

INSOLUBLES

WALTER SEGRAVE

CRITICAL EDITION WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY BARBARA BARTOCCI AND STEPHEN READ





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⟨Capitulum Septimum⟩

⟨De apparentibus insolubilibus⟩

7.1 | Iam restat quedam alia sophismata solvere que apparent insolubilia, E₈ 31vb
non tamen sunt, ut hec:

5 7.1.1 Ponatur quod ista scribatur:

Hoc est verum,
que sit A, et hec similiter:

Hoc est falsum,
que sit B; et ponatur quod per subiectum ipsius A demonstretur B et per
10 subiectum B demonstretur A. Queritur tunc aut A sit verum vel falsum.
Si verum, cum non significet nisi B esse verum, ergo B esse verum est
verum, ergo B est verum, et B significat A esse falsum, ergo A esse falsum
est verum, ergo A est falsum. Si conceditur quod A est falsum, ergo B est
15 falsum. Consequentia satis patet et sequitur: B est falsum, ergo A esse
falsum est falsum, ergo A non est falsum.

7.1.2 Simile est: significet A B esse falsum et B C esse falsum et C A esse
falsum, et accidit | idem.

O 2vb

7.1.3 Similiter: significet A istam:

Hoc non est verum,
20 et queratur an A sit verum vel falsum.

ad 7.1 In omnibus hiis est eadem solutio. Pro quo est sciendum primo
quid est significare; ut vult Aristoteles in libro Peryhermenias capitulo de
verbo, significare est intellectum constituere in animo audientis et eius
animum sistere et quietare et representare aliquid. Dicit enim sic:

25 ipsa quidem secundum se dicta nomina verba sunt et
significant aliquid; constituit enim qui dicit intellectum
et qui audit quiescit.

Illud ergo nomen significat aliquid quod sistit et quietat intellectum in
illo et hoc indifferenter quantum est ex parte sua et etiam quocumque

3 Iam] nunc O || sophismata] om. O || que] quia tamen E₄ 4 non tamen sunt] non
sunt E₈ om. E₄ || ut] sicut O || hec] hic E₄ O 5 Ponatur] ponitur E₈ 9 demonstratur]
demonstratur E₈ 10 demonstretur] demonstratur E₈ || sit] est O 11 verum¹] falsum E₄
|| esse² verum³] est verum *scr. et del.* E₄ 12 esse²] est E₄ 14 sequitur] scitur E₈ ||
est] esse E₈ 16 est] hoc si *add.* O 19 Hoc] om. E₄ E₈ 20 an] utrum E₄ 21 est²]
om. E₄ O 22 est] sit O || vult Aristoteles] Philosophus vult O || in libro] libro E₄
primo O 23 significare] om. E₄ || animo] auditoris vel *add.* O 24 aliquid] om. E₄ E₈
|| Dicit] dico E₄ || sic] om. E₄ 25 quidem secundum se] *post verba* O || quidem]
quid E₄ enim quod O || nomina] et *add.* E₄ vel *add.* E₈ O || sunt] om. *p.c.* E₄ 26 enim]
quod E₄ om. E₈ 29 sua] intelligit quodcumque *add.* E₄ intelligit cuicumque *add.* O ||
etiam] aliquo O

⟨Chapter 7⟩

⟨On merely apparent insolubles⟩

7.1 It now remains to solve some sophisms which seem to be but are not insolubles, such as these:

7.1.1 Suppose that someone writes:

This is true,
call it A, and also

This is false,
call it B.¹⁴³ And suppose that A's subject refers to B and B's subject refers to A. Then ask if A is true or false. If ⟨A⟩ is true then, since it signifies only that B is true, it is true that B is true, therefore B is true; and B signifies (only) that A is false, therefore it is true that A is false, therefore A is false. If it is granted that A is false, then B is false. The inference is clear enough and then: from 'B is false' it follows that it is false that A is false, therefore A is not false.

7.1.2 A similar one: let A signify that B is false and let B signify that C is false and C that A is false, and the same thing happens.

7.1.3 Similarly: let A signify:

This is not true,¹⁴⁴
and ask if A is true or false.

ad 7.1 The solution is the same in all these cases. Here first recall what it is to signify: as Aristotle proposes in *De Interpretatione* ch. ⟨3⟩, 'On Verbs', to signify is to establish a thought in the hearer's mind¹⁴⁵ and to make their mind come to a halt and acquiesce and to represent something ⟨to their mind⟩. For he says this:

"Verbs taken by themselves are names and signify something; for the speaker establishes a thought and the hearer settles on it."¹⁴⁶

Therefore, that name signifies something which it presents and it brings the thought to rest on it, and this indifferently for its own part and also

¹⁴³ See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §4.2.3. (Bradwardine's own solution is given in §ad 4.2.3 in ch. 12, p. 168.)

¹⁴⁴ See Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §4.2.4. (Again, Bradwardine's own solution is given in §ad 4.2.4 in ch. 12, p. 170.)

¹⁴⁵ Hamesse, *Les auctoritates Aristotelis*, p. 305, #6.

¹⁴⁶ Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, ch. 3, 16b20; in Boethius' translation: "Ipsa quidem secundum se dicta verba nomina sunt et significant aliquid—constituit enim qui dicit intellectum, et qui audit quiescit" (*De Interpretatione vel Periermenias*, p. 7)

alio intellecto; non enim | est vox agens (cognoscens), sed quantum est ex parte sua semper uno modo agit. Unde si Sortes per aliquam propositionem aliquando voluntarie intelligit verum et solum verum, non tamen propter hoc dicitur propositio significare illud verum ex quo [significare] 5 debeat propositio dici vera, sed illud dicitur propositio significare ad cuius intellectum actualem semper movet audientem et hoc quantum in eo est et hoc indifferenter quemcumque audientem, quacumque alia intellecta. Potest enim homo voluntarie per istam:

E₈ 32ra

Homo est animal

10 intelligere hominem esse asinum, sed tamen illud non significat.

ad 7.1.1 Isto supposito dico quod iste due orationes:

Hoc est verum

et

Hoc est falsum

15 possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo materialiter, alio modo significative. Materialiter accepte nihil significant nisi se ipsas et hoc non per modum complexi sed incomplexi ut lignum, lapis, se ipsas significant. Dico ergo quod subiectum ipsius A potest demonstrare vel singulariter significare ipsum B materialiter acceptum; potest enim intellectum eius 20 constituere sic et animum audientis in ipso quietare. Et similiter e converso, subiectum ipsius B sic potest significare A. Et si sic significet, non est difficultas, quia constat quod utrumque istorum significative acceptum est falsum, quia A significat B materialiter acceptum fore verum et hoc est falsum; similiter B acceptum significative significat A materialiter 25 acceptum esse falsum et hoc similiter est falsum, quia neutrum illorum materialiter acceptum est verum | vel falsum.

