true and so it would signify itself to be true about its true contradictory ⟨C⟩, which cannot be the case. And so it is clear that also in:

⟨C⟩ Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you,

the subject does not supposit for B, since A would signify this:

Nothing proposed to Socrates is known by you.

It is clear from what has been said how one should respond to these sophisms.

6.15 Let us suppose that there are only these two propositions:

God exists,

and

'God exists' is the greatest true proposition,[139]

call ⟨the latter⟩ A, and ask if A is true or false.[140]

[138] That is, inference ⟨E´⟩ would be valid, and so the conclusion would be known since the premises are known.

[139] Another possible interpretation of 'maxima propositio' is as a maxim (see, e.g., Boethius, *De Topicis Differentiis*, tr. Stump, pp. 33, 46 ff.), but it's not clear that this is the interpretation of the phrase that Bradwardine and Segrave are alluding to here.

[140] See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §12.1, who dubs 'God exists' A and '"God exists" is the greatest true proposition' B. Bradwardine proves that 'God exists' is "the truest principle of all" (*verissimum omnium*) in his *De Causa Dei*, ed. Savile, I 11 (1618, 199A): "Moreover, in the order of truths, there is no infinite regress, but there is some first truth which is the cause of all others. But it is this, 'God exists', since this does not have any truth as its prior cause" (Item in ordine verorum non est infinitus processus; sed est aliquod primum verum, quod est causa omnium aliorum. Sed illud est, Deus est, cum non habeat aliquod verum prius causam illius). See also §6.9 above. Staying with Segrave's terminology, suppose that A (that is '"God exists" is the greatest true proposition') is true. Then no proposition is more true than 'God exists', but A entails that 'God exists' is true (and not vice versa) and so is greater (more true) than it. Contradiction. So A is not true but false, in which case 'God exists' is not the greatest true proposition. But A is the only other proposition so it must be greater and true. Paradox. (Note that this proof of paradox starts with the inference which Segrave then rejects in §ad 6.15.)

ad 6.15 Et patet ex dictis quod A est concedenda, et non sequitur:

A est vera, et A est maior quam deus est, ergo deus est non est maxima ⟨propositio vera⟩.

Causa autem quare non sequitur eadem est in omnibus.

6.16 Similiter sit A nomen cuiuslibet propositionis cuius predicatum est vere predicabile de toto, et B nomen cuiuslibet propositionis cuius predicatum vere non | dicitur de toto cuius est ⟨pars⟩, tunc E_4 161va

Homo est animal est B.

Hec est vera et sit illa C, queritur utrum C sit A vel B, et patet deductio sicut in aliis.

ad 6.16 Ad illud dicitur quod C est B, et cum dicitur:

C est B, et B est predicatum ipsius C, ergo predicatum ipsius C vere dicitur de C, ergo C est A,

negatur hec consequentia:

B dicitur de C vere, et B est predicatum ipsius C, ergo predicatum ipsius C vere dicitur de C,

quia in consequente subiectum non supponit pro B. Non enim potest denotare se esse veram sine contradictione pro hoc predicato B, sicut patet inspicienti, ideo pro illo non supponit, sed est sensus:

Predicatum C non vere dicitur de C.

6.17 Sic ergo ex predictis patet quomodo respondendum sit ad omne insolubile.

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1 est] sit O 2 et] *om.* O 4 quare] quia O 5 nomen cuiuslibet] nullum predicatum alicuius O || predicatum] non vere dicitur de toto *add. a.c.* E_8 6–7 est ... predicatum] *om. hom.* O 7 vere non] *inv.* E_8 9 et[1]] *om.* E_4 11 dicitur[2]] arguitur E_4 11–12 et ... B] *om. hom.* O 12 C[2]] A *in marg.* O 12–13 ergo ... vere] *om. hom.* E_4 13 dicitur] predicatur O || C est A] A est C O 15 dicitur] *om.* E_4 15–16 ipsius ... predicatum] *om. hom.* E_4 15 C[2]] *om.* E_8 16 predicatum ipsius C] *om. hom.* O 17 consequente] antecedente E_8 21 Sic] ecce O || respondendum sit] *inv.* O || omne] *om.* O 22 insolubile] etc. stude quia proderit multum *add.* O

ad 6.15 And it is clear from what has been said that A should be granted, and this is not valid:

> A is true and A is greater than 'God exists', therefore 'God exists' is not the greatest ⟨true proposition⟩.

And the reason why it is not valid is the same in every case.

6.16 Similarly, let A be the ⟨common⟩ name of any proposition whose predicate is truly predicable of the whole, and B be the ⟨common⟩ name of any proposition whose predicate is not truly said of the whole of which it is part.[141] Then consider:

> 'A man is an animal' is a B,

This is true. Call it C and ask if C is an A or a B, and the argument is clear, just as in the other cases.[142]

ad 6.16 To this I reply that C is a B, and when it is said:

> C is a B and B is C's predicate, therefore C's predicate is truly said of C, therefore C is an A,

I deny the following inference:

> B is truly said of C and B is ⟨C's⟩ predicate, therefore C's predicate is truly said of C,

because in the conclusion the subject does not supposit for B. For it cannot mean that it itself is true of this predicate B without contradiction, as is clear to anyone who considers this, so it does not supposit for ⟨B⟩. But the sense ⟨of 'C is a B'⟩ is:

> C's predicate is not truly said of C.

6.17 So, from what has been said it is clear how one should respond to every insoluble.

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[141] 'A' is somewhat like the predicate 'autological', and 'B' is somewhat like 'heterological'. Cf. Grelling's paradox (q.v.). Note that A and B are contradictory predicates, so every proposition must be either an A or a B and not both.

[142] If C is an A, then C's predicate is truly said of C, and B is C's predicate, so C is a B; while if C is a B, then since B is C's predicate, C's predicate is truly said of C, so C is an A. But it must be either an A or a B, so it's both. Contradiction. See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §§10.1–2, and discussion, *ibid.*, 'Introduction', p. 9.