E₈ 32rb

Si autem in hac institutione sic instituatur ut per utriusque subiectum demonstretur alterum acceptum significative, dico quod hoc est impos-

1 enim est] *inv.* O || cognoscens *coniecimus*] vel cognitionis cognoscere E₄ a.c. E₈ cuiuscumque vel cognitionis cognoscere p.c. E₈ vel cognitionis cognoscit O || sed] in *add.* E₄ 1–2 ex parte] extra E₄ 2 semper uno modo] uno modo semper O || aliquam] aliam E₄ 3 aliquando] oculo O || tamen] *post* propositio O 4 propter] ex E₄ 5 debeat] debebat O || illud] igitur E₄ 6 actualem] intellectualius E₄ 7 est] *om.* O || quemcumque] quantum E₄ || audientem] et in *add.* O 7–8 quacumque ... intellecta] quamcumque aliam intellectam E₄ 7 quacumque] re *add.* O 8 istam] idem E₄ 10 sed] *om.* O || tamen illud non] illud non tamen E₄ 11 dico] *om.* E₄ 15 alio modo] et E₄ 16 accepte] accepta E₄ E₈ || ipsas] ipsa O 18 subiectum] significatum E₄ || demonstrare] denominare O ipsum *add.* E₄ || singulariter] formam O 19 intellectum eius] *inv.* E₄ 20 constituere sic] *inv.* O || et animum] in animo E₄ animam O || in ipso] et enim ipsam O || quietare] quietatur E₄ || similiter] sic O 20–21 converso] contra a.c. E₄ E₈ 21 subiectum] significatum E₄ || sic¹] *om.* E₄ || significet] significat O 23 A] *om.* O sic *add.* E₄ || significat] significabit O 25 esse] fore O || similiter] simili O 26 est verum] *inv.* E₄ 27 instituatur] instituantur E₈ || per utriusque] pro utroque E₈ O 28 demonstretur] denotaretur et O

regardless of any other thing comprehended; for a sound does not have a mind of its own, but for its own part always acts in the same way. Thus if Socrates at some time wilfully comprehends a truth and only a truth by some proposition, it is not for that reason, however, that the proposition is said to signify that truth from which the proposition should be said to be true. But the proposition is said to signify that towards whose actual comprehension (the proposition) always prompts the hearer, and (it does) this in itself and does this for any hearer indifferently regardless of any other thing comprehended. For by:

A man is an animal,

a man can wilfully comprehend that a man is an ass, and yet it does not signify that.

ad 7.1.1 Having assumed that, I reply that these two utterances:

This is true,

and

This is false,

(which we called A and B respectively) can be thought about in two ways, in one way materially, in another way significatively.¹⁴⁷ Taken materially (the utterances) only signify themselves and this not in a propositionally complex way but, just like 'wood stone', they signify themselves in a non-propositional way. Therefore I reply that A's subject can refer to or individually signify B taken materially, for it can establish (the speaker's) thought of it (sc. B) in this way and bring the hearer's mind to settle on it. And similarly, conversely, B's subject can signify A taken in this way (sc. materially). And if it signifies it in that way, there is no difficulty, because it is certain that each of these utterances taken significatively is false, because A signifies that B taken materially is true and this is false; similarly, B taken significatively signifies that A taken materially is false and this is false too, because neither of them taken materially is true or false.

However, if in this manner it is so established that by the subject of each utterance the other utterance is referred to taken significatively, I reply

¹⁴⁷ See, e.g., Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, I 64, p. 196: "material supposition is when the term does not supposit significatively" (suppositio materialis est quando terminus non supponat significatively); Buridan, *Sophismata*, ed. Pironet, p. 56: "To the third sophism ('Man is a species') one can respond [...] by saying that the sophism is true taking the term 'man' materially, and false taking it personally or significatively" (Ad tertium sophisma ('homo est species'), potest responderi [...] dicendo quod sophisma est verum, capiendo istum terminum 'homo' materialiter, et falsum, capiendo personaliter sive significatively). See also Manlevelt, *Quaestiones libri Porphyrii*, p. 212, where he observes that although all personal supposition is significative, not all significative supposition is personal.

sibile. Numquam enim erit intellectus audientis per ea quietatus et hoc indifferenter respectu cuiuscumque audientis et quocumque alio intellecto. Significatio enim utriusque dependet ex significatione reliqui et ita quolibet cognitio quam faciunt semper est dependens et ita numquam
 5 erit intellectus eiusdem quietatus per ista.

7.1.1.1 Sed forte arguitur: nomina relativa significant aliquid et tamen significata dependent ex se invicem.

ad 7.1.1.1 Ad illud dicendum quod non est simile quia hoc est proprium relativis quod neutrum cognoscatur sine reliquo, sed in proposito non
 10 manifestatur aliqua dependentia relativa.

Vel dicitur aliter quod licet significatum termini relativi ut tale dependeat ex suo correlato et e contra, istum tamen terminum significare suum significatum non dependet ex significare alium terminum suum significatum, sed uterque significat significatum suum, ac si alius terminus non significaret, licet secundum tale esse unum representatum non posset prius
 15 cognosci sine alio cognito; ita tamen non est in proposito, sed utrumque terminum significare dependet ex reliquum significare.

7.1.1.2 Sed dices forte quod illud non oportet quia pono quod per subiectum ipsius A demonstretur B; et hoc: A, absolute nec materialiter nec
 20 significative acceptum. Quo posito stat | argumentum ut prius.

Eg 32va

ad 7.1.1.2 Ad illud dicendum quod si A demonstretur, necessario demonstratur significative acceptum vel materialiter acceptum quia inter has acceptiones non est medium, sicut inter significare et non significare non cadit medium. Multotiens tamen consideratur terminus per intentionem communiorem quam sit illa intentio: significare vel quam sit ista intentio: non significare, et tamen in ista necessario consideratur vel significative acceptum vel non significative acceptum. Unde potest terminus
 25

1 intellectus ... quietatus] audientis intellectus quietatus per illam E₈ O 2 respectu]
 om. E₄ E₈ 3 Significatio] significatum O 4 ita] ideo O om. E₄ 5 intellectus eiusdem]
 animus O 6 arguitur] aliqua O || aliquid] aliqua E₄ 7 significata] significatio O || ex]
 ad E₄ 8 dicendum] dico O 9 neutrum] unum non O 11 quod licet significatum] hee
 significant O || termini relativi] nominis relatum (*dub.*) E₄ || tale] tali O || dependeat]
 dependentiam E₈ dependentiam *add.* E₄ 12 suo] sui O || correlato] correlatio O || e contra]
 extra E₈ O || significare] significet O 13 significare alium terminum] alio termino
 significare E₄ significante aliquem terminum O 14 significat] om. O || significatum]
 om. E₄ E₈ 15 secundum tale esse] significatum (*dub.*) E₄ || posset] om. E₈ || prius]
 perfecte E₄ om. O 16 cognosci] per alium vel *add.* O 17 reliquum *corr.*] reliquo *mss*
 18 pono quod] om. E₈ 19 demonstretur] demonstraretur E₄ || A²] om. O B *add.* E₄
 20 acceptum] *post* materialiter E₄ || ut] sicut E₄ 21 dicendum] dicitur E₄ dico O ||
 demonstretur] demonstraretur E₈ demonstratur O 23 has] duas *add.* O || acceptiones]
 expositiones E₄ || sicut] nec *add.* E₄ E₈ 24 consideratur] medium sive O 25 significare]
 significans E₄ E₈ 26 intentio] om. O || et tamen in ista] illa tamen E₄ tamen intentio
 illa O || vel] *post* necessario E₄ 27 acceptum²] accepta O om. E₄

that this is impossible. For the hearer's thought will never be settled by means of these ⟨subjects⟩ and this indifferently for any hearer and regardless of whatever other thing is comprehended. For the signification of each utterance depends on the signification of the other and so any cognition which the utterances produce is always dependent and so the hearers' comprehension will never be settled by means of these ⟨subjects⟩.

7.1.1.1 But perhaps one can argue that relatives¹⁴⁸ signify something and yet their significates depend on each other.

ad 7.1.1.1 To this it should be replied that the two cases are not similar because it is peculiar to relatives that neither of them is known without the other, but in the present case no relative dependency is evidenced.

Alternatively, one might reply that although the significate of a relative term as such depends on its correlate and vice versa, yet one term's signifying its own significate does not depend on the other term's signifying its significate. What is more, each ⟨relative term⟩ signifies its own significate even if the other term did not signify it; although according to such being, the one thing represented ⟨to the mind⟩ could not be known earlier without the other being known. However it is not so in the case ⟨of A and B⟩, but each term's signifying depends on the other's signifying.

7.1.1.2 But perhaps you may reply that this is not necessary because I assume ⟨as in 7.1.1⟩ that B is referred to by A's subject; and A is taken neither materially nor significatively but absolutely.¹⁴⁹ Having assumed that, the argument works as before.

ad 7.1.1.2 To this it should be replied that if A is referred to, it is necessarily referred to taken either significatively or materially, because there is no middle between these ways of taking it, just as there is no middle between signifying and not signifying. However, often a term is thought about by means of an intention more general than the intention of signifying, or than the intention of not signifying, yet it is necessarily thought about in it taken either significatively or not significatively. Thus a term taken

¹⁴⁸ Segrave is not referring to relatives such as 'father/son', 'master/slave', but to anaphora (relative pronouns). On the medieval discussion of anaphora, see, e.g., Parsons, *Articulating Medieval Logic*, ch. 8.

¹⁴⁹ On absolute supposition, see, e.g., *Tractatus de Proprietatibus Sermonum* (in De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum*, II 2, p. 716): "some ⟨modes⟩ of supposition are absolute, some ⟨context-⟩relative. A term is said to have absolute (supposition) when used by itself, e.g., 'man'. For it supposits absolutely from its imposition for anything equally" (suppositionum alia absoluta, alia respectiva. Absoluta dicitur quam habet terminus per se sumptus, ut 'homo'. Supponit enim absolute ex institutione pro quolibet equaliter). It was often called 'suppositio naturalis': see Barth, *The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy*, ch. 4 §14 (p. 98); De Rijk, 'The Development of Suppositio Naturalis in Medieval Logic', p. 71.

demonstrari significative acceptus, etsi non demonstretur hoc sic dicendo:
significative acceptum. Unde sic dicendo:

Hoc est vox,

demonstrando hanc vocem: homo, si vero ut materialiter acceptam, dico
5 quod demonstretur significative accepta etsi non demonstretur sub hac
intentione: significative accepta. Unde est idem dicere:

hec vox,

et:

hec vox significans animal rationale,

10 et ita est in proposito. Unde nullo modo potest esse mutua demonstra-
tio nisi accipiendo demonstrata materialiter quia qualitercumque aliter
demonstrarentur, demonstrantur ipsa significata. Et in tali casu num-
quam posset intellectus eius determinari circa illa significata, ymmo foret
circulatio | in infinitum ponendo semper significatum pronominis loco
15 pronominis, sicut manifeste patet sic dicto:

O 3ra

Hoc est verum,

idem foret dicere et dicere sic:

Hoc est falsum est verum

et loco huius pronominis | ponatur suum significatum sic

E4 161vb

20 Hoc est verum est falsum est verum.

Et ita numquam terminaretur intellectus, ymmo continue terminus unius
esset terminus alterius.

ad 7.1.1.2–1 Vel aliter dicitur quod licet per subiectum utriusque pos-
sit reliquum significari et hoc absolute neque | ut materialiter neque ut
25 significative, tamen subiectum A non supponit pro B nisi materialiter
acceptum. Non enim potest A denotare se esse veram pro B accepta sig-
nificative sine contradictione et ideo restringitur ne supponat pro B sic

E8 32vb

1 significative] significare E4 || demonstretur] demonstrative E8 || hoc] hec E4 3 Hoc]
homo E8 4 vero ut] non demonstretur E4 || materialiter] materia O || acceptam]
accepta E8 O 5 demonstretur¹] demonstratur dico quod demonstratur nec O nec *add.* E4
|| demonstretur²] demonstratur O 6 significative accepta] significatum E4 E8 9 sig-
nificans] significat O 10 ita] sic O 11 materialiter] materia O 12 demonstrarentur]
demonstratur E4 E8 || ipsa significata] ipsa significativa E4 *inv.* O 13 determinari]
demorari O || foret] esset O 15 pronominis] propositionis O || dicto] dicendo O
16 verum] vox O 18 verum] vox O 19 huius] *om.* O || ponatur] hoc O || suum
significatum] *inv.* E4 || sic] sicut E8 est O 20 Hoc ... verum] verum est falsum O ||
Hoc] est falsum *add.* E8 O || verum²] et loco huius pronominis ponatur suum signifi-
catum sic: hoc est falsum est verum est falsum *add.* E4 21 terminaretur] terminetur E4
|| intellectus] intentio O || continue terminus] ex illo casu (*dub.*) E4 22 esset] et E4
|| alterius] unius E4 E8 23 dicitur] potest dici O || licet] *om.* E4 23–24 possit] pos-
set E4 E8 24 absolute] et *add.* E8 || neque²] nec O 26 acceptum] accepta E4 E8 ||
denotare] demonstrare O 27 ideo] non E8 vero O || supponat] supponit O || sic]
simile O

significatively can be referred to even if ⟨this way of taking it⟩ may not be referred to by saying ‘taken significatively’. Thus speaking in this way:

This is a sound,

referring ⟨by ‘this’⟩ to the sound ‘man’, if it may indeed be referred to taken materially, I say that it may be referred to taken significatively even if it is not referred to under the intention ‘taken significatively’. For it is the same to say:

This sound,

and:

This sound signifying a rational animal,

and so it is in the present case (*sc.* of ‘this’ in A referring to B). For in no way can there be a reciprocal reference unless they are referred to materially, because however else they may be referred to, the significates are referred to. And in such a case ⟨the hearer’s⟩ comprehension could never be terminated regarding these significates, rather there would be an infinite ⟨referential⟩ circle always putting the significate of the ⟨demonstrative⟩ pronoun ⟨‘this’⟩ in place of the pronoun, as manifestly appears in an utterance like ⟨A⟩:

This is true,

to say which it would be the same to say:

‘This is false’ is true,

and to put its significate in place of the pronoun, like this:

“‘This is true’ is false’ is true.

And so the comprehension would never terminate, rather the term of the one would continually be ⟨replaced by⟩ the term of the other.¹⁵⁰

ad 7.1.1.2–1 Alternatively, one might reply that although each utterance can be signified by the subject of the other utterance and is so absolutely, neither materially nor significatively, yet the subject of A does not supposit for B unless it is taken materially. For A cannot mean itself to be true of B taken significatively without contradiction and for that reason ⟨A’s

¹⁵⁰ The threat of infinite regress described here is very similar to that described by John Dumbleton in his account of insolubles. See, e.g., Read, ‘The Calculators and the Insolubles’, pp. 147–48.

significative accepta, sed materialiter—et hoc posito quod alio modo non possit accipi nisi materialiter vel significative—sic ut significet A esse falsum. Et similiter subiectum ipsius B consimiliter restringitur ne supponat pro A sic significative accepta. Et secundum hoc facilis est responsio sicut patet intelligenti.

ad 7.1.1.2–2 Aliter dicitur ad hoc argumentum et probatur quod licet per hoc pronomen: hoc, possit indifferenter quodcumque singulariter significari, non tamen sequitur quod pro quocumque possit supponere respectu cuiuscumque copule vel respectu cuiuscumque predicati, sicut iste terminus ‘falsum’, quodlibet falsum significat et non tamen quodlibet falsum supponit respectu cuiuscumque copule, ut superius patuit. Et secundum istum modum dicendi facilis est responsio. Hec enim est falsa:

Hoc est falsum,

et non quia denotat hoc predicatum in(esse) A, sed quia est affirmativa et denotat predicatum inesse alicui pro quo subiectum supponit, cum tamen subiectum non supponat pro aliquo et ita denotat falsum sicut facit hoc:

Falsum dicitur a Sorte.

Et ita patet responsio ad hoc et ad omnia talia similia per que quidam nituntur probare quod universaliter pars potest supponere pro suo toto respectu cuiuscumque predicati vel copule, et hoc argumentum vocant achillem invictum cum tamen non deceat loripedem claudicantem militi tam strenuo comparare.

7.2 Alia sunt sophismata que videntur | esse insolubilia et non sunt.

E₈ 33ra

7.2.1 Ut hoc: sit A nomen cuiuslibet negative respondentis in ista disputatione et proponatur:

Tu es A.

Si negatur, contra: tu negative respondes, ergo tu es A per casum. Si conceditur, contra: tu affirmative respondes in hac disputatione, ergo non es A.

1 alio modo non] non alio modo O 2 possit] posset E₄ E₈ || materialiter vel significative] significative vel materialiter O 3 similiter] om. O || restringitur] restringatur E₈ O || ne] ut O || supponat] supponunt E₄ 4 accepta] accepit E₄ accepto O || sicut] ut O 6 et probatur] probabile O || licet] si E₄ 7 possit] posset E₄ E₈ 8 tamen sequitur] inv. O || quod] om. E₄ || possit] posse E₄ 9 respectu²] om. O || cuiuscumque²] om. E₈ O 10 et] om. O 10–11 quodlibet² falsum] pro quocumque falso O 11 copule] vel predicati add. O || superius] prius E₄ 12 enim] non E₈ 14 denotat] denotatur E₈ denotet O 16 subiectum] suppositum E₄ || supponat] supponit E₄ 21 cuiuscumque] cuiusdam E₄ || vel copule] om. O || hoc] hanc E₄ 22 achillem invictum] achilles invictus O || tamen] videtur E₄ || deceat] deiciat E₈ deiciant O || loripedem] loyci pedem O 22–23 militi ... comparare] unde immerito debet tam strenuo militi comparari E₄ unde merito debet tali strenuo militi comparari O 24 sophismata] om. O || esse] om. O 25 Ut] sicut O || hoc] hoc vel hic (dub.) E₄ hec E₈ || respondentis] responsive E₄ E₈ 28 contra] extra E₄ 29 in hac disputatione] om. O || ergo] tu add. O

subject) is restricted so that it does not supposit for B taken significatively, but materially—and this having assumed that it can only be taken materially or significatively—so that ⟨B⟩ signifies that A is false. And similarly, the subject of B is restricted likewise so that it does not supposit for A taken significatively. And according to that way of speaking the response is easy, as is clear to the one who understands it.¹⁵¹

ad 7.1.1.2–2 Another possibility is to reply to this argument by proving that although anything whatever could be indifferently signified singularly by the pronoun ‘this’, yet it does not follow that it could supposit for anything whatever, whatever the copula or whatever the predicate, just as the term ‘falsehood’ signifies any falsehood whatever and yet does not supposit for any falsehood whatever, whatever the copula, as is clear from the above ⟨chapters⟩. And according to this way of replying, the response is easy. For ⟨B⟩:

This is false

is false and not because it means that this predicate ⟨‘false’⟩ belongs to A, but because it is an affirmative and means that the predicate belongs to something for which the subject supposits while nonetheless the subject does not supposit for anything, and so it comes out false, just like:

A falsehood is said by Socrates.¹⁵²

And so the response is clear to this and to all similar arguments by means of which some people endeavour to prove that the part can supposit universally for its whole with respect to any predicate or copula whatever. They call this argument an “invincible Achilles”,¹⁵³ when, however, it is not fitting to compare a club-footed cripple to such a vigorous soldier.

7.2 There are other sophisms which seem to be but are not insolubles.

7.2.1 Like this: let A be the name of anyone responding negatively in this disputation and let:

You are an A

be proposed. If you deny it, on the contrary: you respond negatively, therefore you are an A by the scenario. If you grant it, on the contrary: you respond affirmatively in this disputation, therefore you are not an A.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹ Segrave seems here to take §7.1.1 to be an insoluble and so to be solved by his restrictivist account.

¹⁵² See §6.3.3 above. So perhaps Segrave thinks the example in §7.1.1 is an insoluble after all, and to be solved by the fallacy of accident.

¹⁵³ One of these people was Bradwardine: see his *Insolubilia*, §4.2.3 and §ad 4.2.3 (p. 168).

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §11.2. According to Pozzi, *Il Mentitore e il Medioevo*, p. 361, n. 266, this sophism is found also in Buridan, Marsilius of Inghen and Henry Hopton. However, in Buridan’s *Summulae* the sophism occurs in the explicit form ‘You will respond negatively’ (Buridan, *Summulae*, tr. Klima, p. 991, sophism 16; ed. Pironet, p. 179: *tu respondebis negative*). There is a sophism more similar to Segrave’s 7.2.1 in Marsilius’ *Insolubilia*, in the discussion of the fourth sophism in ch. 3 (ms Pal.lat. 995, f. 72v): “Sic solvitur hoc sophisma similiter: ponatur a significat omne negative responsurum et nullum alium et quod numquam respondebis nisi una responsione quam primo michi facies ad proposi-

7.2.2 Simile est: sit A nomen cuiuslibet aliter respondentis quam affirmative.

7.2.3 Simile est: proponatur hec:

Tu negative respondes in A,

- 5 sit A tempus in quo respondebis ad hanc [vel] <et> ad nullam aliam. Si conceditur, concedis falsum pro tempore pro quo est falsum, ergo male respondes. Si negetur, negetur verum pro tempore pro quo est verum etc.

ad 7.2.1–7.2.3 Ad ista et similia que capiunt veritatem vel falsitatem ex modo respondendi, modo respondendum est uno modo negando actum
10 propositum quia ex responsione negativa fiunt vera et ex affirmativa fiunt falsa.

ad 7.2.1 Et ideo cum proponitur hec:

Tu es A,

neganda est, et cum arguitur:

- 15 Tu negative respondes ad istam <ergo tu es A>,
neganda est non quia falsa, sed quia repugnans casui. Ex hac enim et casu sequitur unum quod in omni casu negandum est tamquam falsum si non fiat obligatio in contrarium. Sequitur enim:

- 20 Omnis negative respondens est A, tu negative respondes
ad istam, ergo tu es A,
ergo male respondes quia negas verum non obligatus. Istud debet semper defendi tamquam repugnans, et consequentia patet quia non sumus in casu ubi accidit insolubile cum nec ponatur hic verum nec falsum nec equivalens.

- 25 **7.2.1.1** Sed dices postquam: tales propositiones veritatem contrahunt si negentur, et falsitatem si concedantur; quare non debeo illas concedere et negare actum propositum ita bene | sicut negare illas.

E₈ 33rb

1 est] si *add.* O || aliter respondentis] *inv.* O 4 A] et *add.* O 5 respondebis] respondes O || hanc] illam O 6 conceditur] concedis O || pro²] *om.* O || ergo] tu *add.* O 7 negetur, negetur] negis negis O negatur E₄ || pro²] *om.* O 8 et] ad *add.* E₄ || vel] et E₄ 9 modo respondendum est uno modo] est uno modo respondendum O 10 ex²] responsione O 14–16 et ... est] *om. hom.* E₈ 17 est] *om.* E₄ 18 fiat] *om.* O 19 Omnis negative] aliquis negare O || est] ad *add.* O 20 ergo] *om.* E₄ E₈ 21 obligatus] et O 21–22 debet ... defendi] semper defendi debet O 21 debet semper] *inv.* E₄ 22 et] *om.* E₄ 23 ubi] nisi O || ponatur hic] ponitur nec O 25 tales] iste O 26 negentur] negantur E₄ O || et¹] *om.* O || debeo] concedis O

7.2.2 A similar one: let A be the name of anyone responding otherwise than affirmatively.¹⁵⁵

7.2.3 A similar one: let this be proposed:

You respond negatively at A,

where A is the time at which you will respond to this proposition and to no other. If you grant it, you grant a falsehood at the time at which it is a falsehood, therefore you respond wrongly. If you deny it, you deny a truth at the time at which it is a truth, (therefore you respond wrongly).

ad 7.2.1–7.2.3 To these and similar sophisms which derive truth or falsehood from the way of responding, one should respond in one way, (*viz*) by denying that response because from a negative response they become true and from an affirmative they become false.

ad 7.2.1 For that reason when this proposition:

You are an A,

is proposed, it should be denied, and when it is argued:

You respond negatively to this, (so you are an A),

this should be denied not because it is false, but because it is inconsistent with the scenario. For from this proposition together with the scenario, one conclusion should be denied in every scenario as false if no obligation to the contrary is set up (e.g. that you should respond affirmatively). For this inference is valid:

Everyone responding negatively is an A, you respond
negatively to this, therefore you are an A,

therefore you respond badly because you deny a truth while under no obligation (to do so). That conclusion should always be rejected as inconsistent, and the inference is clear because we are not in a scenario where an insoluble results since here neither ‘truth’ nor ‘falsehood’ nor an equivalent¹⁵⁶ term occurs.

7.2.1.1 But you may reply: these propositions become infected with truth if they are denied, and with falsehood if they are granted. Why should I not grant them and deny that response just as well as deny them?

tionem quam tibi proponam et tunc propositio i(s)ta est: tu non es a. Manifestum est enim quod in hoc casu idem est querere tu es a et tu es michi responsurus.” As for Hopton, the attribution of the treatise in question is questionable, and in any case the text is merely an adaptation of Bradwardine’s treatise (see Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, ‘Introduction’ p. 38): the sophism is found on ff. 18vb–19ra of the manuscript.

¹⁵⁵ See, e.g., Pironet, *Guillaume Heytesbury: Sophismata Asinina*, sophism 34 (pp. 327, 431, 481) and Synan, ‘The *Insolubilia* of Roger Nottingham, O.F.M.’, p. 270, §63; in §64 he replies that the proposition ‘Tu es A’ (‘You are an A’) should be doubted.

¹⁵⁶ See §6.13.1.

ad 7.2.1.1 Et dico quod causa est quia licet homo possit ita respondere, magis tamen inconveniens sequitur: qui concedit, ipse ponit quod significatur per concessum. Unde qui concedit se esse A, ponit se negative respondere, sed qui negat, nihil ponit. Ideo minus inconveniens accidit
 5 hic quam ibi.

ad 7.2–7.2.3 Aliter dicitur et bene quod ad tales propositiones, que veritatem capiunt ex hoc quod negantur a respondente et falsitatem ex hoc quod conceduntur, non est respondendum pro tempore quo dependent ex actu respondendi sed pro alio tempore quo non dependent.

10 **ad 7.2.3** Ut si proponatur hec:

Tu negative respondes,

ad istam non est respondendum pro tempore quo respondeo, sed pro alio tempore quia si respondeam pro illo tempore responsionis mee vel oportet negare verum pro tempore quo est verum vel concedere falsum
 15 pro tempore quo est falsum. Et ratio istius positionis est hec: quia veritas istius responsionis debet dependere ex veritate vel falsitate illius ad quod respondetur et non e contra, ymmo veritas illius ad quod respondetur presupponitur naturaliter ante realem concessionem istius et hoc pro tempore pro quo conceditur, etsi non in tempore in quo conceditur. Et
 20 secundum istum modum | patet responsio ad omnia talia satis facilis.

O 3rb

aliter ad 7.2.1–7.2.3 Aliter ad hec dicitur quod huiusmodi institutiones dependentes ut sic:

A ⟨est⟩ nomen cuiuslibet negative respondentis etc.

non sunt admittende nisi sub conditione quod non proponatur aliquod
 25 tale contrahens veritatem ex actu negandi nec falsitatem ex actu concedendi, sicut nec sunt huiusmodi institutiones admittende nisi sub conditione ut convertatur A cum isto termino: asinus in propositione vera et cum isto termino: homo in propositione falsa, | ista institutio non est admittenda

E₈ 33va

1 Et] *om.* E₄ || quia] *om.* E₄ || possit] posset E₄ E₈ || ita] bene *add.* O 2 qui] quia E₄ *om.* O || ponit] ponatur E₄ 3 Unde qui concedit] unum quem concedere O 4 Ideo] ergo O || accidit] est et sequatur O 9 ex] in *add.* E₄ || respondendi] *om.* E₄ 10 proponatur] proponitur 12 ad ... respondendum] *om.* O || pro¹] illo O || tempore] pro *add.* E₄ || respondeo] est responsio O 13 si] non *scr. et del.* O || responsionis mee] respondeo negative O 14 oportet] oporteret E₈ 15 tempore] pro *add.* E₄ || istius] huius O 15–16 est ... responsionis] est hec quia veritas responsionis *add.* mss 16 vel falsitate] vel falsitatem E₄ *om.* O 17 et non ... respondetur] *om.* hom. O 18 realem] lacuna in E₈ 19 pro] *om.* O 20 facilis] facilia E₄ faciliter O 21 huiusmodi] huius E₄ hee O 26 nec] *om.* O || huiusmodi] huius E₄ || nisi] nec O 28 ista institutio] institutio hac E₄ || non] *om.* E₄

ad 7.2.1.1 I reply that the reason is that, although a man can respond in this way, nonetheless a greater inconvenience ensues: one who grants anything affirms what is signified by what was granted. For that reason one who grants that he is an A claims that he responds negatively; but one who denies something, does not affirm anything. So a lesser inconvenience results from ⟨my response⟩ than from the other.

ad 7.2–7.2.3 Alternatively, one might reply, and correctly, that the response to these propositions, which become true from being denied by the respondent and become false from being granted, should not be given for a time at which the propositions depend on the act of responding, but for another time at which they are not dependent.

ad 7.2.3 E.g., if this:

You respond negatively

is proposed, the response to it should not be given for the time at which I respond, but for another time, because if my response is given for the time of my response, either it is necessary to deny a truth for the time at which it is a truth or to grant a falsehood for the time at which it is a falsehood.¹⁵⁷ And the reason for this solution is this: because the truth of this response ⟨*sc.* to ‘You respond negatively’⟩ should depend on the truth or falsity of that to which it is a response and not conversely; indeed, the truth of that to which it is a response is naturally presupposed before its actual granting, and this for the time for which it is granted, although not at the time at which it is granted. And according to this way of replying, it is clear that the response to all these sophisms is quite easy.

aliter ad 7.2.1–7.2.3 Alternatively, one might reply to these sophisms that this kind of dependent imposition,¹⁵⁸ like:

A ⟨is⟩ the name of anyone responding negatively etc.,

should only be admitted on the condition that nothing is proposed which becomes true from an act of denying or becomes false from an act of granting. So impositions of this kind should only be admitted on condition, e.g., the imposition that A converts with the term ‘ass’ in a true proposition and with the term ‘man’ in a false proposition¹⁵⁹ should only

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Burley, *Obligations*, tr. Kretzmann and Stump, §3.73.

¹⁵⁸ On dependent imposition (*institutio dependens*) see Burley, *De obligationibus*, ed. Green, §§1.14–1.22 (vol. II, pp. 37–38): “Dependent imposition is that which depends on an act of use [...] One rule given for dependent imposition is this: Dependent imposition should only be admitted on condition” (*Institutio dependens est quae dependet ab actu utentis [...] de institutione dependenti talis datur regula: institutio dependens non est admittenda nisi sub conditione*). (N.B. the section of Burley’s text on dependent imposition is omitted from Kretzmann and Stump’s translation.)

¹⁵⁹ This is an example of *institutio absoluta*: see, for example, Burley, *De obligationibus*, ed. Green, §§1.02–1.03, p. 35 (tr. Kretzmann and Stump, p. 371).

nisi sub hac conditione quod non coniugatur cum aliquo termino tali ubi sequitur, si tota propositio sit vera, quod sit falsa, ut hec:

Tu es A,

vel:

5 Homo est A,

vel:

Asinus est A

sequitur enim:

10 Hec est vera: Homo est A, ergo A convertitur cum isto termino: asinus, ergo est falsa.

Et sic patet ad talia.

7.3 Aliter paralogizatur sic: Multa sunt entia nomina non habentia, et hoc loquendo de nomine positivo; non enim est aliquid quin habeat vel nomen positivum vel privativum quia quodlibet est nominatum vel
15 innominatum. Tunc possibile est A esse nomen cuiuslibet innominati. Ponatur ergo inesse et demonstro aliquod tale; hec est vera:

Hoc est A

Et sequitur ultra: ergo est innominatum, per casum. Consequens tamen falsum quia A est nomen eius.

20 7.3.1 Simile est posito quod Sortes non habeat nunc nisi hoc nomen: Sortes. Possibile est A | imponi cuilibet non habenti duo nomina. Ponatur ergo inesse; vel ergo Sortes est A vel non, et patet deductio.

E₄ 162ra

ad 7.3 Ad ista dico quod hec est distinguenda:

possibile est A esse nomen cuiuslibet innominati

25 secundum divisionem et compositionem. In sensu composito est falsa, est enim sensus:

Hec est possibilis: A est nomen cuiuslibet innominati,

et hoc loquendo de nomine positivo, et hoc est falsum. Sensus divisus est verus et est sensus:

2 sequitur] quod *add.* O 5 est] omnis (*dub.*) *add.* E₄ 6 vel] *om.* E₄ E₈ 7 est] *om.* E₄ 8 enim] *om.* E₄ 9 Homo] hoc E₄ O || est A] *om.* O || A²] *om.* O ibi *vel* vel (*dub.*) *add.* E₄ 12 Aliter] sic *add.* E₄ 13 non enim] quia non O || aliquid] aliquod E₄ || quin] quod non O 14 vel nomen] *inv.* E₄ || vel²] nomen *add.* O || quodlibet] vel *add.* O 15 A esse] *inv.* O 16 Ponatur ergo] *iter.* O || hec] hoc E₄ 17 Hoc] hec E₄ 18 per casum] *om.* O || tamen] est *add.* O 20 est] enim O || nisi] unicum *add.* E₄ || hoc] istud O 22 ergo²] *om.* O 23 hec est distinguenda] distinguenda est hec O 25 divisionem et compositionem] compositionem et divisionem O || composito] et E₄ 26 est enim] et est E₄ 27 Hec est possibilis] *om.* O || est possibilis ... nomen] est nomen A est possibilis E₄ 28 divisus] divisionis E₄ 29 verus] verum E₈ O

be admitted on the condition that it is not conjoined with any term where it follows that if the whole proposition is true, it is false; e.g.,

You are an A,

or

A man is an A,

or

An ass is an A,

for this inference is valid:

‘A man is an A’ is true, therefore A converts with the term
‘ass’, therefore ‘A man is an A’ is false.

And so the response to such sophisms is clear.

7.3 A paralogism can be made in another way like this: There are many beings which do not have names, speaking here of positive names; for there isn’t anything which does not have a name, either positive or privative, because everything is named or unnamed. Then it is possible that A is a name of everything which is unnamed. So suppose that ⟨A⟩ applies ⟨to everything unnamed⟩ and I refer to such a thing. ⟨So⟩ this is true:

This is A,

and then by the scenario it follows that it is unnamed. Yet the conclusion is false because A is a name of it.¹⁶⁰

7.3.1 It is similar supposing that Socrates now has only this name ‘Socrates’. ⟨Then⟩ it is possible that A is imposed on everything not having two names. So suppose that ⟨A⟩ applies ⟨to everything not having two names⟩; so either Socrates is A or not. And the argument is clear.¹⁶¹

ad 7.3 I reply to these sophisms that:

It is possible that A is the name of everything unnamed should be disambiguated according to the divided and composite senses. In the composite sense it is false, for the sense is:

This is possible: A is the name of everything unnamed, and speaking of a positive name, this is false. The divided sense is true and the sense is:

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §11.4.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §11.3.

Cuiuslibet nunc innominati possibile est ut A sit nomen,
sicut illud quod nunc est album possibile est ut sit nigrum, tamen hoc
non est possibile album esse nigrum.

ad 7.3.1 Et eadem est responsio ad similia.

- 5 **7.4** Alia sunt sophysmata que videntur esse insolubilia et non sunt, ut:
Equivocum est univocum.

ad 7.4 Et illa | similiter solvenda sunt per distinctionem. Subiectum
enim propositionis respectu predicati secunde impositionis potest habere
suppositionem simplicem vel personalem. Si simplicem, vera est et est
10 sensus:

E₈ 33vb

- Hoc nomen equivocum est univocum,
et hec est vera quia significat omnia sua significata per unum nomen
et unam rationem. Diffinitio enim huius nominis: equivocum compe-
tit omnibus equivocis secundum quod sunt equivoca. Si autem habeat
15 suppositionem personalem, falsa est et est sensus:

Aliquod suppositum huius termini: equivocum est uni-
vocum,

sicut canis et consimilia, et hoc est falsum.

- 20 **7.5** Alia sunt sophysmata que ortum habent ex actu voluntatis et ista sunt
difficiliora aliis.

1 nunc] *om.* O || ut] quod O || nomen] et *add.* O 2 sicut] quod E₈ est *add.* O || illud]
om. O || est²] *om.* E₈ || ut sit] esse O || tamen hoc] et re (*dub.*) ex hoc E₄ 3 esse]
est O 4 est responsio] *inv.* O 5 esse] *om.* E₄ O || ut] *om.* E₄ 6 est univocum] cum
univoco E₈ 7 Et] *om.* O || similiter] similia E₄ || solvenda] dissolvenda E₈ 9–10 est
sensus] *inv.* O 11 equivocum ... univocum] est equivocum E₄ 12 hec] hoc O || est
vera quia] vera O 13 et] per *add.* E₄ || equivocum] *iter.* E₄ 14 omnibus equivocis]
inv. O || habeat] habeant O 16 est] si O 18 consimilia] similia E₄ talia O 19 et ista
sunt] *om.* E₄ E₈

Of anything now unnamed, it is possible that A be a name of it,

just as of what is now white it is possible that it be black; however, it is not possible that what is white is black.

ad 7.3.1 And the response is the same to the similar sophisms.

7.4 There are other sophisms which seem to be but are not insolubles, e.g., (An) equivocal is univocal.¹⁶²

ad 7.4 These sophisms should similarly be solved by means of a disambiguation. For the subject of a proposition can have simple or personal supposition with respect to a predicate of second imposition.¹⁶³ If ⟨the subject has⟩ simple ⟨supposition, the proposition ‘Equivocal is univocal’⟩ is true and the sense is:

This name ‘equivocal’ is univocal,

and this is true because it signifies all its significates by means of one name and one essential definition.¹⁶⁴ For the definition of the name ‘equivocal’ is applicable to all equivocals insofar as they are equivocals. But if ⟨the subject⟩ has personal supposition, then ⟨‘(An) equivocal is univocal’⟩ is false and the sense is:

Some suppositum of the term ‘equivocal’ is univocal,

like ‘dog’ and similar terms, and this is false.¹⁶⁵

7.5 There are other sophisms which derive from an act of will and they are more difficult than the others.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §11.1.

¹⁶³ On first and second imposition, see, e.g., Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, I 11. For this rule, see the first rule of equivocation, *ibid.*, III-4 ch. 4.

¹⁶⁴ See Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 1.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Bradwardine, *Insolubilia*, §ad 11.1.1.

¹⁶⁶ Some sophisms on acts of will, but not those presented by Segrave, are found in Kilvington’s *Questions on Aristotle’s Ethics*, ed. Michalowska, p. 153 ff. The fourth sophism in Marsilius’ *Insolubilia* reads: “The fourth sophism is like this: suppose that Socrates wants to eat if Plato wants to eat and otherwise not. Then it is asked whether Socrates want to eat. And if so, then Plato wants to eat, (and) furthermore, then Socrates does not want to eat. If it is said that (Socrates) does not (want to eat), then Plato wants to eat and furthermore, then Socrates wants to eat. Hence from first to last, if Socrates does not want to eat Socrates does want to eat” (Quartum sophisma sit tale: ponamus quod sortes volt comedere si plato volt comedere et aliter non est, et quod econtra plato volt comedere si sortes non volt comedere et aliter non est. Tunc queritur [utrum etc] utrum sortes volt comedere. Et si sic ergo plato volt comedere. Ultra ergo sortes non volt comedere. Si dicitur quod non, ergo plato volt comedere et ultra ergo sortes volt comedere, ergo de primo ad ultimum, si sortes non volt comedere sortes volt comedere). (Pal.lat. 995, f. 86r.) He adds (f. 86v): “Another sophism: Socrates wants to run if Plato wants to run and not otherwise, and Plato wants to run if Socrates does not want to run” (Aliud sophisma: sortes volt currere si plato volt currere et non aliter, et plato volt currere si sortes non volt currere), but doesn’t elaborate. The sophism ‘Socrates vult comedere’ is also found in Buridan, *Sophismata* (ed. Pironet, p. 183). The sophism ‘quod Sortes velit currere si Plato velit currere et aliter non, et quod Plato velit

7.5.1 Ut hoc posito quod Sortes velit aliquid, puta A—sit A aliquis effectus volubilis—sub ista conditione quod Plato velit illud et non aliter et quod Plato velit A sub ista conditione quod Sortes non velit illud. Iste casus patet per hoc quod voluntas est respectu impossibilium, ergo quilibet
 5 potest conditionare volitum per quamcumque conditionem sibi placuerit. Quero utrum Sortes vult A vel non. Si vult, ergo Plato vult per casum, et sequitur: Plato vult, ergo Sortes non vult per aliam partem casus, ergo (Sortes non vult A). Si non vult Sortes, ergo Plato vult per casum, et sequitur ultra: ergo Sortes vult, quia sub illa conditione vult Sortes, ergo
 10 posita conditione, ponitur ipsum velle.

7.5.2 Similiter: velit Sortes malum omnibus volentibus sibi malum et Plato e contra omnibus non volentibus sibi malum; aut | ergo vult Sortes Platoni malum vel non; et patet deductio.

Eg 34ra

7.5.3 Simile est: Maledicat Sortes omnibus maledicentibus sibi sic dicendo:
 15 Maledicantur omnes mihi maledicentes,
 et Plato e contra sic dicendo:
 Maledicantur omnes mihi non maledicentes.
 Aut ergo maledicit Sortes Platoni aut non; et patet deductio sicut in aliis.

ad 7.5.1 Ad primum dico quod hec est distinguenda:
 20 Sortes vult A sub hac conditione quod Plato velit A,
 et similiter alia pars casus ex eo quod potest esse conditionalis vel de conditionato extremo. Si utraque sit conditionalis, repugnat, sicut probat

2 Plato] Petrus *passim* O || et non aliter] *om.* O 3 A] istum O 4 per hoc quod] quia O || impossibilium] possibilem O 5 volitum ... conditionem] voluntatem sub quacumque conditione O || sibi] ubi E₄ || placuerit] placuit O 6 vult¹] velit O || Si] Sortes *add.* O || Plato vult] *inv.* E₄ 8 Sortes ... A] etc. *mss* 9 ergo¹] *om.* E₄ 11 Similiter] simile O || velit] est velud E₄ || malum²] *om.* E₄ 12 contra] converso O || aut ergo] *inv.* E₄ 13 vel] et O 15 omnes] communes O 15–17 maledicentes ... mihi] *om. hom.* E₄ 16–17 et Plato ... maledicentes] *om. hom.* O 18 aut] vel E₄ || sicut] et *add.* O 19 hec] ista O 20 quod] qua O || velit] vult O || A²] *om.* E₄ E₈

7.5.1 For example, suppose that Socrates wills something, e.g. A—where A is some willable object—on the condition that Plato wills ⟨A⟩ and not otherwise and that Plato wills A on the condition that Socrates does not will ⟨A⟩. The scenario is clear by the fact that the will embraces impossible things,¹⁶⁷ therefore anyone can impose any condition whatever on what is willed that pleases him. I ask if Socrates wills A or not. If he wills ⟨A⟩, then according to the scenario Plato wills ⟨A⟩ so it follows that Plato wills ⟨A⟩, whence according to the other part of the scenario Socrates does not will ⟨A⟩, and so ⟨Socrates does not will A⟩. If Socrates does not will ⟨A⟩, then according to the scenario Plato wills ⟨A⟩ so it follows that Socrates wills ⟨A⟩, because Socrates wills ⟨A⟩ on the condition ⟨that Plato wills A⟩. Therefore, when the condition is satisfied, his willing ⟨A⟩ ensues.

7.5.2 Similarly: let Socrates will bad things for everyone who wills bad things for ⟨Socrates⟩ himself and conversely let Plato will bad things for everyone who does not will bad things for ⟨Plato⟩ himself.¹⁶⁸ So either Socrates wills bad things for Plato or not; and the argument is clear.

7.5.3 It is similar supposing that Socrates bad-mouths everyone who bad-mouths him by uttering this:

Everyone who bad-mouths me should be bad-mouthed,
and Plato does the converse by uttering this:

Everyone who does not bad-mouth me should be bad-mouthed.¹⁶⁹

Then either Socrates bad-mouths Plato or not; and the argument is clear as in the other cases.

ad 7.5.1 To the first I say that this:

Socrates wills A under the condition that Plato wills A,
should be disambiguated, and the other part of the scenario similarly, because it can be a conditional proposition or one having a conditioned extreme.¹⁷⁰ If each is a conditional proposition, then they are inconsistent

curre si Sortes non velit currere et aliter non' occurs in Roger Roseth: see Murdoch, 'From Social into Intellectual Factors', in *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning*, p. 325 n. 95.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, III.5, 1111b22 ("Voluntas autem est impossibilibus, puta immortalitatis") in Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, ed. Gautier, p. 414, 16.17.

¹⁶⁸ The sophism 'Socrates wishes Plato evil' (*Socrates optat malum Platoni*) is found in Buridan's *Sophismata*, tr. Klima, p. 996, ed. Pironet, p. 185.

¹⁶⁹ This sophism is found in Buridan's *Sophismata* (tr. Klima, p. 995, ed. Pironet, p. 184).

¹⁷⁰ See, e.g., Paul of Venice, *Logica Magna: De Conditionalibus*, ed. and tr. Hughes, §1, pp. 2–6. It marks a scope distinction: taken as having a conditioned extreme, 'Socrates wills A on the condition that Plato wills A' reads: 'Socrates wills ⟨A⟩ on the condition that Plato wills A', that is 'Socrates wills, on the condition that Plato wills A, A'; taken as a conditional, it reads: 'On the condition that Plato wills A, Socrates wills A', that is, 'If Plato wills A, Socrates wills A'.

argumentum. Si de conditionatis extremis, sic est casus possibilis et tunc est sensus:

Sortes vult A sic conditionatum quod Plato velit illud ita
esse quod voluntas Sortis feratur non in A absolute, sed
in A sic conditionato,

sicut ego volo esse in luto cum centum marcis, et tamen (non) volo esse in luto.

Hoc posito dico quod neuter vult A, sed uterque vult A cum conditione vel conditionatim et sic numquam erit argumentum, quia ex illis de conditionatis extremis non sequuntur | ille conditionales. Non enim sequitur ex Sortem velle esse in luto cum centum marcis, ipsum velle esse in luto et quicumque conditio ponatur inesse.

O 3va

ad 7.5.2 Ad alia similiter est respondendum, unde qui habet voluntatem respectu alicuius universalis vel sub intentione universali solum, non habet voluntatem respectu alicuius particularis nisi conditionaliter, videlicet si ipsum contineatur sub illo | universali. Unde voluntas generalis non est voluntas respectu particularis nisi conditionata. Hoc posito neuter vult alteri malum simpliciter sed uterque vult malum conditionaliter, puta si ipsum contineatur sub illo generali in quod fertur sua voluntas.

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ad 7.5.3 Pro tertio sciendum quod maledicere non solum est dicere malum, sed dicere malum in predicando illud alicui cum voluntate ut illud sibi accadat. Unde neuter istorum vult malum alteri simpliciter, sed conditionaliter et secundum quid sicut nec in alio casu. Unde neuter malum dicit alteri nec alicui simpliciter, sed conditionaliter, puta si ille sit maledicens mihi vel si ille sit mihi non maledicens. Unde si non exprimatur illa conditio, tacite tamen intelligitur in illo generali, ergo etc.

Expliciunt insolubilia Magistri Walteri de Sexgrave de Anglia Amen.

3 sic] ita O || conditionatum] conditionatim E₈ conditionatus O 4 non] om. E₈ O || absolute] *add. in marg.* E₄ 6 marcis] mortis E₈ ducatis O || et tamen] ergo ego O 8 dico] om. O || uterque] utrumque E₈ O 9 conditionatim] conditionatus O || quia] om. E₈ || de] om. O 10 enim] om. E₄ 11 ex Sortem velle] ex eo quod Sortes velit O || marcis] mortis E₈ ducatis O || ipsum velle] quod ipse velit O 13 voluntatem] om. O 14 universalis] talis O 15 respectu] om. O || conditionaliter] conditionatus conditio autem O || videlicet] valet O 17 respectu] om. O 18 malum²] om. E₄ 19 sub] in O || fertur] ferretur E₄ E₈ 20 tertio] est *add.* O || maledicere] malum dicere E₄ 21 illud²] aliud E₈ animo O 22 malum alteri] *inv.* O 23 neuter] istorum *add.* O 23–24 malum dicit alteri] maledicit O 24 conditionaliter] ut *add.* O 25 vel] sibi ulterius *add.* O || mihi ... maledicens] om. *hom.* E₄ 26 tamen] om. O || illo] illa O || etc] Stude Antoni quia proderit tibi multum *add.* O 27 Expliciunt ... Amen] Magister Walterii de Sexgrave de Anglia etc. E₈ || Walteri] Gualteri O || de Sexgrave] *lac.* E₄ || de Anglia Amen] cuius anima requiescat in pace, completa per me Antonium de Monte. M^o III^c lxxxv^o die veneris quintodecimo mensis octobris post botos immediate O

with each other, as the argument shows.¹⁷¹ If each has a conditioned extreme, in this way the scenario is possible and then the sense is:

Socrates wills A so conditioned that Plato wills it so to be that Socrates' will is not directed towards A without qualification, but towards A conditioned in that way,

just as I will my being covered with mud for one hundred marks¹⁷², but I do <not> will my being covered with mud <without qualification>.¹⁷³

Having stated that, I reply that neither <Socrates nor Plato> wills A <without qualification>, but each wills A on a condition, that is, in a conditioned way,¹⁷⁴ and in this way the argument will never work, because from these propositions with conditioned extremes those conditional propositions do not follow. For from Socrates willing his being covered with mud for one hundred marks it does not follow that he wills his being covered with mud regardless of any condition imposed.

ad 7.5.2 One should respond to the other sophisms similarly, because anyone who has a will in respect of a universal object or one contained only under a universal intention, only has a will on a condition in respect of something partial, namely if that object is contained under that universal object. For that reason a general will is only a will in respect of something partial if the will is conditioned <in some way>. On that assumption, neither <Socrates nor Plato> wills bad things for the other without qualification, but each wills bad things on a condition, e.g. if it is contained under that general object towards which his will is directed.

ad 7.5.3 With regard to the third argument, recall that to bad-mouth is not only to say bad things, but to say bad things predicating them of someone while willing bad things to befall him. So neither of them wills bad things for the other unconditionally, but on a condition and subject to a qualification, just as in the first case (§ad 7.5.1). For neither <Socrates nor Plato> bad-mouths the other nor anyone without qualification, but on a condition, e.g. if he is bad-mouthing me or if he is not bad-mouthing me. Thus if the condition is not overtly expressed, nonetheless it <should be> tacitly understood in the general object, therefore <it is not without qualification, but conditional>.

Here end the insolubles of Master Walter of Segrave, from England.

¹⁷¹ In §7.5.1, the paradox is clearly elaborated by a sequence of conditionals.

¹⁷² A mark was two-thirds of a pound, that is, 13 shillings and fourpence. A hundred marks was a lot of money.

¹⁷³ The example is found in Burley, *De Puritate*, ed. Boehner, p. 87; tr. Spade, p. 175: see Read, 'Inferences', pp. 183–84.

¹⁷⁴ The adverb 'conditionatim' is not listed in Latham et al. (eds), *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources*, but is constructed in the same way as the adverbs 'copulatim' and 'disiunctim' (whose logical use is not recorded in the *Dictionary* either). All three expressions are found in, e.g., Maulfelt's *De suppositionibus* (see Read, 'Descensus copulatim: Albert of Saxony and Thomas Maulfelt', p. 74).